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This dissertation explores the interaction between filmmaking and the changing
exigencies of leftist political ideologies in China at different stages of modernity: semi-
colonial modernity, socialist modernity, and global modernity. Besides a historical
examination of the left-wing cinema movement in the 1930s and socialist cinema in the
Mao era, it focuses on the so-called "main melody" films that are either produced with
financial backing by the state or sanctioned by governmental film awards in 1990s China.
As products of globalization, Chinese "main melody" films are growing in complexity
and maturity with the deepening of globalization, especially in competition with
Hollywood cinema. Inspired by Louis Althusser, this dissertation attempts to address the
lacunae of existing scholarship on Chinese "main melody" films by analyzing the role of
the film medium as a significant ideological state apparatus (ISA) in serving ideological
transitions occurring in 1990s China. Meanwhile, it also examines how the operation of
vthe ideological mechanism in Chinese "main melody" films is different from the
Althusserian definition. An examination of the polyphonic narration of history shows
how the revolutionary history has been retold in "main melody" films in different ways to
create a rich discursive space in post-socialist China. Special attention has also been paid
to the cinematic representation of Chinese nationalism, contending that the instigation of
nationalism in non-EuroAmerican societies--despite the fact that nationalism can be
easily appropriated by the state as an effective ideological discourse to conceal domestic
social conflicts--calls attention to the often ignored historical linkages between
colonialism and the expanding global capitalism. In addition, it also examines the role of
Chinese intellectuals in the discursive construction of nationalism. An analysis of
Chinese masculinity shows that recent changes in gender discourse are closely related to
China's socio-economic development in the era of globalization. Based on Stuart Hall's
"encoding/decoding" model, the last part of this dissertation explores how the Chinese
spectator as a subject can negotiate the ideological interpellation by the "main melody"
film text in his/her own way.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As a socially significant mass medium of education, propaganda, and
entertainment, Chinese cinema did not receive the international attention it deserved until
the mid-1980s, partly because ofthe inaccessibility of Chinese cinema in the
international market, and partly because of a deep-rooted political hostility against
Communism during the Cold War era, which viewed Chinese cinema produced under the
socialist regime as a tool of propaganda and brainwash. Since the mid-1980s, with the
appearance of some Chinese films, especially those made by the so-called Fifth
Generation filmmakers, at major international film festivals, Chinese cinema has become
the focus of intense interest amongst some Western film critics. Chinese film studies has
become one of the fastest growing and most vibrant academic fields in the West, which,
in return, created an echo in China, thanks to the increasing cultural communication
between China and the West. Since the late 1980s, Chinese filmmakers and critics have
begun to reexamine the history of Chinese cinema and map its future in a global
perspective.
The flourishing of Chinese film studies, internationally as well as domestically, is
the very product of the tides of globalization. During the Cold War era, although cultural
exchanges between China and the West were not completely shut down due to the
political confrontation, they were very limited. In terms of cinema, just as most Western
2films could not be released in the Chinese film market, so was Chinese cinema not
exhibited and distributed in the West. It was the end of the Cold War that brought about a
global marketwhere some Chinese films were introduced to the world and became
transnational cultural productions. The appearance of Chinese cinema at the international
film festivals, however, could not be regarded simply as a cultural matter, just as the end
of the Cold War was not merely a political matter. Both foretold the powerfulness of the
oncoming global capitalism at an unprecedented pace. Has the end of the Cold War >
melted away all the ideological messages that had been heavily encoded in Chinese
cinema during the socialist years? Will ideological confrontations no longer be the
fundamental source of conflict in the global era? Is global politics entering a new phase
that is dominated by the clash of civilizations, as claimed by Samuel Huntington? At least
in China, the last socialist country, or post-socialist country, in the world, there are no
quick answers for these questions.
As an indispensable part of the visual culture, cinema has played an important
role in the process of nation-building and globalization. This dissertation explores the
interaction between filmmaking and the changing exigencies of leftist political ideologies
in China at different stages of modernity: semi-colonial modernity, socialist modernity
and global modernity, with the main body of the dissertation focusing on the so-called
zhuxuanlii or "main melody" films of the global era. For those who are not familiar with
this term, I would like to give a brief definition here. Film industry in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) was under direct control of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). Socialist cinema was first of all an important tool of propaganda. In comparison,
3both its economic value and entertaining function were less important. However, a reform
in the Chinese film industry since 1984 resulted in an excessive development of
entertainment productions, especially martial arts films, which was obviously a profit-
driven phenomenon. In order to stress the propaganda function of cinema, in 1986, the
CCP government borrowed zhuxuanlii, originally a musical term meaning "main melody"
or "leitmotif," to define an official guideline in filmmaking. As this new term connotes,
entertainment productions can be permitted only when the mainstay of the filmmaking
continues to produce films that promote the Party leadership and (post-) socialism.
However, filmmakers did not follow the Party call at that time; they were more interested
in exploring how to make successful entertainment films. After the Tiananmen Incident
in 1989, in order to accomplish an ideological transition from Socialism to post-
Socialism and reinforce the Party's control, the government-sponsored "main melody"
films have been vigorously promoted. They are either produced with financial backing by
the government or sanctioned by governmental film awards. Compared with other
domestic productions, "main melody" films always have been given the best screening
times. Some of them were extremely popular and well received by Chinese audiences. In
this dissertation, I treat "main melody" films as a film category rather than a film genre
because it is difficult to identify a consistent stylistic dimension in "main melody" films.
In terms of thematic motifs, "main melody" films also display a rich variety; important
motifs include: the revolutionary history of the CCP, socialist development after 1949,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and achievements of the "open and reform" policy.
Therefore, rather than defining "main melody" films thematically or stylistically, I
4choose to take them as a film category based on their ideological function- serving the
legitimacy of the CCP in China since 1990. To simplify matters, I use the Huabiao
Awards, a governmental award established in 1994 to judge if a film is "main melody" or
not. Almost all films I discussed in the second part of this dissertation are on the Huabiao
list.
Two main reasons have led me to choose "main melody" films as the object of
my research. First, my research on "main melody" films attempts to address the lacunae
of existing scholarship on Chine~e film studies. Film productions in China can be roughly
divided into three categories: art cinema, entertainment films and government-sponsored
"main melody" films (Sometimes a film can be put into more than one category). In
terms of film consumption, we have to add another important category-imported foreign
films, especially Hollywood films since the mid-1990s. However, current Chinese film
studies is concentrated on a few films with international reputation, mainly works of the
Fifth and Sixth Generation filmmakers, or art cinema in general, despite the fact that most
of these films have very limited influence in China. For example, Chen Kaige's Haizi
Wang (King of the Children) had no copy sold in China; but after being shown at a few
international film festivals, it became a hot topic in several works of Chinese film studies.
As a matter of fact, if we consider the annual feature film productions in China, films
made by the Fifth Generation since the mid-1980s and the Sixth Generation since the
mid-1990s have never been the mainstay of film production and consumption in the
Chinese film market. In the 1980s, besides Chinese audiences' persistent ardor for
foreign-produced films, box office revenues were mainly collected from Xie Jin's
5political melodramas as well as a few entertainment filmmaking experiments. On the
other hand, when I decided my topic three years ago, there was no academic study on any
"main melody" films, especially in the English-speaking world. In other words, there has
been an uneven development between Chinese film studies and the film production and
consumption in the Chinese film market. As some scholars have poignantly pointed out,
it was the legacy of Orientalism and the Cold War attitude that contributed to a false
prosperity of Chinese cinema in the international film market. l Consequently, Chinese
film studies in the English-speaking world has been affected. Although a few essays on
"main melody" films were published in the past three years, there is still no systematic
study of this important film category. By focusing my attention on "main melody" films,
as systematically as I can do, I believe that this dissertation will fill a gap in current
Chinese film studies.
Secondly, my study aims to examine the ideological significance of Chinese
cinema in a post-socialist global context. As I mentioned, "main melody" films have been
largely neglected in Chinese film studies, especially by the English-speaking world.
Sometimes when these films are referenced, they are merely treated as oversimplified
works of propaganda. Therefore, the crucial ideological significance of "main melody"
films is seriously underestimated. It suggests that a political-oriented film does not
deserve any serious academic attention because politics no longer plays a leading role
compared with culture, or capital, with which I cannot agree. In my point of view, such
an underestimation, as Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations, conspires to the global
I Dai Jinhua, "A Scene in the Fog: Reading the Sixth Generation Films," in Cinema and Desire: Feminist
Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work ofDai Jinhua (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 71-98.
expansion ofcapitalism. I argue throughout the dissertation that images on the screen
reflect politics in everyday life, which not only applies to Chinese "main melody" films
exclusively, but cinema in general.
My theoretical approach in this project is basically an ideological analysis.
Inspired by Louis Althusser, this dissertation examines the role of the "main melody"
films as an important ideological state apparatus (ISA). Althusser claimed that compared
with the singular repressive state Apparatus, there is a plurality of ISAs, and its operation
is full ofcontradictions. My examination of"main melody" films reveals the
contradictory character of ideological operation. Meanwhile, I also want to examine how
the ideological operation in Chinese "main melody" films is different from the
Althusserian definition. According to Althusser, the ISAs as a body are not immediately
visible, and ideology never says, "I am ideological." Once the mechanism of ideology is
exposed, it can no longer work effectively. In 1990s' China, the co-existence of "main
melody" films with many "non-main melody" films, mainly domestic entertainment
productions and Hollywood blockbusters, means the ideological function of "main
melody" films has been brought to light: Chinese audiences know exactly that "main
melody" films intend to convey certain ideological messages. However, many "main
melody" films achieved considerable success in the domestic market, and some even
defeated Hollywood blockbusters. It seems that the exposing of the ideological intention
causes no vital damage to the ideological operation of the "main melody" films. A
possible answer to this theoretical paradox, I would like to argue, lies in the fact that the
1990s' China was undergoing an unprecedented ideological transition, and "main
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7melody" films have provided the audience a way to keep up with this transition. That is
to say, Chinese people's uneasiness with the social changes, especially the expansion of
global capitalism, to some extent, has facilitated the successful ideological operation of
"main melody" films in post-socialist China. But this does not mean that the audiences
fully identify with ideological messages conveyed by the "main melody" films. I will also
question the Althusserian notion of interpellation by examining the subjectivity of
Chinese audiences when watching "main melody" films.
In addition to ideological analysis, I attempt to combine culture studies with film
studies in order to emphasize the importance of the context in reading films, trying to
answer questions such as why and how a given "main melody" film gets produced, what
kind of specific political message it carries, and to what extent its audiences will be
successfully targeted. A textual-based approach has dominated film studies over years,
while cultural studies pays more attention to the circulation and consumption of cultural
products. By combining them together, I wish to offer a comprehensive understanding of
"main melody" films in their socio-political context. For example, my reading of Xie
Jin's huge-budgeted "main melody" film Yapian Zhanzheng (The Opium War) is based
not only on the film text, but also its production and consumption context- the hand
over of Hong Kong in 1997. This contextualization shows how a cinematic narration of
"a century of humiliation" actually works as a national celebration of the CCP regime. As
shown at the end of the film, the Qing government ceded HK to the British after being
defeated in the Opium War. In 1997, when China resumed its territorial rights on Hong
8Kong, the CCP leadership, although absent in the film narration, was constructed as a
powerful regime that finally could carry out fair play with the West.
Thirdly, this dissertation also attempts to examine "main melody" films and the
Chinese film industry from a political economy perspective. As products of globalization,
Chinese "main melody" films are growing in complexity and maturity with the deepening
ofglobalization, especially in competition with Hollywood cinema. In this context,
Chinese cinema has to be taken into account as an important section of cultural industry
that should bring in economic benefits. I will explore the Chinese government's efforts in
reorganizing the film industry and producing more successful "main melody" films to
compete with Hollywood blockbusters.
In brief, my interdisciplinary approach in this dissertation aims to counteract the
textual-focus methodology in film studies, offering a more comprehensive understanding
of Chinese cinema. I have to admit that this is a very ambitious project and I always have
trouble to ~trike balances between different approaches. Even at this moment, I'm still
not sure to what extent I have accomplished my ambition. But I believe that it is a task
worthy of trying.
Before the 1980s, the orthodox Chinese language scholarship on the pre-1949
Chinese cinema is Zhongguo dianyingJazhan shi (The History of the Development of
Chinese Cinema) by Cheng Jihua in collaboration with Li Shaobai and Xing Zuwen,
which was originally published in 1963 and republished in 1980 after having been
banned as "poisonous weeds" at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
Meanwhile, as opposed to Cheng's history of Chinese cinema that is "so extremely
9orthodox in attitude and in structure," Jay Leyda's Dianying: an Account ofFilms and the
Film Audience in China (1972) is the only available source for Chinese film studies in the
English-speaking world. French film historian Regis Bergeron also published Le cinema
chinois, 1905-1949 in 1977.
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a veritable explosion of scholarship on
Chinese cinema. With an acute awareness that "Chinese cinema is beginning to receive
serious attention in Western academic circles for the first time now," Chris Berry edited
Perspectives on Chinese Cinema in 1985 and expanded it in 1991. Paul Clark's Chinese
Cinema: Culture and Politics since 1949 (1988) is an important study of Chinese cinema
during its socialist years. New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics, co-edited by
Nick Browne, Paul Pickowicz, Vivian Sobchack, and Esther Yau, was published in 1994
and has become one of the most important collections on Chinese film studies. Rey
Chow's Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary
Chinese Cinema (1995) is an influential work of Chinese film studies framed by
•
postcolonial theories. In Transnational Chinese Cinema: Identity, Nationhood, Gender
(1997), Sheldon Lu also tries to construct a pan-Chinese film studies from a transnational
perspective.
The approach of the hundredth anniversary of Chinese cinema (1905-2005)
caused another wave of re-evaluating the Chinese contribution to the development of
world cinema over the past century, practically as well as theoretically. In China, several
new versions of the history of Chinese cinema were published recently. For example, Xin
zhongguo dianyingshi: 1949-2000 (A History of Cinema in New China: 1949-2000,
10
2002) by Yin Hong and Ling Yan portrays how Chinese cinema has transformed from a
monistic political tool to a pluralistic artistic medium and a popular entertainment
industry. Dangdai dianying luncong (Series on contemporary Cinema) collects almost
all-important essays published in Dangdai dianying (Contemporary Cinema), one of the
most influential filmjoumals in China. Published in the U.S., 100 Years ofChinese
Cinema, as the editors claim, offers "a sweeping panorama of the evolution of the
cinemagraphic arts in China in its historical context and through insightful critical
analyses of major representative films from different generations offilrnmakers." Besides
works focusing on films made by the Fifth and Sixth Generation, studies on films made
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese have also attracted considerable attention.
Thanks to silent film festivals, early Chinese cinema has aroused the interest of a few
scholars. For example, An Amorous History ofthe Silver Screen, Shanghai Cinema,
1896-1937 by Zhang Zhen provides "a rich and comprehensive review of the early
Chinese movie industry," as reviewed by David Wang. In Projecting a Nation: Chinese
National Cinema Before 1949, Hu Jubin addresses the issue of Chinese nationalism as
being part of the complex history of cinema in the early modern Chinese nation.
Based on the above-mentioned scholarship on Chinese cinema, my dissertation is
divided into two parts. Part I examines the development of the leftist ideas in Chinese
cinema at different stages of modernity; semi-colonial modernity, socialist modernity,
and global modernity in three chapters. It not only highlights the relationship between
Chinese cinema and the formation of Chinese modernity, but also provides a historical
context to observe the development of "main melody" films in the 1990s.
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Chapter 2 begins with a review of the birth of the Chinese film industry,
examining the interaction between politics, domestically as well as internationally, and
the development of Chinese cinema, especially the Left-wing Film Movement in the
1930s. I argue that the Chinese film industry was a product of semi-colonial modernity,
and a persistent resistance to the very semi-colonial situation accompanied its
development. Drawing from ideas of both Chinese film critics and Western scholars, a
reflection on the relationship between cinema and politics aims to stress the theoretical
significance to study the ideological function of the film medium.
In Chapter 3, I examine the politics and aesthetics of socialist cinema in the Mao
era. Mao's Yan'an Talk is my point of departure because it decided the direction of
cinema in socialist China-serving the Party politics. A reading of a classic socialist
cinema Baimaonu (The White-haired Girl) shows how class discourse and gender coding
were integrated to form socialist aesthetics, especially in terms of how gender coding was
used to serve class struggle. By examining filmmakers' efforts in developing a national
style in socialist cinema, I want to bring attention to the role of cinema in developing a
socialist modernity under a Cold War background.
The end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization made the issue of
national identity more complicated than before. Chapter 4 examines how political and
economic reforms initiated by the CCP government since 1984 have changed the Chinese
film industry in a global context. As important cultural productions that serve the CCP
legitimacy in post-socialist China, both the quality and quantity of "main melody" films
were increased in the 1990s. In order to compete with Hollywood, the industrial
12
reorganization of the Chinese film industry has taken the form of "state capitalism." On
its way to global modernity, how the CCP tries to work out the contradiction between its
socialist legacy and capitalist agenda has been vividly represented in "main melody"
filmmaking. A following case study "Disney in China" examines how global capitalism
operates in China and the reaction from the Chinese government. It discusses issues of
cultural imperialism, and local resistance.
Part II focuses on how new cinematic languages have been invented in "main
melody" films to serve the ideological transition occurring in post-socialist China, and to
cope with changes in the global era as well. In addition to an examination of three related
themes: narration of history, nationalism, and Chinese masculinity, I also explore the
issue of Chinese spectatorship.
The rewriting of history is the most significant characteristic of "main melody"
films. Chapter 5 borrows a term "polyphonic" from Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of
polyphonic novels to describe narrative strategies in "main melody" films. Bakhtin
defines Dostoevsky's novels as polyphonic novels, in which the character's voice is
never ultimately overpowered by that of the narrator. My use of the term polyphonic
emphasizes the co-existence of different ways ofhistorical narration in "main melody"
films that are diverted from that of socialist cinema. Three films have been examined in
detail in this chapter: Dajuezhan (The Great Decisive War), a trilogy about the three
military campaigns launched by the Communists to defeat the Nationalists during the
civil war, gained considerable popularity in China with a distinctive epic narration; Wade
1919 (My 1919) recalls one important historical moment, the Paris Peace Conference
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after the WWI, in a highly personalized memoir style; and Likai Lei/eng de rizi (Days
Without Lei Feng) depicts a story of an ordinary people in post-socialist China who
inherits the spirit ofa selfless socialist hero. The polyphonic narration ofhistory creates a
rich discursive space in a quickly commercialized Chinese society, each with their special
ideological function.
In chapter 6, special attention is paid to the issue of Chinese nationalism. In
addition to the argument that nationalism can be easily appropriated by the state as an
effective ideological discourse to conceal domestic social conflicts, I contend that the
instigation of nationalism in non-EuroAmerican societies also calls attention to the often
ignored historical linkages between colonialism and the expanding global capitalism. For
example, in My 1919 and Hengkong chushi (Magnificent Birth), a film on China's
nuclear testing in the 1960s, a shared theme of"China can say no" speaks directly to a
strong nationalist sentiment against the West in contemporary China. This chapter also
examines how Chinese intellectuals have been involved in the discursive construction of
nationalism.
In Chapter 7, I analyze discourses ofOrientalism and Occidentalism in the
cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity. We all know that Said's notion
Orientalism as a system of discourse that constructs the images of the East in the eyes of
the West. The Westerners often assume an authoritative position to read the non-Western
"Others" as feminized objects, which has been vividly embodied in many Hollywood
productions. The "Zhang Yimou model," which features "young women with numerous
pseudo-traditional Chinese rituals," has been charged by many critics as self-Orientalism
14
that caters to the taste of the western audiences. In reverse, Occidentalism is about how
the East views the West. It has been an important discursive system in modem China.
Chinese masculinity has a rich representation in mass media. In this chapter, I shall focus
on one predominant theme: cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity in contrast to
Western masculinity. Occidentalism plays a crucial role in the cinematic imagination of
Chinese masculinity in "main melody" films. For example, Huanghe juelian (Grief over
the Yellow River) tells a story of how an American pilot is rescued by the Chinese during
the WWII. In contrast to the American pilot, there are three male Chinese characters, two
widowers and one sexually impotent. Although their male identity may be problematic
viewed from an individual perspective, masculine characteristics emerge through
nationalism once they form a collective male group to fight for the nation. It is in the
mirror of American masculinity that a traumatized Chinese masculinity regains its vigor.
In Chongchu yamaxun (Charging out Amazon), two Chinese soldiers not only defeat
their Western classmates during an intensive military training, one even wins the
admiration of a western female. This masculine imagination of China on the international
stage is closely related to China's socio-economic development in the era of globalization
and the rising of nationalism.
Based on Stuart Hall's "encoding/decoding" model, the last chapter explores how
the Chinese spectator can negotiate the ideological interpellation from "main melody"
films. It is one of my efforts in combining cultural studies with film studies. Hall argues
that the dominant ideology is typically inscribed as the "preferred reading" in a media
text, but that cannot be automatically adopted by receivers. According to him, there are
15
three kinds of readings: "dominant readings" are produced by those whose social
situation favors the "preferred reading," "negotiated readings" are produced by those who
can alter the "preferred reading" by taking account of their own social position, and
"oppositional readings" are produced by those whose social position puts them into direct
conflict with the "preferred reading." Due to the ideological transition occurring in
1990s' China, these three kinds of readings have happened simultaneously to "main
melody" films. For example, the success of films that promote model CCP members, I
would like to argue, comes from the common people's deep dissatisfaction with the status
quo in 1990s' China, especially their great resentment towards the issue of corruption.
The box office winner in 2000, Shengsi jueze (Life and Death Decision), aims to glorify
the Party leadership in the anti-corruption campaign. But "oppositional reading" reveals
that the audiences are more interested in viewing the corrupt secrets that are generally
unavailable in mass media.
As Part II shows,.as an important ideological state apparatus in 1990s' China,
"main melody" films have also played an important role in developing Chinese
modernity iIi the global era. In this process, the reconfiguration of Chinese subject
happens at two opposite levels simultaneously: one is based upon the ideological
interpellation from the "main melody" film; the other comes from a subjective agency
that is capable of decoding the interpellation critically.
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CHAPTER II
WHEN CINEMA MET POLITICS: THE LEFT-WING FILM MOVEMENT IN CHINA
When the motion-picture camera was first invented at the end of the 19th century,
it was used either to record scenes of daily life, making a realistic simulacrum of a "living
picture", such as Lumiere brothers' early works, or to create a technological wonderland
through trick effects, of which Georges Melies' Le Voyage dans la Lune (1902) is a
telling example. By combining characteristics of other art forms, from painting to
sculpture, from music to literature, cinema quickly grew into an ideal medium for
reaching the masses. Some artists devoted themselves to the creative potential of this new
art form, while many businessmen concerned more with its promising commercial future.
Film historians generally take April 14, 1894-the date when New York City opened the
world's first Kinetoscope-as the commercial beginning of the motion picture industry in
the United States.! Before America achieved its dominance in world cinema, the
pioneering French and British filmmakers had occupied the forefront of the film
technique in its early years.
This chapter examines the early years of the film industry in the semi-feudal and
semi-colonial China, paying special attention to the development of the left-wing film
movement in the 1930s. The late 19th and the early 20th century also witnessed the
I Tino Balio, ed., The American Film Industry (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 14.
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expansion of new imperialism. Japan and the United States joined and accelerated the
colonial expansion initiated by European powers. Accompanying the imperialist powers'
aggressive competition for overseas territorial acquisitions, film technique was
introduced into many colonized countries. By projecting moving images onto the silver
screen, cinema could offer its audiences passive escapist entertainment, spaces of creative
imagination, or other things, depending on individuals' different interests as well as their
specific socio- historical circumstances. The encounter between the film medium and the
political turmoil at given historical conjunctures, as shown in the rising ofthe left-wing
film movement, sheds light on the characteristics of the film medium that are more
complex than those of other mass media. Furthermore, recent debates about globalization
that have been so dominating among scholars in humanities and social science also
inspire me to situate "national cinema" in a broader cultural and political perspective. The
international power configuration in which China was falling at the hands of the
imperialism was the spark that ignited the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist sentiments
among Chinese in the 1930s, therefore a strong will to achieve national independence
spread throughout the left-wing film movement. How the left-wing filmmakers gradually
mastered the film medium in order to disseminate their leftist ideas will be explored
through two films-Chuncan (Spring Silkworms, 1933) and Yuguangqu (Song of the
Fishermen, 1935). The following theoretical discussion on the interwoven relationship
between filmmaking and the changing exigencies of leftist political ideologies in China
aims to bring attention to the political significance of the film medium.
18
Colonial Modernity and the Birth of the Chinese Film Industry
In the narratives of Chinese modernity, "the occlusion of (semi-) colonialism," a
trend in social science writings that shaped Cold War China studies, as Tani E. Barlow
has convincingly argued, created an exceptionalist China that prevented the U.S. from
ending up on the wrong side, that is, the side of imperialism and colonialism.2 Or, as
Andrew Jones interprets further, this occlusion precluded an engaged analysis of the
intertwining of capitalist modernity and imperialism on a global scale.3 Therefore,
Barlow calls for a post-Cold War project that requires "the construction of critical
genealogies across national boundaries" to confront "the massive history of global
European colonialism.,,4 In the rethinking of the correlation of modernity and
colonialism, "colonial modernity" has become a productive theory to interrogate the
formation of modernity throughout a socio-historical perspective. As other modem
phenomena arisen in the early 20th century's China, the birth of the Chinese film industry
cannot be examined more comprehensively through the framework of colonial
modernity.
Compared with Western European countries and the U.S., China at the end of the
19th century was falling behind, especially in terms of its modem scientific development.
The Celestial Empire was experiencing its most humiliating moment under the threat of
the Western gunboat. A series of unequal treaties put China at the mercy of the Western
powers. However, the fact that China became a semi-colonial country with many foreign
2 Tani E. Barlow, Formations o/Colonial Modernity in East Asia, 1997,374-375.
3 Andrew Jones, Yellow Music (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 8.
4 Tani E. Barlow, 1997,398.
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territories contributed to the birth of its film industry. In 1896, film as a new technology
and form of entertainment was introduced into China. Soon after, short films were
exhibited regularly as part of variety shows in Shanghai, then the most prosperous treaty
port in China. It was phrased in Chinese as yingxi or dianying, which literally means "the
shadow play of electricity." In the following years, Chinese urbanites saw more and
more foreign-produced dianying, most from France and the U.S. Movie going became
one important symbol of modem life. In other words, if we could provisionally agree that
"semi-colonial" was the socio-historical condition of China at the tum of the 20th century,
then the Chinese film industry was the very product of this condition. When foreign films
were regularly shown in Chinese cities, most film companies set up in China prior to
1917 were financed with foreign capital. 5 Western businessmen were then the main
investors in the Chinese film industry. They controlled not only film production, but film
distribution and exhibition as well. For example, the first Chinese feature film Nanfu
nanqi (The Difficult Couple, 1913) was produced by the American-invested Yaxiya
yingxi gongsi (Asia Shadow Play Company).6 For example, Spanish businessman B.
Goldenberg had owned the biggest chain theater in Shanghai, and monopolized Shanghai
film distribution for many years until he left China with a big fortune in 1926.7
The fact that film companies in China during this period were either foreign-
invested or privately owned, argues film historian Hu Jubin, demonstrates that both the
5 For the activities of the foreign film companies in China, see Li Suyuan and Hu Jubin, Zhongguo wushen
dianying shi (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1996), 2-23, 100-104.
6 Cheng Jihua et aL Zhongguo dianyingjazhan shi (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1982), 16-19.
7 Cheng Jihua et aL 12.
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Chinese government and major political parties had yet to realize cinema's ideological
significance.8 Another possible reason, in my point of view, lies in that most Chinese
investors were unable to compete with their Western rivals in obtaining even a small
portion of the domestic film market, in terms of both capital and technology. The Euro-
American imperialist expansion in semi-colonized China directly served their pursuit of
profits, and the opium trade was a telling example. Although cinema is fundamentally
different from opium or other traditional products because of its cultural nature, what
deserves special attention is its economic and technological nature. Filmmaking generally
requires a higher budget. Once a film copy is produced, however, as Thomas Guback has
pointed out correctly, huge profits will come in with a rather lower print and distribution
fee, so that film distribution becomes the most important factor for making a profit.9 The
bigger the market a film can reach, the more money it can make. In this sense, the
importance of an overseas market for capital accumulation cannot be viewed more clearly
than in the film industry. Not surprisingly, all colonized and semi-colonized countries
became the markets of the Western film industry. Foreign films, especially those from
Hollywood, were the predominant presence in the Chinese film market up to 1949,
accounting for as much as 90 percent of the market. lO
Under such an aggressive importation, the development of the Chinese film
industry was greatly hampered. It was until the establishment of the Motion Picture
8 Hu Jubing, Projecting A Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2003), 45.
9 Thomas Guback, The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America since 1945
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), 30.
10 Sheldon Lu, ed., Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1997), 4.
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Department of the Commercial Press in 1917 that Chinese national capital began to
finance film production in order to promote education. With an acute awareness of the
negative social values conveyed by foreign films released in China, the Commercial
Press also aimed to enlighten Chinese people by producing films that could promote
Chinese culture. I I These efforts brought home vividly the tenuous struggle between the
colonizer and the colonized in the cultural domain. Nevertheless, the Commercial Press
could not change the prevalently marginal situation of the Chinese film industry single-
handedly. Most Chinese entrepreneurs considered cinema merely as a less important
business, and radical Chinese intellectuals also paid no serious attention to cinema, even
after the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Only a few intellectuals such as Hong Shen and
Tian Han recognized the significance of cinema as a potential means of mass education.
Hong Shen argued that "yingxi is an effective tool to spread civilization" and it "can
popularize education and improve the Chinese nationals.,,12 However, his opinion of
filmmaking was condemned by others as "prostitution of art."13
Despite pressures from foreign imports and ignorance from both Chinese
entrepreneurial and intellectual groups, the Chinese film industry developed steadily from
an experimental stage to its first commercial success in the 1920s. The emergence of
some popular film gemes, such as martial arts and costume dramas, indicated that the
transformation of cinema from a western technology into an indigenous form of
entertainment was carrying out successfully.
II Cheng Jihua et al. 39.
12 Hong Shen, "Women dagu de shiqi yijing guole me?" in Hong Shen wenji, 1957, volA, 514.
13 Ibid.
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Although no hindsight can change history, it is still valuable to argue against any
teleological idea by imaging possible alternatives. Therefore, it is not absolutely
meaningless to wonder: had the 1920s and the 1930s not witnessed an unprecedented
national crisis, would the Chinese film industry have kept its commercial orientation?
Examining the political situation in 1920s' and 30s' China, domestically as well as
internationally, not only can help us contextualize the development of the Chinese film
industry, but also can offer us a better understanding of the often overlooked subjectivity
of the semi-colonized in a "one-sided approach to the construction of the modem world
by global capitalism," to borrow a phrase that Arif Dirlik uses to criticize current studies
on globalization. The term "colonial modernity," claims Arif Dirlik, is significant most
importantly because "it recognizes the voices of the colonized without dissipating into
globalization or postcolonial blurrings the power relations that have shaped the global as
we encounter it today.,,14 The Chinese film industry in the late 1920s and 1930s, as I shall
illustrate, uttered words of the colonized in its anti-colonial struggle for national
sovereignty.
After China's imperial history of more than two millennia was brought to a close
in 1912, the newly established republican China failed to obtain the backing of western
powers to reclaim China's lost territories. Japan placed harsh demands about taking over
German rights in China. In the process of learning from the West in order to strengthen
China, some May Fourth thinkers were attracted to Marxism. Founded in 1921, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took warlordism, landlordism, and imperialism as its
14 Arif Dirlik. "The End of Colonialism? The Colonial Modem in the Making of Global Modernity,"
Boundary 2 (Spring 2005): 1-31.
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three main targets. In May 1925, after a communist worker was murdered by Japanese
owners of a cotton mill in Shanghai, the British police fired at marching students and
workers. This event became known as the May 30th Massacre, which resulted in a
massive nationalist movement. The rise of nationalist sentiments in the Chinese society
had significant influence on the development of the Chinese film industry. Mingxing
Studio, established by Li Minwei in Hong Kong in 1922 and moved to Shanghai in 1925,
aimed to "replace foreign films with Chinese films and even to sell Chinese films
overseas, and this will effectively remedy the problems associated with foreign films.,,15
The success of its 1923 feature film Gu 'er jiuzuji (Orphan Rescues His Grandfather) not
only made it possible for the company to further expand and develop, but also stimulated
more entrepreneurs to invest in the film industry. With the establishment of more than
100 film companies by mid-1920s, film production flourished from about 10 films in
1922 to over 120 in 1926.16 Founded in 1930, Lianhua Film Company had "Fuxing
guopian (Rejuvenating the National Cinema)" as its primary concern, claiming that:
In order to resist cultural and economic invasion by foreign film companies,
intrinsic Chinese national virtues should be advocated and the consciousness of
the age must be guided properly. To increase profits for domestic film companies,
Lianhua must bring together Chinese-owned movie theaters and buyout foreign-
owned ones, to compel movie theaters to show domestic films.... 17
Regarding foreign films as tools of "foreign culture invasion," Luo Mingyou, the owner
of Lianhua, took the transition from silent film to sound film as an opportunity to
15 Shadow Play Journal (1922). Quoted from Hu lubin, 2003, 51.
16 180 is the highest number offered by Li Suyuan and Hu lubin. According to their research, since 1927,
the upsurge of setting up film companies gradually subsided and many film studios closed down. In the
following years, the number of film companies was around 20 to 30: 32 in 1927,23 in 1928,31 in 1929,26
in 1930 and 20 in 1931. See Li Suyuan and Hu lubin, 1996, 193.
17 Hu lubin, 2003, 52.
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reorganize the Chinese film industry. In order to shake off the monopoly of the foreign
films in China, Lianhua adopted a system integrating film production with distribution.
With the release of Gudu chunmeng (Spring Dream in the Old Capital) and Yecao
xianhua (Wild Flowers) in 1930, Lianhua was the first national film company that
successfully attracted attention from Chinese audiences. The following years witnessed
the first golden age of the Chinese film industry.
Viewed from this perspective, the Chinese film industry is not only a product of
(semi-)colonial modernity; its development was also accompanied with a persistent
resistance to the very colonial situation that conceived it. The struggle of anti-imperialism
in the Chinese film industry did not concern only filmmakers; it echoed the general
public's aspiration for a more powerful China. Sent into deep despair by the hostile
international environment as well as domestic social problems that China had to face,
more and more Chinese came to realize that it was time to engage in social activities. Led
by a few radical intellectuals such as Hong Shen, they protested the offensive
representation of Chinese images in foreign films and a few American capitalists'
ambition to build an "Oriental Hollywood" in Shanghai. In his research on the film
censorship during the Nanjing decade (1927-1937), Xiao Zhiwei lists the efforts that the
Nationalist government made in controlling foreign film distribution and studio activities
in China. 18 Xiao argues that it was through the rhetoric of nationalism that the
government and the Chinese film industry cooperated with each other. 19 I agree with him
that these efforts should be put into the context of the overall struggle to gain national
18 Hu lubin, 2003, 35.
19 Xiao Zhiwei, 1997,52.
25
sovereignty from the imperialist powers and to promote nationalist consciousness. It is
undeniable that nationalism is a rhetoric that can be easily appropriated and manipulated
by power groups. What should not be underestimated, however, is the historical situation
that made a nationalist rhetoric possible and commonly shared. In other words, the
political concern of the Chinese film industry that emerged in the 1930s was partly a
result of the anti-imperialist struggle, which revealed that cinema was not only a form of
entertainment but also a powerful means to mobilize and unify the Chinese people. The
political characteristics- of cinema crystallized in the Left-wing Film Movement (1932-
1937) that I would like to speculate upon, especially in terms of its ideological function.
Politics and Techniques in Left-wing Cinema
In 1927, the first revolutionary alliance between the Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was ended with a political coup
launched by Chiang Kai-Shek, after that the Communist movement shifted its efforts to
the countryside. Under the white terror of the KMT, the early 1930s witnessed a
revolutionary tide arising in the cultural front. Left-wing organizations mushroomed in
many cities, and most of them were involved by underground CCP members. In March
1930, Zhongguo zuoyi zuojia lianmeng (The Left-wing Writers' League of China) was
established in Shanghai. Zhongguo zuoyi xiju lianmeng (The Left-wing Dramas' League
of China) was established soon after. It was renamed as Zhongguo zuoyi xijujia lianmeng
(The Left-wing Dramatists' League of China) in January 1931 and issued the guiding
principles of filmmaking. According to the principles, besides theater performance, it was
necessary for the League to give attention to Chinese cinema. In addition to producing
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film scripts, and having members participate in activities held by film studios, the League
would try to raise money to produce films independently. Another task was to organize
film study groups, as well as progressive actors and film technicians, to build a base for
the Chinese Left-wing Film Movement. In order to launch a struggle against the petit
bourgeois trend in the field of Chinese cinema, it was indispensable for the League to
criticize and purge the current Chinese Film Movement.2o
Japanese invasion further increased the political turmoil in 1930s' China. After
the Mukden Incident, Japan took over Northeast China and proclaimed it an independent
state in 1932 by installing Pu Yi, the last Manchu emperor, as the puppet ruler of
Manchukuo. On Jan 28, 1932, Japan attacked Shanghai, and Chinese people's patriotic
zeal reached an all-time high, asking film companies to produce more films as a way to
fight against Japan, which provided a rare opportunity to launch the Left-wing Film
Movement. Although anti-imperialism was not the primary task of the movement, it was
necessary to work out an effective way to deliver left-wing revolutionary ideas in facing
Japan's increased imperialist aggression. A group ofCCP members thus entered film
circles and made the Left-wing Film Movement a reality. The leader of this movement,
Xia Yan, a distinguished scriptwriter and critic, recalled the situation as follows:
When the Japanese invasion became imminent and anti-Japanese sentiment more
popular, those who advocated anti-Japanese ideas were supported by the masses.
We were considered anti-Japanese and therefore supported by ordinary people.
The film capitalists were no longer afraid to work with us. The situation was thus
to our advantages?l
20 According to Cheng Jihua, the guiding principles, Zuixin xingdong gangling, was passed in September
1931 and published in Wenxue Daobao on 23 October 1931, 6-7.
21 Xia Yan, "Xinde bashe," in Zhongguo zuoyi dianyingyundong, 1993,9-14.
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Based upon its previous commercial success, the Chinese film industry was
becoming an increasingly politicized enterprise. 1933 was the most productive year of
left-wing film production, and Mingxing Studio produced more than 20 left-wing films.
In the following years, as filmmakers gained more experiences with filmmaking, more
successful left-wing films were produced, and some of them became classics of Chinese
cinema. However, Shanghai fell to the Japanese soon after the breakout of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937, and the Left-wing Film Movement was terminated.
The Left-wing Film Movement has been the subject of extensive research. Cheng
Jihua, Li Shaobai and Xing Zuwen first inaugurated the title of zuoyi dianying yundong
(Left-wing Film Movement) in 1962 as an official-approved term to define the
progressive film culture in the 1930s and the 1940s in Zhongguo dianyingfazhan shi
(The Development of Chinese Cinema), the most authoritative history of pre-1949
Chinese cinema.22 Before the publication of this book, left-wing cinema had been
generally referred as progressive cinema. In 1993, an official list of74 left-wing films
produced between 1932 and 1937 was printed in Zhongguo zuoyi dianying yundong (The
Chinese Left-wing Film Movement), an anthology dedicated to the Left-wing Film
Movement,23
Besides the two Chinese publications, a few English publications have appeared
recently, including Laikwan Pang's Building a New China in Cinema: The Chinese Left-
wing Cinema Movement, 1932-1937, Hu Jubin's Projecting a Nation: Chinese National
Cinema before 1949, and Vivian Shen's The Origins ofthe Left-wing Cinema in China,
22 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 3-4.
23 See Chen Bo, ed., Zhongguo zuoyi dianying yundong (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1993).
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1932-37. Amongst them, I find Pang's approach the most inspiring one. With the aim of
illustrating how political, aesthetic, and commercial discourses fought and negotiated
with each other in leftist filmmaking, Pang demonstrates that a new collective subject,
referring to both filmmakers and viewers since they shared a common social commitment
to a nation-building project, was constructed in and through the left-wing cinema. 24 In
the following part, bearing her argument in mind, I shall examine two left-wing films-
Chuncan (Spring Silkworms, 1933) and Yuguangqu (Song ofthe Fishermen, 1935) with
the aim to show how left-wing filmmakers came to master the film medium as an
important means to attract the masses and to deliver political messages. Spring
Silkworms, an early attempt of the left-wing filmmaking, failed to attract an audience,
while Song ofthe Fishermen set a new box office record for Chinese cinema. Both the
failure and the success helped the left-wing filmmakers to better appreciate the
characteristics of the film medium and its special political function. They brought home
vividly that both commercial and artistic characteristics have to be taken into account
together in order to carry out a left-wing filmmaking agenda.
Spring Silkworms was originally a short story written by Mao Dun (the
pseudonym of Shen Yanbing, 1896-1981), one of the most versatile authors among the
May Fourth generation of Chinese literati. A staunch advocate of Chinese Communism,
Mao Dun turned decisively from a journalist and propagandist into a career as a novelist
after the 1927 fiasco. In April 1930, after a short stay in Japan, he returned to China and
joined the Left-wing Writers' League. Spring Silkworms was written in 1932 and
published in 1933.
24 Laikwan Pang, 2002,73.
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Set in a village of southern China, Spring Silkworms tells a story of an old peasant
named Tongbao and his family members who make every effort to raise silkworms, with
the hope that a good harvest of cocoons could payoffpart of their debt. In order to buy
more leaves to feed the worms, they even decide to mortgage their grove of mulberries,
the last piece of property they own. The harvest, however, turns into a disaster because
Japanese-made synthetic silk is dumped on the Chinese market, and most silk factories
have shut down due to the oncoming Sino-Japanese War. Finally, they are forced to sell
the crop at an extremely low price and got deeper into debt.
This story has been highly praised by the CCP literary critics in the sense that the
miserable fate of the Tongbao family represents the bankruptcy of the peasantry under
the double pressure of imperialist aggression and the traditional usury.25 The economic
destitution of Chinese peasants was represented vividly under Mao Dun's pen. Despite
his critique of the inherent limitations of the proletarian genre, C.T. Hsia claims that
Spring Silkworms is Mao Dun's best story, and perhaps the most outstanding
achievement in Chinese proletarian fiction. As he states:
Although it is [Mao Dun's] articulate intention to discredit this kind of feudal
mentality, his loving portrayal of good peasants at their customary tasks
transforms the supposed Communist tract into a testament of human dignity. 26
The multiple layers of Mao Dun's writing always give more than one interpretation.
Spring Silkworms is just one telling case. From a more economic perspective, David Dei-
wei Wang argues that this story "highlights the confrontation of modern machinery with
provincial handicraftsmanship; of Western know-how with native values; and of a
25 Yang Yi, The History ofModern Chinese Literature (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1987), 134.
26 C. T. Hsia, A History ofModern Chinese Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 162-3.
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capitalist monopoly with the rural struggle for cultural and socioeconomic autonomy." 27
Considering Mingxing's intention in producing this film, Wang's idea is very convincing.
The year of 1933 was called the "Year of Chinese Cinema" because a large number of
domestic productions appeared in the market. One of Mingxing's plans for this year was
to make a series of feature films promoting China's major industries, including silk, tea,
coal, and salt. Besides Spring Silkworms on the silk industry, Mingxing also produced
Yanchao (Salt Tide) andXiangcao meiren (Tobacco and Beauty) for the salt and cigarette
. d' . I 28In ustnes respectIve y.
Spring Silkworms was quickly adapted into a film soon after its publication. It was
directed by Cheng Bugao, a left-wing filmmaker. Under an anonym of Cai Chusheng,
Xia Yan, the leader of the Left-wing Film Movement, undertook the role of scriptwriter.
Except for a few shots, his film script was faithful to Mao Dun's original work. It follows
the narrative ofthe story. As a silent film, almost all the captions come directly from the
original, either through dialogues or by introducing the backgrounds of given scenes.
While the novel only mentions briet1y "this year Shanghai was seething with unrest and
all the silk weaving factories have closed their doors," the film stresses the exploitation of
Chinese peasants by foreign imperialism and traditional usury by adding an opening
scene to the original narrative. A long shot of a small town street follows a medium shot
of a tablet-"Yuanlai Pawn Store." The camera then focuses on a notice: "Store will be
closed anytime after pawning 100 dollars." People are crowded in front of the store door
and the old Tongbao is one ofthem. In a following scene, Tongbao goes to buy silkworm
27 David Der-wei Wang, ed., Fictional Realism in 20th Century China, 1992, 51.
28 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 44.
31
seeds with the money from pawning some silk products. On his way back home, he
bumps into his neighbor Ah Tu who comes to buy rice. Ah Tu complains: "I've already
pawned my rice saved for the New Year. I have to pay back the debt of buying those
damn fertilizers." Tongbao agrees that this year is worse than last year: "All our money
has been swindled away by the foreign devils."
Later, Xia Yan creates another dialogue between Tongbao and a young landlord,
Master Chen, to highlight Japan's threat to the Chinese silk industry:
Master: It is very risky to raise silkworms this year. A war is going on in
Shanghai. All silk filatures are closed. In America, Japanese-produced silk only
asks for 500 dollars, whilst Chinese silk cost 1000 dollars.
Tong Bao: Your Master, no kidding. Our Chinese ladies and Misses need to wear
silk clothes anyway.
Master: They are wearing Japanese man-made silk.
These two brief dialogues reveal how the peasants suffer from a double
exploitation: imperialism (fertilizer, man-made silk) and Chinese usurers (pawn store,
debt). As a prestigious writer of the leftist literature, Xia Yan's creative adaptation in
these two scenes succeeds in addressing the main political message of this film: it was the
imperialist's economic invasion and the domestic political turmoil that produced the
bankruptcy of the peasantry.
Before Spring Silkworms, Xiao Yan's first film script is Kuangliu (Torrent, 1933),
which was also the first left-wing film produced by the Mingxing Studio. It recounts how
a schoolteacher fights the flood with his villagers while a landlord uses the name of
charity to extort money. Calling it "the beginning of a new guideline for Chinese
cinema," left-wing critics paid high compliments to its cinematic representation of class
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struggle in the rural China.29 In tenns of box office receipts, Torrent was also successful,
partly due to the documentary footage of the Yangtze River flood in 1931, and partly due
to the romance between the schoolteacher and the landlord's daughter. 3D Consequently,
when left-wing filmmakers attempted to screen Spring Silkworms, a masterpiece of the
left-wing literature, to spread their leftist ideas, Mingxing Studio willingly invested a
large amount of money, anticipating another box office success after Torrent. 3!
In the CCP's official account of the Left-wing Film Movement, Spring Silkworms
was praised as the first attempt of adapting a work of Chinese left-wing literature for the
silver screen: "It triggered extensive discussions in the literate group, which considered
this film a successful and meaningful attempt, an important work in the 1933's film
production.,,32 This rhetoric created an impression that Spring Silkworms, just like
Torrent, was a successful film too. As a matter of fact, Spring Silkworms only had a poor
5-day screening period. It was first released on October 8 in Xingguang Theater with a
full house, thanks to the big advertising scheme Mingxing had launched.33 As the theater
probably did not see a satisfied box office, the film was withdrawn on October 12. It
disappointed both the left-wing film critics and the general audiences, and the "extensive
discussions in the literate group" were actually concerned with how to take lessons from
its failure. Although Xia Yan expressed that what he attempted in this film was "a
29 Cheng Jihua et al. 204.
30 After shot the documentary footage, Cheng Bugao came out the idea of producing Torrent.
31 Cheng Bugao, Yingtang yijiu (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1983), 1-2.
32 Cheng Jihua et al. 208, 211.
33 Shenbao (Shanghai Daily), 9 October 1933.
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documentary cinema style" that did not involve many interesting plots, it was obvious
that neither critics nor audiences could acknowledge his artistic experiment.34 Several
critics claimed that since there was not a single climax, the audience could not figure out
the central message from the boring and disorganized plots.35 The CCP leadership must
have found the severe critique of a leftist work harmful to the development of the left-
wing film movement, so a pro-Spring Silkworms campaign was launched in the following
days to praise its positive elements. Unsurprisingly, the short screening period of Spring
Silkworms has never been mentioned in the CCP's official account.
The poor box office performance of Spring Silkworms also indicated a failed
political agenda. Pang argues briefly that the failure of Spring Silkworms heralded an
apparent segregation between serious literature and cinema in the movement. 36 This
segregation, in my point of view, sheds light on both the compatible and incompatible
characteristics of literature and cinema. Literature is fundamentally a linguistic medium,
while cinema is primarily visual. Robert Scholes locates the primary difference between
written and filmed stories in the ways that "readers read" those texts differently.
Borrowing from French narrative theory, he uses "narrativity" to refer to the process "by
which a perceiver actively constructs a story from the fictional data provided by any
narrative medium.,,37 According to him, the written narrative, conveyed by the more
abstract sign-system of words, requires and rewards "a narrativity that concretizes and
34 About the discussion on Spring Silkworms, see "Meiri Dianying" in Chenbao, 8 October 1933.
35 Ibid.
36 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 46.
37 Robert Scholes, 419.
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pictorializes the verbal images into more specific mental pictures of persons, places,
actions, and things." The success of Mao Dun's original novel, I would argue, lies exactly
in the written narrativity that brought sufferings of the Tongbao family to readers' mind
through verbal images. The failure of its film adaptation was much related to the
inexperienced camera work that was incapable of offering its audiences clear messages,
especially during the years of silent film. Besides this historical reason, the failure was
also partly due to an inapprehension of the incompatible characteristics of literature and
cinema. The concrete pictorialization of the filmed image, argues Robert Scholes,
requires and rewards precisely the opposite kind ofnarrativity-the abstracting of highly
specific stimuli into more general patterns of structure and theme. When the novel Spring
Silkworms already has a highly abstracted narrativity, it requires a much lively camera
work to accomplish a de-abstracting process, and to produce a pictorialized effect. A
faithful adaptation of the original novel failed the de-abstracting process.
As the novel describes, Tongbao is a traditional Chinese peasant who has strong
religious beliefs. The Tongbao family holds a divine ritual every year, from cleaning
bamboo baskets to hatching eggs. On the second day of incubation, Tongbao smears a
garlic bulb with mud and places them at the foot of the wall inside the shed. If, in a few
days, the garlic bulb puts out many sprouts, it means the eggs would hatch well. Later,
the garlic only gets four measly shoots, and the silkworms grow fast and thrive. But a
good harvest does not bring happiness to the poor family because of the war situation and
the economic invasion from Japan. Unfortunately, the irony of the "fateful" garlic cannot
be fully offered by the camera work, and the highly praised "human dignity" as embodied
35
by Tongbao failed to be appearing on the screen, too. While literary narrative presents the
religious spirit with spaces of imagination, the divine ritual in the film is covered by a
series of silent shots, resulting only in becoming one of the most boring parts of this film.
This is why Robert Scholes suggests that the language of description and reflection in a
novel must be eliminated in cinematic translation.38
However, a weakness of Robert Scholes' theory is that he makes no distinction
between different film genres in term of "specific stimuli" that will undergo abstracting.
If the inexperienced camera work in Spring Silkworms should take the main
responsibility for its failure, how could we explain the success of some previous films
such as Orphan Rescues His Grandfather or Torrent? Furthermore, despite the general
failure of the camera work in Spring Silkworms, a fascinating part in this film that should
be mentioned is the documentary-style shot in which the silkworms begin spinning their
cocoons. This is a moment that the power of images overwhelms that of the literary
language. In the story, old Tongbao and his elder son squat under the racks, hearing the
small rustlings of the spinning worms, then Tongbao's younger son, Duoduotou, peeks at
the cocoons several times. In the film, the camera shows how the brush was completely
covered over with cocoons, as white as snow. In this sense, it is not daring to say that
silkworms are "the true stars of the film.,,39 Even measured with a contemporary standard,
this poetic ambience still can place the film into the highest class of silent films.
In terms of character development, Duoduotou is the most impressive one in the
film. Full of youthful passion, he enjoys working, but doesn't believe in taboos and
38 Robert Scholes, 419.
39 Vivian Shen, The Origins a/the Left-wing Cinema in China, 1932-37 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 144.
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superstitions, or that one good crop would enable them to wipe out their debt and own
their land again. Old Tongbao becomes ill from rage on the selling trip. After carrying his
father into the house, Doudoutou takes the garlic in hand and squashes it, and finally
throws it into river. It is obvious that the task of changing the statue quo is put upon the
shoulders of the young generation, but how their rebellious spirit could serve this cause is
left unanswered.
Unfortunately, both the shining cocoons and the rebellious Duoduotou were
overshadowed by the monotonous narrative in the film. The unenthusiastic response of
critics and audiences to Spring Silkworms instructed the emerging left-wing filmmakers
to cast aside artistic ambitions and concentrate on a film's clarity and emotional
engagement. In order to encourage emotional engagement, one characteristic that
literature and cinema can share with each other is the ability to touch audiences and move
them into tears. Melodramatic elements, or ways of melodramatic expression, contribute
greatly in this respect. Peter Brooks has sought out the roots of the melodramatic
imagination in the French popular theater and offers important reasons for its rise and
persistence. According to him, melodrama arose out of a particular historical conjuncture:
the post-revolutionary, post-Enlightenment, post-sacred world where traditional morality
was questioned and there was a need to relocate and rearticulate a "moral occult." 40
There has been a long tradition of melodramatic expression in Chinese literature too, such
as the vernacular huaben in the Song dynasty, or stage plays in the Yuan dynasty, in
which the common people make efforts to overcome crisis and achieve justice. This
40 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of
Excess (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976),43.
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tradition was further developed in the Mandarin Duck and Butterflies novels of the 1920s
and 1930s. Catering into an established appreciation of melodramatic expression among
the general audience, film adaptations ofthese novels were well received in the 1930s. In
order to gain commercial appeal, and achieve its political goals as well, left-wing
filmmaking had to take into account the established aesthetic tradition. If a lack of
melodramatic plots was one main reason for the failure of Spring Silkworms, then the
proficient use of melodramatic elements contributed greatly to the success of Cai
Chunshen's left-wing filmmaking practice. Produced in 1934, Song ofthe Fishermen,
with its pathetic protagonists, melodramatic plots and appealing musical works, offers a
telling example of the interaction between art, politics and commercial success.
Song ofthe Fishermen tells the story of a poor fishing family living at the
beginning of the 19th century. A poor fisherman's wife is left behind with her twins, a
son and a daughter, after her husband's death. In order to make a simple life, she has
become a wet nurse for a rich fish-lord He Renzhai's newborn son. The young master, He
Ziying, becomes playmate to the twins despite of their class difference. After school, the
young master asks Little Cat, the daughter, to sing "Song of the Fishermen" before he
teaches them what he has learned in school:
Clouds floating in the sky,
Fish swimming in the water,
Dry the fishing net in the morning sunshine,
The sea wind is touching my face ....
As they grow up, the young master decides to study fishery abroad. "The life is
hard for fishermen, I hope that I can learn some advanced knowledge abroad and things
will be improved when I'm back," he promises to the twins. After he leaves, the village
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is robbed by bandits, and the fish-lord moves to Shanghai, starting a fishery company
with his friend Liang Zizou. The twins also come to Shanghai with their blinded mother.
Because the twins could not find jobs, they have to pick up garbage, and make a living as
street clowns. But they lie to their mother. The happy mother asks Little Cat to sing the
song to her uncle:
The tide is rising, the wave is surging,
Fishing boats are going in every direction,
Casting the net and holding the rope,
It's difficult to catch the fish in the fog.
Fishing is hard and the rent is heavy,
Fishermen are poor from generation to generation,
The old fishing net that my grandpa left
We will live by it throughout another winter.
Premiered on June 14, 1934, Song ofthe Fishermen played for 84 straight days in
Shanghai, which was an unprecedented great success for Chinese filmmakers. 41 In
addition, it was also the first Chinese film that won an international prize (an honorary
"Outstanding Film") at the 1935 First International Film Festival in Moscow. Why did
this film become so successful? Director Cai Chusheng offered his own answer in After
84 Days, a short article written to his audiences:
A primary precondition for making a good film is to arouse the audiences'
interests. There are several Chinese films with correct or close to correct ideas,
but why don't they achieve perfect effects? It is because they are too boring to
arouse the audiences' interests. So, in order to make it easier for the audiences to
accept the author's idea, we have to sugarcoat the correct ideas.42
41 As Laikwan Pang finds in Shenbao, the temperature of Shanghai in that summer was exceeding 100 F,
and the Xingguang theatre used its new air conditioning for the first time in showing Song ofthe Fishermen,
this simple reason might contribute to the high attendance at the film. See Pang, 2002, 157. Also see
Shenbao, 11 June 1934.
42 Cai Chusheng. "84 tian yihou (After 84 days, to the audiences of Song ofthe Fishermen)," Meizhou
dianying (1934): vo!.l.
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For Cai Chunsheng, there were three different groups of audiences. The first group was
the intellectual elites who could explore the deepest meaning conveyed by a film; the
second group was urbanites finding his film interesting and funny, and the third were
those with lower education and understood only the surface part of his work.43 It was
based upon such knowledge that Cai consciously produced his works with rich aesthetic
information, packaging powerful social critiques with attractive sugarcoat. If Spring
Silkworms only interested audiences in the first group, then audiences at different levels
enjoyed watching Song ofthe Fishermen together.
An engaging melodramatic climax in this film comes after the young master
returns and works as an engineer in his father's company. One day he meets the twins
and gives them some money, which only leads to their arrest on suspicion oftheft. This
incident is only a prelude for what will happen later. After having been released, the
twins find that their mother has been accidentally killed in a fire. Soon after, the young
master's father is betrayed by his mistress and his friend, and commits suicide. The three
childhood friends start to do fishing together. However, Little Monkey is getting
seriously sick. Before death, his final request for his sister is to sing "Song of the
Fishermen" one more time. With the song going, the camera offers poetic and charming
scenes of the East China Sea, which makes their situation in the city of Shanghai more
miserable. Although the first part of the film has shown how much they have suffered as
poor fishermen, nostalgia for their hometown comes out of a deep despair towards the big
city where they even cannot find jobs. The condemnation of city life is a general theme
among Chinese intellectuals in the 1930s under the process of urbanization and
43 Cai Chusheng. "Zai huike shi zhong (In the Meeting Room)," Dianying yu xiju (1936): YoU, 2-3.
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modemity.44 In this sense, "Song of the Fishermen" becomes the only thing that could
connect them with their lost homeland.
As in other left-wing films, class difference is one of the most important themes
in Song ofthe Fishermen. Cai Chusheng was very creative in describing the issue of
class. In Song ofthe Fishermen, class confrontation was brought in through a
juxtaposition of two families, one poor and one rich. After the twins were born in their
shabby house, their mother has to nurse the young master to make a living. The class gap
has been written into their lives from this moment. Lacking nutrition, Little Monkey was
weak and mentally retarded. Although the three children get along well, the young master
cannot prevent his wet nurse being fired by his inexorable father. Later, after both
families move to Shanghai, the class gap between the rich and the poor is further
exhibited by a series of meaningful and humorous shots:
Shot 1, a garden house, indoor. A young lady (fish-lord He's mistress) is wearing
make-up in front of a mirror. She puts some powder on her face.
Shot 2, outdoor, a garage box out of the garden house. Little Cat is putting mud
on her face to avoid being sexually attacked. She plays with Little Monkey by
putting mud on his face too.
Shot 3, inside the garden house. The fish lord comes to talk to his mistress. He
pours himself a glass of wine and hides the bottle in his back. The mistress
pretends to taste the wine but grabs the bottle and throws it out of the window.
Shot 4, in the garage box. The bottle hits Little Monkey's head and he falls down.
Little Cat is trying to get the bottle from another boy.
These consecutive shots show the audience how the life of the rich is totally
different from that of the poor. Not only are cosmetics too luxurious for poor girls like
Little Cat, but even her pretty face will cause her big troubles on the street. The wine
bottle becomes a useful prop. When it is thrown out and hits Little Monkey, he has no
44 Vivian Shen, 99.
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way to ask for an apology, and what Little Cat and the other boy care about are who will
have this bottle and sell it for money. When the bottle first hits down Little Cat and then
gets broken in the fight, an implicit message is that the rich will not help the poor by any
means. They can only make the poor's life more miserable. This message is conveyed
skillfully with a sort of Chaplinian black humor. As Cai claims, a truthful portrayal of the
social reality cannot be achieved without artistic skills:
We should pay attention to skills of description. For general audiences, when they
are watching films, they are not taking classes in school, so the film itself has no
way to force the audiences to accept its ideas. As filmmakers, our responsibility is
to learn how to attract more audiences to watch our films. A film with good ideas
may have 100 audiences, but if we add some artistic skills, it will attract 1,000 or
even 10,000 audiences.45
Cai was criticized by some leftwing film critics because of his sympathetic
attitude towards the young master and his father in Song ofthe Fishermen. Furthermore,
the bankruptcy of the poor fishermen is described a doomed failure of the traditional
fishing industry in face of the modernized fishing industry. No clear clue has been
offered in the film about the role of imperialist exploitation. The reformist young master
has no way to save the national fishing industry when the film ends. "My original
intention is, even a person like He Ziying, a reformist with good will to improve the
society, will undoubtedly end in disillusionment when his career cannot break away from
the imperialist economic invasion.,,46 Instead of providing other more radical
revolutionary messages, Cai chose to set his political agenda at a level that would be
45 Cai Chusheng. "Zhongguo dianying xiang hechu qu (Where is the Chinese Cinema Going)," Diansheng
dianying zhoukan (1934): YoU, 31.
46 Cai Chusheng, After 84 Days.
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easily accepted by the urban audiences, and this was another reason that contributed to
his success, too.
Song ofthe Fishermen is a landmark in Chinese cinema. Besides the star power of
Wang Renmei, the actress who played Little Cat in the film, the popularity of this film
was traceable to its title song. Composed by Ren Guang, "Song of the Fishermen"
remains today one ofthe best-loved and most memorable songs. It started a movie boom
in Shanghai. For the first time, a film became best known to its audiences by its musical
sound-track. Being issued by the Baidai Company, this famous sound-track was sold
more than ten thousands copies. The significance of music drew great attention from the
left-wing filmmakers. Consequently, they made more efforts to enhance the attraction of
the left-wing films through music. For example, "Biyege" (Song of Graduation) in Taoli
jie (Plunder of Peach and Plum, 1934), "Yiyongjunjinxingqu" (March of the Volunteers)
in Fenyun ernii (Sons and Daughters of the Storm, 1935), "Sijige" (Song of Four Seasons)
and "Tianya genii" (Wandering Singing Girl) in Malu tianshi (Street Angel, 1937) all
became popular songs in the following years.
As a prominent filmmaker, Cai Chusheng contributed greatly to the success ofthe
Left-wing Movement in China. The success of Cai Chusheng's film career also highlights
the difference between literature and cinema in terms of market promotion. Literary
creation is less bound by the market, so readership is not the most important criterion to
judge the value of a work. It is highly likely that people will acknowledge the artistic
value of a work after a decade or longer. Things are totally different for cinema. With a
higher production budget, the first aim of filmmaking is making profits; therefore a good
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box office receipt becomes all-important. Since revolutionary ideas could not reach the
masses until they like to sit down in theater, how to attract audiences becomes an
important task of left-wing filmmaking. As a pioneer of Chinese cinema, Cai's
filmmaking talent has been proved not only by the high artistic quality of his works, but
also by their successful market performance. After the anti-Japanese War, he and other
left-wing filmmakers continued to produce progressive films. Cinema became a
powerful artistic weapon for them to criticize the KMT policies. In 1947, Cai Chusheng's
film Yijiang chunshui xiangdongliu (A Spring River Flows East) set another box office
record, thanks to his successful melodramatic representation of the ordinary people in the
war-ravaged China.
When Cinema met Politics: A Theoretical Reflection
Based on a film list collected by Cheng's The Development ofChinese Cinema,
up to 400 feature films were produced during 1932-1937, of them 74 have been officially
stamped as left-wing films. 47 A small amount though, left-wing films deserve special
attention because they embodied left-wing filmmakers' efforts in using cinema as an
important medium to engage in politics. Much of the left-wing filmmaking tradition were
inherited and developed in socialist cinema during the 1950s and 1960s.
An interesting episode occurred during the Left-wing Film Movement was the so-
called "soft film and hard film debate." Initiated by the KMT in 1930, a Nationalist Film
Movement, as part of the New Life Movement, aimed to revive traditional Chinese
culture and moral principles that could best serve the KMT as the ruling party. Different
47 Cheng Jihua et al. 133. Out of the 74 official-stamped left-wing films, only 31 are still available today.
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from the Left-wing Film Movement, nationalist discourse in the Nationalist Film
Movement was appropriated to downplay and even oppose class struggle. Made in 1932,
Lianhua Studio's Rendao (Humanity) reflected the KMT's public policy of promoting
traditional Chinese moral principles. In this film, a family tries to support its son in
college under tough economic conditions, not knowing that the son has become a
playboy. After getting a well-paid job, the son, however, does not give a hand to his
father and wife at home. His father starves to death. Only after his mistress's betrayal is
revealed that the son goes home and begs the heaven's forgiveness. Film like Humanity
that promoted filial piety was very typically in the Nationalist Film Movement. In the
face of growing left-wing criticism, a KMT-affiliated scholar Huang Jiamo published an
article "Yingxing dianying yu ruanxing dianying" (On Hard Film and Soft Film) at the
end of 1933, in which he contended that "Cinema is ice-cream for the eyes and a sofa for
the mind," and attacked the left-wing filmmakers as "putting too much stress on
ideology.,,48 The terms "soft film" and "hard film" referred respectively to entertainment
film and left-wing film since then. The aim ofthe "soft film" theory was to divert
filmmakers' attention away from social criticism embedded in left-wing filmmaking. One
task of the Left-wing Dramatists' League, as I mentioned earlier, was to criticize and
purge the current Chinese Film Movement and to launch a struggle against the petit
bourgeois trend in the field of Chinese cinema. Therefore a vigorous debate began
48 Huang Jiamo. "Yingxing dianying yu ruanxing dianying (On Hard film and soft film)," Xiandai dianying
(1933): vo1.6, 3.
-------------------- ---
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between left-wing film critics and supporters of the "soft film." Lasting for 3 years, it was
the first major theoretical debate in the history of Chinese cinema.49
Viewed in hindsight, some "soft film" critics' negative comments on left-wing
films were valid. It was true that left-wing filmmakers needed to better master the film
medium in order to attract more audiences. Pang argues that the debate was more than a
simple theoretical discussion when the two camps were directly connected to two rival
political parties-the KMT and the CCP. 50 I cannot fully agree with her on this point
because no film can ever be studied as a pure artistic production unaffected by its socio-
political context. Politics is part and parcel of filmmaking, especially in the 1930s when
China was facing a formidable threat from Japan. Just like Xia Yan stated in his response
to the "soft film" advocates: "Are things at the present time soft? .. .International political
and economic conflicts are quite hard. The Mukden Incident and Japanese invasion of
Shanghai are surely not soft."Sl Films as artifacts ofthe era display concerns prevailing
when they were made. The theoretical debate on "soft film" and "hard film" has to be
situated into the concrete historical circumstance where politics matter the most. What
emerged in the debate was the political function of cinema that was always
underestimated, and the same underestimation continues today, either in the name of
entertainment, or in the name of art.
The interwoven relationship between cinema and politics was not a topic that only
occurred in 1930s' China. Another discussion between two important members of the
49 On the critique on soft film, see Hu Jubing, Chapter 4. Also see Zhen Zhang, 2005, Chapter 5.
50 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 51.
5l Xia Yan. "Ruanxing de yinglun (The hard words of soft film theory)," Chenbao, 13 June 1934.
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Frankfurt School further sheds light on the theoretical significance of the cinema-politics
interaction. In 1935, as the Nazis began building up their war machine, Walter Benjamin
interpreted fascist aesthetics of violence and war as the culmination of I'art pour I'art. His
response to this anesthetized politics was to mobilize the so-called forces of aesthetic
production for political ends. In his famous essay, "The work of art in the age of
mechanical reproduction," besides a lament on the decay of the "aura," he praised the
powerfulness of film in contemporary mass movements because "its social significance,
particularly in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic
aspect, that is, the liquidation ofthe traditional value of the cultural heritage." For him,
mechanical reproduction of art would change the reaction of the masses toward art in the
sense that "a progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual
and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert," which would thus pave the
way for the predominance ofthe political function of art. Film, not only as a collective
work of art, but also because of its ability of presenting an 0 bj ect for simultaneous
collective reception, would become the ideal medium for the propagation of political
content. Benjamin was well aware of some negative consequences of film, such as the
shock effect that a film can exert on people's mind, and the market values as the very
characteristic of film, but as far as he concerned at that time, the most urgent question
was how to introduce into the theory of art concepts that would be "useful for the
formation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art," as he remarked in the opening
pages ofthis essay. The Left-wing Film Movement in 1930s China echoed Benjamin's
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idea, and the success of this movement to some extent proved that cinema could be a
highly effective political tool in mobilizing the masses for revolutionary goals.
However, the revolutionary potential is not an inherent characteristic of the film
medium. It only works when the medium is under the control of revolutionaries.
Otherwise, there is no way to explain the popularity of certain "soft films" in 1930s'
China, or Nazi films that engaged a whole nation in victorious war campaigns. As some
critics point out, the revolutionary qualities that Benjamin ascribes to the film medium
and the potential for class consciousness he ascribes to film audiences are contradicted by
empirical conditions-the culture industry was already engaged in an effort to restore a
counterfeit aura to film, by virtue of the "cult of stars." 52 In a direct refutation of
Benjamin's essay, Adorno argues:
Whether a technique can be considered progressive and "rational" depends on the
meaning of its context and/or its place in the whole of society as well as in the
organization of the particular work. Technical development as such can serve crude
reaction as soon as it has established itself as a fetish and by its perfection
represents the neglected social tasks as already accomplished. 5
In other words, whether the film medium can be considered progressive or not
depends on its relationship with the hegemony, or the dominant ideology. In the western
world, when the hegemony is a white, middle-class, male-dominated ideology, the film
industry under such a control functions consensually in its mediation of hegemonic
values and the class interests of the dominant group. In this regard, the "soft film" theory
is just one more effort to represent "the neglected social tasks as already accomplished."
52 Richard Wolin, Walter Benjiamin: An Aesthetic ofRedemption (New York: Columbia University, 1982),
192-3.
53 Theodor W. Adorno, "The fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening," in Essays on
Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 288-317, 296.
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What is closely related to, and complicates the issue of the hegemonic function of
cinema is the development of the film industry in Japanese-occupied Manchuria and
Shanghai during the war period. By the 1930s, after a prolonged silent era, film industry
in Japan has become a thriving business. In 1933, after the seizure of the Northeast
China, the Japanese built Manchuria Cinema Association, the so-called "Manying" in
Changchun. Film production in Manchuria has rarely been studied, partly due to the lack
of access to the first hand materials, and more importantly, due to the political sensitivity
of this topic.54 Japanese researcher Tadao Sato has argued that "though the Manchuria
Cinema Association was established primarily to further Japan's colonial designs, it also
promoted the illusion that an intimacy could be created between the Japanese and Han
Chinese." 55 Did this illusion work effectively in Manchuria? Hu Jubin contends that
Manchurian cinema received a cold reception because Chinese audiences refused to
accept their new identity as "Manchurian.,,56 This phenomenon is worth pondering. It
explains how a specific context could keep the audiences watchful and thus undermine
ideological interpellation from the film text. Although Manying made painstaking efforts
to appeal Chinese audiences, Chinese audiences' strong nationalist sentiment against
Japanese occupation led to their refusal of the Japanese colonial interpellation.
In November 1937, Shanghai fell to the Japanese after a three-month fighting, and
became an "orphan island." A large number of Chinese filmmakers retreated to
54 Hu Jubing thinks that Hu Chang and Gu Quan's Manying: guoce dianying mianmian guan (Manying:
State Policy films from Various perspectives), published by Zhonghua Shuju in 1990, is the only available
Chinese publication. See Hu Jubing, 2003, 118.
55 Tadao Sato, "Li XiangIan and Yoshiko Yamaguchi," in The 16th Hong Kong International Film Festival:
1992 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Urban Council, 1992), 4-9.
56 Hu Jubing, 2003, 118.
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Chongqing or were moved to Hong Kong. But Shanghai remained the center of the
Chinese film industry. The "mysterious" cinema boom during this period, mainly the
mass production of costume films, observes Hu Jubin, was a clever negotiation between
the issue of "national conscience" and the desire for profits.s7 For example, Mulan
congjun (Mulan Joins the Army, 1939) features the ideal ofloyalty and the virtue of filial
piety. It interweaves a romance between Mulan and Liu Yuandu, a male general, and
ends happily with a wedding ceremony. Viewed with a leftist perspective, both the
traditional moral values and the entertaining elements in Mulan Joins the Army would
label it as a reactionary "soft film." However, since Shanghai was under Japanese control,
leftist criticism lost its political edge. Producing more "soft films" became an effective
strategy to survive the Chinese film industry. By illustrating how the Shanghai cinema
both collaborated with the Japanese and resisted their cultural domination, Poshek Fu
argues that the wartime Shanghai film industry was a site of political ambivalence:
It cooperated with the Japanese, but only to the extent of keeping the Shanghai
cinema alive. It refused to serve the ideological machine of the occupying force. Its
existence was to entertain Shanghai, not to propagandize for the "New [East Asian]
Order."s8
In Mulan Joins the Army, by telling how the legendary woman warrior Mulan
takes her father's place in the army when her country is invaded, the idea of resistance
against Japanese aggression is disseminated implicitly.59 Surprisingly, this film was
released in Japanese-occupied areas and even in Japan because the Japanese thought that
57 Hu Jubing, 2003, 120-131.
58 Poshek Fu, "Struggle to Entertainment: The Political Ambivalence of Shanghai Film industry under
Japanese Occupation, 1941-1945," in The 18th Hong Kong International Film Festival: Cinema ofTwo
Cities: Hong Kong-Shanghai (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Urban Council, 1994),50-62.
59 For an analysis on the success of this film, see Poshek Fu, 2003, 11-21.
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it "merely tells a historical story.,,60 This interesting fact further highlights the
complicated colonial situation in Shanghai, where the colonizer and the colonized read
the same text differently. While the colonizer was prone to maximize their colonial
power, the colonized could sense the most inexplicit political message of resistance,
thanks to the real social reality where they lived and suffered. Besides my critical attitude
on Romi Bhabha's notion of "ambivalence" because of its ignorance of the uneven power
relationship between the two oppositional sides, I have to say that "ambivalence" also
speaks to the historical circumstance in the wartime Shanghai. In other words, it was the
existence of ambiguity that made not only the survival of the Chinese film industry a
reality, but also the dissemination of resistance ideology possible.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Chinese film industry in Shanghai was
under a full Japanese occupation. As other cultural branches, it was required to advocate
the idea of the Great Asia Prosperous. In 1943, an anti-British historical epic about the
Opium War, Wanshi liufang (Eternity) was produced with the aim to legitimize the
Japanese aggression in Asia in the name of opposing Western imperialism. The narrative in
this film, however, focuses on romance rather than historical events, and the anti-British
sentiment was projected as a vague anti-foreign nationalism, which, as Poshek Fu has
correctly pointed out, revealed a shared public ambivalence about the symbolic politics of
the Opium War, which emerged only with a historicization of Chinese experiences with
imperialism and semi-colonialism in the 20th century.61
60 Hu Jubin, 2003, 131.
61 Poshek Fu, 2003, 109.
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Fu's examination ofpopular culture in wartime Shanghai opens us a new
perspective to explore the politics of cinema:
It was in this dilemma that their tactical insistence on popular cultural values
brought to the fore the political ambivalence of cultural production under brute
power: in the highly politicized situation in which Shanghai filmmakers found
themselves, apolitical entertainment that was deliberately depoliticized became
significantlypolitical. 62
Politics of cinema are not fixed, but metamorphic and floating, which allow us to rethink
the ontology of cinema that regards cinema solely as an aesthetic object. The
transition from apolitical to political, as formulated here, is decided by given socio-
historical circumstances that conceive popular culture in general.
If we can argue that "soft films" were crude reactions in 1930s Shanghai due to
their apolitical escapism, then the same apolitical nature indicated a resistant gesture to
Japanese colonial control that became "significantly political." Although cinema has rarely
been considered innocent of complicity in ideological operation, film studies in general has
been experiencing an aesthetic-centered and textual-based approach. In textual criticism,
there is an overall ignorance of the context that determines the very ideological function of
a given work. In this sense, Fu's theoretical evaluation of the tactical strategy of the
Shanghai filmmakers under Japanese occupation is of great significance. It proves that any
textual analysis that severs a film from its context is bound to be incomprehensive.
62 Poshek Fu, 2003, 131.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN SOCIALIST CINEMA:
FROM THE WHITE-HAIRED GIRL TO FIVE GOLDEN FLOWERS
"Of all the arts for us, the film is the most important," said V.1. Lenin in 1922, in
consideration of the large illiterate population in a multilingual Russia. 1 The effects of
cinema reached "where even the book cannot reach" in the Russian Revolution, and it
was "more powerful than any kind of narrow propaganda." 2 The great potential of
cinema as an incomparable instrument to disseminate all sorts of ideas was quickly
realized by different political groups, and how to exercise cinema's broadest possible
influence on the masses became their primary concern. Left-wing filmmakers in 1930s
Shanghai made great efforts in bringing their political agenda closer to the urban
audience. The CCP began to pay attention to the propaganda and educational function of
the film medium during the Left-wing Film Movement. After the movement was
terminated by the outbreak of a full-scale anti-Japanese war, the KMT government
retreated to Chongqing and began to produce patriotic feature films and documentaries.
While the Japanese-controlled Manchurian cinema aimed at promoting Pan-Asianism,
1 From a conversation between Lenin and Lunacharsky in 1922, recalled by the latter in a letter to G. M.
Boltyansky. On the same occasion Lenin also remarked, "You will have to develop production on a wider
basis and, in particular, introduce wholesome films to the masses in the city and, to an even greater extent,
in the countryside." See Richard Taylor and Ian Christie, eds., The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet
Cinema in Documents, 1896-1939 (London: Rutledge, 1988), 107.
2 Stated by Anatoli Lunacharsky, the People's Commissar for Education, in 1924. See Richard Taylor and
Ian Christie, 109.
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Shanghai under the Japanese occupation remained the center of the Chinese film industry
by its massively produced "apolitical" entertainment films that ignored, and therefore
indirectly resisted Japanese colonialization.
Due to the technological complexity and capital-intensive nature of the film
industry, the CCP only made fewer documentaries during the anti-Japanese war and the
following civil war. In the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC), the film
industry became a highly centralized Party organ dedicated to legitimatize the authority
of the CCP. Socialist cinema has been generally ignored in Chinese film studies despite
the fact that many of these "red revolutionary canons" have influenced more than one
generation. Post-socialist China has also witnessed a great amount of remade "red
canons," which further necessitates studies on socialist cinema.3 Starting with Mao's
1942 Yan'an Talks, this chapter will trace the birth of socialist cinema, examining both
its political and aesthetic characteristics. Special attention will be paid to two aspects:
first, I want to explore how class discourse and gender coding were further politicized in
socialist cinema; second, inspired by the 1930s discussion on minzu xingshi (national
style), I shall try to map out the formation of national style in Chinese cinema and
evaluate its significance under a Cold War background.
The Yan'an Talks and the Birth of Film Industry in New China
Yan'an, a small town in Northwest China, was the destination of the Long March
that began Mao Zedong's ascent to power in 1935. It grew into an influential
3 For a study on this phenomena, see Dai Jinhua, "Chongxie hongse jingdian (Rewriting Red Canons)," in
Chen Pingyuan and Shangkou Xin eds., Dazhong chuangmei yu xiandai wenxue (Beijing: New World
Press, 2003), 505-560.
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Communist-led revolutionary base during the anti-Japanese War. In response to the
expansion of the CCP, the KMT launched several economic blockades that isolated the
base area. The Japanese also realized that the CCP was their opponent in the war and
started to exterminate the base area. Meanwhile, various conflicts grew within the CCP-
among Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, and Zhang Guotao, and between people from different
parts of China. These conflicts increased and threatened relations between the Party and
the peasants, the primary source of Party support. As these combined factors exacerbated
the situation in Yan'an, Mao decided to launch a rectification movement to strengthen
Party morale and discipline.4 During the movement, Mao delivered his influential
speeches at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art in May 1942, stressing that creative
writing and art must serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and criticizing those
intellectuals who maintained a distance between themselves and the people:
Workers in literature and art until now have been heroes without a battlefield,
remote and uncomprehending [They] are unfamiliar with the people they write
about and with the people who read their work, or else have become estranged
from them. Our workers in literature and art are not familiar with workers,
peasants, soldiers, or even their cadres.5
Mao was interested in literature and art merely as a tool of propaganda and
education. Between his two criteria in literary criticism-the political and the artistic,
artistic creation must subordinate to political demand. In his typically pragmatic and
authoritative way, Mao emphasized that only when intellectuals integrated with the
4 Mark Selden traced this movement back to early 1939 with Mao's triumph at the Party's Sixth Plenum.
See Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Most historians consider February I, 1942 as the official beginning of the Yan'an Rectification Movement
when Mao delivered a lecture entitled "zhengdun dangde zuofen (Rectify the Party's Style of Work)."
5 Bonnie S. McDougall, Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan 'an Conference on Literature and Art": A
Translation ofthe 1943 Text with Commentary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 60.
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masses of peasants and workers could they create works benefiting the revolution. He
assigned literature and art to a position of assisting other revolutionary works in order to
fight against the national enemy and accomplish national liberation:
[Our purpose is] to ensure that literature and art fit well into the whole
revolutionary machines as a component part, that they operate as powerful
weapons for uniting and educating the people and for attaching and destroying the
enemy, and that they help the people fight the enemy with one heart and one
mind.6
At the price of diminishing the diversity of literary representations and
undermining the intellectuals' independency, the Yan'an Talks became the CCP's
guidelines for making intellectual policy as well as policy in literature and art,. The major
reason for the importance of the Talks, as Bonnie McDougall points out, is that they
embody Mao's ability as a political leader to organize the loose body of current literary
doctrines among the leftists in China, formulate them with sufficient clarity and
understanding as to make them a comprehensive literary policy for the present situation,
and see to their immediate implementation in Yan'an.7 The Yan'an Talks made literature
and art powerful political tool to launch land reforms, wage war against Japan, win public
support, and spread revolutionary ideas across the country. Workers ofliterature and art
at Yan'an began to conform their creative work to the Party guidelines. Zhao Shuli's
novella Li Youcai Banhua (The Rhymes ofLi Youcai, 1943) was one of the first works of
fiction to be produced under the new guidelines. With a strong consciousness of serving
the current policies, the author describes new changes brought by the land reform.
Written in a folk style, Banhua, the novella aims at the masses as its readership. It was so
6 McDougall, 60.
7 McDougall, 9.
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highly praised by the Party that the term "Zhao Shuli Fangxiang (Zhao Shuli Direction)"
became dominant during the 1940s and the 1950s.8
The Yan'an Talks also decided the direction ofcinema in new China. Compared
with Shanghai, Changchun, and Chongqin, the Yan'an base area in the 1940s was not
ready for any mature filmmaking because of its poor economic situation. Although a
Yan'an Film Team was formally established as part ofthe General Political Department,
except for a few documentaries, it was unable to produce any feature films. 9 After the
Japanese surrender, some pro-Communist employees who used to work in the Japanese-
controlled Manchuria Cinema Association set up a Northeast Film Company. Soon it was
taken over by the CCP and renamed Northeast Film Studio. Most members of the Yan'an
Film Team joined the studio and began their feature filmmaking experiments. lO As Paul
Clark claims, the opportunity to apply Mao's Yan'an Talks in feature filmmaking did not
come until this moment. I I The Northeast Film Studio, renamed again as Changchun Film
Studio in 1955, has been known as the "Cradle of New China's Cinema.,,12
Two feature films produced by this studio show how the Party guidelines were
carried out in a socialist-to-be China. Based on a true story, a short experimental feature
film Liuxia fa da laojiang (Leave Him to Fight Chiang Kai-shek) was finished in
8 Tang Yiming, "Mao's talks and Zhao Shuli Direction," in Wenyi Lilunyu Tongshu Wenhua (Taipei:
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongguo Wenzhe Yanjiusuo Choubeichu, 1999),39-54.
9 For the Yan'an Film Team's achievement during the Yan'an years (1937-1947), see Cheng Jihua et al.
337-363.
10 For more details about the takeover, see Patricia Wilson, "The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,
1946-1949," in George S. Semsel et al. 1990,45-56.
11 Paul Clark, 1988,28.
12 On film productions of the Northeast Film Studio in its early years, see Cheng Jihua et al. 381-395.
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February 1948. In this film, a PLA (People's Liberation Army) soldier has accidentally
killed a young peasant and will be executed by the army. The victim's father, however,
asks the army to save the soldier's life so that he can fight the KMT on behalf of his dead
son. As the simple plot summary suggests, the Chinese peasantry and the PLA are
undertaking the same revolutionary cause with a common enemy. For the sake of
defeating the KMT, all personal feuds should be put aside. The good relationship
between the PLA and the Chinese people became an important theme of socialist cinema.
The first full-length feature film Qiao (Bridge, 1949), set in a same civil war
background, has a more complicated plot. In the spring of 1947, the military
confrontation between the CCP and the KMT in the Northeast battlefield was in a critical
moment. In order to transport the CCP military supplies to the front, a bridge needs to be
set up in 15 days. Under Party leadership, workers in a steel factory launch a competition
to complete the bridge. After overcoming many difficulties, they successfully accomplish
the task. Besides the theme of how the well-organized workers support the army, a
meaningful point in Bridge is the cinematic representation of the technical intellectuals.
"Some technicians and a few workers had been worked in the Japanese-controlled
Manchukuo factories for years," tells the introductive caption ofthe film, "they don't
have enough understanding of the productive power ofthe proletarian class." At the
beginning of the film, facing a lack of materials and equipment, a Western-educated chief
engineer insists that he needs at least 40 days to finish the construction. He derides that
passion alone is not enough to complete the bridge when a self-trained worker-technician
tries to fix a steel-making furnace. Later, inspired by the proletarian workers, the chief
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engineer confesses that he should work harder to follow them. At a critical moment of the
construction, an important machine is out of order. The chief engineer comes to the
construction site and fixes it, indicating that he has abandoned his old ideas and joins the
workers. How the intellectuals are re-educated by the working class, as well as the
peasants, would become another important theme in socialist cinema.
With the victory of the CCP over the KMT and the founding of the PRC in 1949,
all the previous KMT-owned film studios were confiscated as national properties, which
further strengthened CCP's control in the cultural domain. Until March 1951, besides
three state-owned studios in Changchun, Peking and Shanghai, there were seven private-
owned film studios and one joint-venture studio in China. Most films produced by the
private-owned film studios were pro-CCP films, more or less influenced by the left-wing
filmmaking tradition. For example, Shanghai Kunlun Studio made Wuya yu maque
(Crows and Sparrows, 1949) on the eve of the CCP takeover. It portrays the struggle
between the residents of a Shanghai building and their exploitative landlord during the
last days of the KMT governance. The ideological motivation behind this film is
allegorically implied by the film title: only when the weak "sparrows" are organized
together could they successfully defeat the aggressive "crows." It ends with a New Year
celebration - obviously a metaphor of an oncoming new era. Having political messages
cloaked in a comic style, Crows and Sparrows has been considered one of the most
successful films in the history of Chinese cinema.13
13 For analysis on this film, see Wang Yiman, "Crows and Sparrows: Allegory on a Historical Threshold,"
in Chris Berry ed., Chinese Films in Focus: 25 New Takes (London: BFI, 2003), 65-72.
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However, the private-owned film studios did not maintain a long-term positive
relationship with the CCP since the Party required the film industry to serve the transition
to socialism in a strict ideological sense. Leftist films produced by those private studios
could no longer fully meet the new political demands; these studios themselves would
become obstacles of a grand nationalization project. It was the critical campaign on a
biographical film Wuxun zhuan (Life of Wu Xun, 1950) in 1951 that facilitated a
complete nationalization of the private-owned film studios into state enterprises.
Wu Xun (1839-1896) is a Qing landlord who promoted free education for the
poor peasants. A film based on his good deeds was half-finished by the Kunlun Studio
before 1949; many revisions were then made to fit new policies set by the CCP. Director
Sun Yu, a prominent left-wing filmmaker, considered the revised script "a critical
biography" that emphasized both the limits ofWu Xun's reformism and his failure to
liberate the poor. Although many intellectuals have regarded Wu Xun as an exemplary
historical figure worthy of praise, in Mao's eyes, his landlord class identity only made
him an enemy of the Chinese revolution. As clearly stated in Mao's Yan'an Talks, works
of literature and art were to be for the masses, and their class stand was to be that of the
proletariat, not that of the petit bourgeoisie, which marked a fundamental difference
between the left-wing cinema in the 1930s and the socialist cinema in the 1950s. In the
socialist China, writers and artists must learn from the workers, peasants, and soldiers,
and then popularize only what was needed and could be "readily accepted" by those same
groups. Therefore, when a landlord became a tragic hero on the silver screen, what Mao
sensed was a common shared "bourgeois" attitude among the intellectual class that would
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produce a negative influence on the class consciousness of the proletarian. Despite a
positive response after its release, Mao launched a political campaign in May 1951,
criticizing Life ofWu Xun as "a reactionary propaganda that insults peasant revolutionary
struggle, Chinese history and Chinese nationality.,,14 The criticism soon went beyond the
film to question intellectuals' political views, and guidelines lay down by Mao's Yan'an
Talks once again were the only criterion to judge the correct and the wrong. 15 After Life
ofWuxun, films produced by other private-owned studios were criticized one by one, and
it became impossible for them to continue any filmmaking. Viewed historically, the
Yan'an Rectification Movement suppressed the dissident voices in the field of literature
and art, and the campaign on Life ofWuxun further carried out this movement in the field
of filmmaking, only this time the targets were private-owned film studios.
The Chinese film industry completed its socialist transition in the mid-1950s, and
experienced steady growth under a system adopted from the Soviet Union. A Film
Bureau was set up, first under the Department of Propaganda in the Central Committee of
the CCP, then under the Ministry of Culture, as the state bran<;h specifically responsible
for the film production. 16 The Bureau formulated film policies and set every film studio's
annual production quota. More importantly, it censored every film before its release.
Founded in February 1951, China Film Management Corporation, renamed as China
Film Distribution and Exhibition Corporation (China Film), was the sole agency
14 Mao Zedong. "Pay attention to the discussion on film The Life ofWuxun," People's Daily, 20 May 1951.
15 This critical campaign has been studied extensively in Chinese. For a brief study in English, see Paul
Clark, 45-55.
16 The Film Bureau has become a part of the Ministry of Broadcast, Film and Television since 1986.
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responsible for distribution and exhibition across the country through its regional offices
and provincial offices. An independent enterprise in name, China Film actually operated
as a government enterprise. All tilms produced by film studios were sold to this sole
distribution company for a fixed price (700,000 yuan each before 1980, approximate
250,000 USD).
By the end of 1965, China was capable of producing about fifty features a year. I?
A population of 720 millions in 1965 seemed a lucrative market for China Film, but it did
not produce huge film revenues. There were two main reasons: First, the rural people,
which occupied 85 percent of the Chinese population, did not pay to see films until the
mid-1980s because film viewing for them was more like a festival organized by the local
Party organizations. The urban audience was the only source of box office revenue.
Second, under strict governmental control, the price of tilm tickets was low and didn't
rise for almost 30 years. I8 As Zhang Yingjin points out, the term "tilm market" in
socialist China was perhaps misleading since the film industry was characterized by their
administrative rather than economic nature. I9 The Party had a full control of this
important cultural section-from production to distribution and exhibition-securing
political function in socialist cinema as a priority to both its commercial and aesthetic
considerations. Operated in direct response to the Party policy-making, the tilm industry
was more strictly organized than any other branches of the cultural industry. This
situation did not change until the late 1980s.
17 Chen Huangmei, Zhongguo zuoyi dianying shi (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1990),273-74.
18 Until 1993, the average price was still around 0.5 yuan to 1yuan.
19 Zhang Yingjin, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Rutledge, 2004), 191.
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The White-haired Girl: Class Struggle and Gender Coding in Socialist Cinema
One primary task that the film industry had to accomplish in the early 1950s was
to legitimatize the CCP's authority and the new socialist China. In March 1951, a one-
month exhibition of films produced by state-owned studios' was held in 26 cities,
presenting 20 feature films and 6 documentaries, which marked the first achievement of
the socialist cinema. Ideologically motivated, many of the films were produced to glorify
the CCP's military victories during the anti-Japanese war and the following civil war, or
the revolutionary deeds of the Communist martyrs. A general presumption about films
produced in the Mao era seems to be that they were pure propaganda films serving
political goals. An underestimation and simplification of their educational and ideological
significance, as well as their artistic achievement, results in a lack of scholarly study of
socialist cinema. It is true that in comparison with left-wing filmmakers who were
capable of striking balances among cinema's artistic, political and commercial agendas,
filmmakers in socialist China faced a much more complicated situation, in which the
political demands had to be fulfilled before any artistic pursuits. Strong Party control
severely handicapped the healthy development of the Chinese film industry, but it did not
suffocate filmmakers' passion. The late 1950s and the early 60s was a golden age of the
socialist cinema.
In the English-speaking world, Paul Clark's Chinese Cinema: Cultural and
Politics since 1949 (1988) is an important study of the Chinese socialist film industry. It
delineates the incorporative role of the film industry when the CCP took the political
revolution further and reconstructed the nation by creating a new socialist culture. Clark
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argues that the transition to socialism in Chinese filmmaking was a struggle for Shanghai
filmmakers to accept the Yan'an ideology. Albeit a productive approach, what is lacking
in his study is a detailed textual analysis that can shed light on the formation of a socialist
aesthetic in cinema. In comparison, Ban Wang's The Sublime Figure ofHistory,
although not a study exclusively devoted to socialist cinema, offers a more
comprehensive picture of the interplay between the aesthetic and the politics in modern
China. He considers socialist cinema an important state ideological apparatus to
reproduce (socialist) subjects through indirect, aesthetic means, such as the fulfillment
and self-empowerment of an individual through participation in collective enterprises, or
the assimilation and sublimation of sexual love into revolutionary and nationalistic
goals.2o Studies done in Chinese recently are also noteworthy. Of the most importance is
Dai Jinhua's Dianying lilun yu piping shouce (A Manual of Film Theory and Criticism,
1993) that examines Chinese filmmaking from the 1950s to 1990s. As she observes,
heroism, collectivism and optimism characterized socialist cinema, and more than a
discourse on Communist revolutions and the maturation of heroes, it attracted and
influenced a whole generation of audiences and turned itself into a meaningful part of
modern Chinese history.21
Baimao nil (The White-haired Girl, 1950) is one of the most outstanding
examples of the socialist cinema in terms of its long-lasted influence. In this film, Yang
Bailao, a poor peasant father, lives with his only daughter, Xi'er, in a northern village.
Xi'er is forcibly taken to the landlord's house as a maid, and is raped later by the
20 Ban Wang, 1997, Chapter 4.
21 Dai Jinhua, Dianying lilun yu piping shouce (Beijing: Kexue jishu chubanshe, 1993), 168-179.
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landlord. After Xi'er manages to run away from the landlord's house and hide herself
deep in the mountains, her hair gradually turns white, and rumors spread in the village
that a white-haired goddess lives in the mountain. It is the Red Army who rescues Xi'er
and helps her get even with the hated landlord. Under the theme that "the old society
turns a human being into a ghost, and the new society turns the ghost back into a human
being," The White-haired Girl vividly represents how millions of Chinese peasants were
exploited by the landlord class in the old China, promising that they will have a happy
life in a bright new China.
Originated from the legend of a white-haired goddess in the border region
between Hebei and Shangxi, The White-haired Girl was first created as a Yangge opera
by members of the Yan'an Lu Xun Academy of Literature and Art. Yangge is a form of
integrated folk art that is very popular in Northeast China. Generally it is performed
festively, with singing and dancing. Responding to Mao's Yan'an Talks, a New Yangge
Movement was initiated in the Yan'an base area, with the aim of learning from the folk
culture and creating works for the masses. 22 The White-haired Girl was a product of the
New Yangge Movement. A successful work as it was, the national popularity of The
White-haired Girl did not come about until 1950 when Shui Hua and Wang Bin adapted
the Yangge opera into film.
Having erased all the legendary elements, an important theme of socialist cinema
- class struggle- was the main narrative line in The White-haired Girl. The class
22 The first performance of this Yange opera was on April 28, 1945, in Yan'an zhongyang dangxiao (the
Yan'an Central Committee Party School). The opera script of The White-haired Girl was published in 1945
under the names of He Jingzhi and Ding Yi. For related study, see Meng Yuan, Geju baimaonuyanjiu
(peking: Zhongguo Renmin University Press, 2005).
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consciousness of the peasants and their confrontation with the brutal landlord class were
constructed from the very beginning of the film. The Yang family is befriended with
other poor peasants such as Uncle Zhao, Danchun and his mother. They work together to
make a living under the landlord's exploitation. After Xi'er is raped by the landlord
Huang Shiren, it is another elder maid in Huang's house who comforts her. When the
elder maid overhears that Huang's mother is going to sell Xi'er, she again helps Xi'er
escape to the mountain. Distinct from earlier leftist films such as Song ofthe Fishermen
or Crows and Sparrows, the ambiguous grey zone between conflicting classes was totally
abandoned in this film; it stated clearly that only people from the same class will help
each other.
The spontaneous class consciousness of the peasants contrasts sharply with the
brutality and hypocrisy of the landlord class. The aggressive landlord Huang Shiren lays
his eyes on the beautiful 17-year-old Xi'er and decides to set up her father. He allows
Yang Bailao a time extension to pay the interest of his debt. On the New Year's Eve,
Yang is forced to sell Xi'er when he is unable to pay both the interest and principal. The
guilty father commits suicide, and Xi'er is taken from her wedding to the landlord's
house. In the scene when the landlord Huang approaches Xi'er and rapes her, what is
shown are close-ups of two tablets: one is Jishan tang (Hall of Charity), the other Daci
dabei (Great Generosity and Big Mercy). These close-ups are accompanied by Xi'er's
cries for help. While the landlord class often uses notions such as charity, generosity, and
mercy to label themselves, what happens in the Hall of Charity actually is nothing but a
merciless rape.
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The juxtaposition of the rape scene with the tablets is worth pondering. It further
visualizes the suffering of the peasant class through the theme of sexual exploitation.
The theme of class struggle becomes more powerful and persuasive when it is
dramatically interwoven with gender discourses. As we know, women's problems have
been a topic that deserves great attention in modern China. In works of literature and art,
women's problems have often been considered as a mirror of China's overall social
problems. Many leftist films featured the urban experiences of women. For example, in
Shennii (Goddess, 1931), the mother works as a prostitute, sacrificing herself for the sake
of her son; Xin niixing (New Woman, 1935) shows how a woman writer has to face many
difficulties in the city and finally kills herself. The gender discourse in The White-haired
Girl is slightly different from the leftist films. With the peasant girl Xi'er as its heroine,
the concerns in The White-haired Girl are not with women's problems, or women's
liberation per se. What Xi'er symbolizes in this film is not only women peasants, but
Chinese peasantry as a whole, or even all the oppressed Chinese people. Although a
cinematic representation of Xi'er' s partly proves Laura Mulvey's feminist account of the
"gaze" in which male spectators always take pleasure in looking at women because when
Xi'er is represented on the screen as a beautiful girl, the film emphasizes her class status
instead of her gender identity. Or, in other words, Xi'er's gender identity in this film is
subordinate to her class identity. Furthermore, when the camera focuses on the tablets
instead ofXi'er, messages of class struggle were put into the foreground. This excellent
mise-en-scene constructs the rape not only as sexual violence, but more importantly, as
class exploitation.
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The appropriation of gender discourses for class struggle is one salient feature of
the socialist cinema. As in The White-haired Girl, the narrative of gender confrontation
was fully incorporated into the grand narration of class struggle in many socialist films.
Sexual exploitation is often represented as one form of class exploitation.
In 1965, The White-Haired Girl was adapted into a revolutionary ballet by the
Shanghai Ballet School, as an effort to nationalize the ballet, a Western-originated form
of art. 23 With affirmation from Mao Zedong, it soon became one of the eight
revolutionary model plays during the era of the Cultural Revolution.24 The ballet version
is different from the film version in several aspects. First, Yang Bailao, the father, is
killed by the landlord when he fights for his daughter. Second, it leaves out Xi'er's
pregnancy and the birth of the baby. In a 1972 same-titled ballet film, Xi'er even
successfully resists Huang Shiren and escapes before being raped. In her study of Chinese
revolutionary literature, Meng Yue reads the successive revisions of The White-haired
Girl as a progressive erasure ofthe gender oppression within class struggle when Xi'er is
represented as the image of an oppressed class rather than an oppressed woman?5 What
ideological mechanism makes the gender discourse serve class struggle in socialist
culture? I found one ofRey Chow's remarks very inspiring. She claims that women's
problems in Chinese writings have been hard to be examined from a feminist perspective
23 Based on the Yangge opera, the story of the white-haired girl was also adapted into a modem Peking
Opera by Fan Junhong in 1958.
24 On May 31, 1967, in order to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Mao's Yan'an talk, People's Daily
published an editorial essay "Geming wenyi de youxiu yangban (The Excellent Models of the
Revolutionary Literature and Art)," in which The White-haired Girl and The Red Detachment ofWomen
have been selected as two of the eight revolutionary model plays.
25 Meng Vue, "Female Images and National Myth," in Gender Politics in Modern China (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1993), 118-36.
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because men always pre-empted women's place as the minor and claim that place for
themselves to the extent that "the Chinese woman" doesn't yet exist. As she argues:
The common view that women's issues always seem to be subsumed under the
"larger" historical issues of the nation, the people, and so forth is therefore true
but also a reversal of what happens in the process of discourse construction. For
in order for us to construct a "large" historical issue, a position of the
victim/minor must always already be present. In terms of language, this means
that for a (new) signifier to emerge as a positive presence, there must always be a
lack/negative supporting it. The producer of the new signifier, however, always
occupies (or "identifies with") the space of the lack/negative (since it is empty) in
order to articulate. 26
In other words, in the process of discourse construction, it is not the larger historical
issues that subsume women's issues. On the contrary, women's issues simply become
nonexistent so it will be easier to appropriate the vacated place to form larger historical
issues. Gender discourses in socialist cinema followed exactly the same rule. The reason
that makes Xi'er's gender identity serve the larger class discourse so perfectly is because
it has been pre-positioned as such. If we can argue that the new signifier in The White-
haired Girl is the CCP or the new socialist China, then Xi' er is the supporting
"lack/negative" that enables the CCP to emerge as a positive presence. Her identity, a
peasant girl, makes her the most "lacking" in contrast to the dominant symbolic, therefore
the most appropriate place for discursive construction. It is through the articulation of
Xi'er, or more accurately, the articulation of the filmmaker on behalf ofXi'er, that the
legitimacy of the CCP and the socialist China has been guaranteed.
What makes the gender discourse more complicated in The White-haired Girl is
the role ofthe Party. As the film shows, Xi'er is not a passive sufferer of the oppression
26 Ray Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Women's Studies (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1993), 110-111.
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but a girl who embodies the resistant spirit ofthe laboring people. Neither Xi'er's father
nor her fiance can protect Xi'er. Her father has been forced to sell her, and Dachun has
failed to help Xi'er escape when she is locked in the landlord's house. Although she
cannot avoid her fate of being exploited and raped, unlike her father, she does not commit
suicide. On the contrary, she shows strong will of resistance. In a stormy night, when the
landlord Huang Shiren and his servant come to a temple for shelter, they are scared away
by the white-haired Xi'er who is seeking food in the temple. Full of hatred, Xi'er chases
them into the storm. However, Xi'er herself cannot accomplish revenge until the coming
of the Red Army. In other words, besides their spontaneous class consciousness, both
Xi'er and Dachun's revolutionary subjectivity have to be activated by the Party. When
Dachun eventually rescues Xi'er from the mountains, his identity is different from the
beginning when he has failed to help Xi'er. Now he is the male embodiment of the Party
and it is the Party who undertakes the responsibilities of a father. By transcending the
biological father to rescue the daughter, the Party assumes the position of a patriarchal
father. In her study of socialist literature, Chen Shunxin argues that if we could attach a
gender label to the dominant literary discourse throughout the socialist era, it would a
male label that represents patriarchal authority.27 The same statement can be applied to
Socialist cinema as well. At the end of the film, Xi'er is shown to have black hair again
because of her happy life with Dachun. The Party is granted an almost supernatural
power that can cure all the sufferings.28
27 Chen Shunxin, Zhongguo dangdai wenxue de xushi yu xingbie (Beijing: Peking University, 1995), 115.
28 Another film describing the same supernatural power was Qing chun (Youth), a 1977 feature film made
by Xie Jin, in which a deaf-mute peasant girl was cured by the miracles ofPLA-administered acupuncture.
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The interweaving of class struggle and gender discourses in The White-haired
Girl has been established as the orthodox in the socialist years. It is not too hard to find
that films such as Liubao de gushi (The Story of Liubao, 1957) and Hongse niangzi jun
(The Red Detachment of Women, 1963) share some similarities with The White-haired
Girl. In The Story ofLiubao, a local warlord tries to seize a peasant girl as his concubine
after he has tortured her elder sister to death. A soldier of the Eight Route Army falls in
love with the girl, and has the CCP-Ied Army rescued her at a critical moment. In The
Red Detachment ofWomen, a young housemaid cannot stand her cruel landlord and runs
away. Later she joins the revolutionary army. The main narrative line focuses on how the
girl gradually grows up to be a woman soldier under the tutelage of a male CCP member.
Besides peasant girls, the space of the "lack/negative" can be assigned to other
marginal social groups whose non-existence could be appropriated to construct larger
historical issues. Qingchun zhige (Song of Youth, 1959) follows Lin Daojing's growing-
up from a girl student to a revolutionary intellectual. As Bang Wang points out, in films
like Song ofYouth , the hero's story is already told, and what the film requires is rather a
candidate's story, which tells of Lin Daojing's "initiation into a place in revolution and
interpellation into the subject position ofhistory.,,29 The peasant class, however, has
been proved the most "politically correct" space of "lack/negative", and others such as
that of intellectuals have been prone to criticism in the anti-rightist campaigns and the
following Cultural Revolution.
The narrative strategy of The White-haired Girl- which promises a bright new
socialist China by condemning the dark old feudalist China- has also been shared by
29 Ban Wang, 131.
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many other films. For example, a vivid comparison between the old and new society can
be found in Longxu gou (The Dragon-beard Ditch, 1952), a screen adaptation of Lao
She's same-titled stage drama. The first part of the film focuses on the miserable lives of
some Peking residents living on the bank of a smelly ditch under the KMT regime. The
government did nothing to dredge up the ditch. As their living situation becomes worse
and worse, the ditch engulfs a lovely girl during a stormy night. Yomi Braster points out
that the remodeling of the irrigation system of Peking had begun under the KMT regime,
and even the Japanese had done some work when Peking was under their occupation.3D
Unsurprisingly, in order to serve the sole legitimacy ofthe CCP, all these efforts have
been ignored in The Dragon-beard Ditch. As told in this film, the CCP government is the
only one that takes care of the people's living situation, and the remodeling ofthe
dragon-beard ditch does not begin until Peking is liberated. Set in Tibet, Nongnu (Serfs,
1963) shows the suffering of Tibetan serfs by telling the life of a serf named Jampa. The
serfs owner works him as a mule. Jampa is forced to flee with his owner when the PLA
enters Tibet. Nearing the border, he throws the owner from his back. As the two fighting,
a pursuing PLA soldier saves Jampa. Serfs ends with Jampa uttering his first words in
years: "I want to talk. I have so much to say." The next shot shows him turning to a
portrait of Mao, saying: "Chairman Mao." As in The White-haired Girl and The Dragon-
beard Ditch, the dark days have passed, and what is waiting ahead is a bright new life.
As a major component of the socialist culture, socialist cinema responded to
almost every policy change in China. Xia Yan, then the leader of the film industry, has
30 Yomi Braster, "Chengshijingguan yu lishijiyi: guanyu 'Longxugou'," in Cheng Pingyuan and David
Der-wei Wang eds., Beijing: dushi xiangxiang yu wenhuajiyi (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005),
125-45.
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stressed that films should touch on the pulse of the time and tell stories full of political
atmosphere.31 Such a highly intensified political consciousness made socialist cinema a
political tool that could effect cultural transformation and shape people's worldview. Its
powerfulness, as shown in The White-haired Girl and many other films, lies in an
apparent simplicity of narration and an absolute absence of ambiguity. Almost every
leading character in socialist cinema, borrowing Frederic Jameson's statement on third-
world literature, could be read allegorically, no matter if s/he is a peasant girl or a
Communist Party member. As ideology-loaded visual signs, all leading characters have
to be read collectively, too. What has been achieved in the narration of revolution is
nothing but women subjected to men/Party and individuals to the collective.
National Style and National Cinema
Compared with leftist films made in 1930's Shanghai, or those made after the
anti-Japanese war such as A Spring River to the East and Crows and Sparrows, a
noticeable feature in The White-haired Girl and many other socialist films is their
extensive appropriation of the folklore culture. The popularity of The White-haired Girl,
to a great extent, owned to its successful singing, originally a part of Yangge. At the
beginning of the film, after the screen fades in on a village by a lake below a mountain
and then cuts to a pan across a valley and a river, Uncle Zhao appears on a hillside,
herding sheep and singing:
Clear flowing water and bright blue sky,
fields of grain below the hills.
The sorghum stretches to the horizon,
the Huang family's land is boundless.
31 Xia Yan, Xie Dianyingjuben dejige wenti (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1959), 8.
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As the song continues, a montage of shots shows the fields, the valley, Madame Huang at
home with her servants, young men laboring in the fields, and Yang Bailao cutting grain.
Then song is continued by a chorus in voiceover:
The master is in the mansion,
tenant farmers bring in the autumn harvest.
They bleed and sweat, working like beasts of burden.
The older farmers' backs are breaking,
their children are nothing but skin and bones.
Their suffering has no end.
Often an impromptu composition, Yangge singing is an indigenous way for rural folks in
Northwest China to express wishes and all sorts of emotions. In the typical Yangge style,
this opening song introduces a beautiful rural landscape with clear message of class
confrontation. When Uncle Zhao's solo is replaced by a chorus, a collective class identity
emerges. It sets the basic tune of the film.
Having been integrated into the narrative, folk songs also help unfold the plot in a
more artistic way. In the scene of the New Year Eve when Xi'er is going to marry
Dachun, after cutting to Yang Bailao entering into the Huang mansion to pay the debt,
the next shot shows Xi'er preparing for her wedding at home. Sitting in front of a mirror,
Xi'er combs and ties her hair with red yarn. She then inspects herself in the mirror and
sings in a happy tone:
Rich girls dress up with flowers when they are getting married,
My father has no money to buy flowers,
He bought me a strand of red yarn,
I tie up my hair in front of the mirror. ...
It turns out that the red yarn is the last tiny happiness she enjoys. By juxtaposing the song
with Yang Bailao entering into the Huang mason, the happy wedding atmosphere is
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overshadowed by an oncoming disaster - the father commits suicide and the daughter is
taken away from her wedding. Tying up the Red Yarn, together with North Wind Blows,
another song in this film, has become well-known across the nation.
In addition to its domestic popularity, The White-haired Girl has been screened in
more than 30 countries and regions. It is said that hundreds of young audiences watched
this film in the rain when it was screened in a National England Youth Celebration.32 At
the Sixth Karlovy Cary International Film Festival in 1951, it won the Special Honorary
Prize. The success of The White-haired Girl, domestically and internationally, signifies
the development of a national style in Chinese cinema. Ifwe can say that the left-wing
filmmakers in the 1930s contributed greatly to the indigenization ofthe Westem-
originated film medium in China, their influence, nevertheless, was confined to urban
areas. After their filmmaking experiments were abruptly interrupted by the Sino-
Japanese War and the following civil war, it was during the socialist era that efforts in
developing a distinctive national style of Chinese cinema paid off.
In modem Chinese history, the adjective term "minzude" (national) was the direct
opposite of "foreign" and "western." It can be understood as "Chinese-ness" or "Chinese
characteristics." Under the impact of Western culture, the May Fourth era witnessed an
increasing concern of how to preserve and carry forward Chinese cultural tradition. In
evaluating the revolutionary role of works of literature and art, Qu Qiubai, a prominent
CCP theorist and critic, has pointed out that the Westernized tendency of May Fourth
Movement upon which the Chinese revolutionary literary movement was based was alien
32 Meng Guda. "Shenmiao de shizhe--zhongguo dianying zai yingguo (Magical Missionary-ehinese
cinema in England)," Dazhong dianying (1952): vol. 14.
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to the people. He worried that ignoring the rich, popular, folk "heritage" of the Chinese
people would rob the leftist literary movement of a mass base.33 His opinion led to the
lively discussion on Dazhong Wenyi (literature for the masses) in 1932 to a new apex.
Studies on this topic have been done extensively over years, including the CCP-stamped
Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi (A History of Modern Chinese Literature) by Tang Tao,
C.T. Hsia's A History ofModern Chinese Literature which goes against the grain of the
Communist view, Marsten Anderson's The Limits ofRealism: Chinese Fiction in the
Revolutionary Period, and Paul Pickowicz's case study Marxist Literary Thought in
China: The Influence ofQu Qiubai, just to name a few. Among leftist writers who were
concerned with the importance and necessity of Dazhonghua (popularization), it was Qu
Qiubai who clarified its mission in two aspects: popularizing the proletarian culture and
creating revolutionary mass culture. He also launched strong criticism of reactionary
popular culture that poisoned the masses' mind with feudalist ideas.
During the discussion on "literature for the masses," the debate on Minzu Xingshi
(national style) became a topic that resounded among Chinese intellectuals. Some agreed
to promote new ideas through traditional literary forms such as folksongs, because they
were more suitable to the masses with lower levels of literacy. Their opponents insisted
that the old literary forms were incapable of disseminating new ideas. Others worried
about the low artistic value of the popular literary forms. Mao joined in this debate and
lifted the issue of national style to a position that was as important as international
thoughts. He called for a literary movement of Zhongguo zuo.feng (Chinese style) and
33 For more discussion on Qu Qiubai's literary opinion, see Paul G. Pickowice, "Qu Qiubai's Critique of
the May Fourth Generation: Early Chinese Marxist Literary Criticism," in Merle Goldman ed. Modern
Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 351-384.
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Zhongguo qipai (Chinese manner). In his 1938 speech entitled "The Position of the
Chinese Communist Party in the National Struggle," Mao issued one of his first cultural
directives to change the literary scene, and the national scene as a whole:
To make Marxism concretely Chinese, to ensure that its every expression
manifest Chinese characteristics-that is to say, to apply Marxism with due
regard for Chinese qualities-this is the urgent problem which the whole party
should try to understand and solve. Foreign-slanted pedantry and obscurantism
must be discouraged, and dogmatism must be arrested so that a fresh and vivid
Chinese style and Chinese manner, of which the Chinese masses are fond, may
take their place.34
Mao carried forward Qu's idea of striving for a literature completely alienated
from the West and stressed the importance of Sinification: "Those who separate
internationalist content from national forms do not understand internationalism at all, and
we should combine these two aspects closely.,,35 This ideal ofSinification, however, was
obstructed by the political crisis at Yan'an, which required literature and art to be tools of
propaganda. In his 1942 Yan'an Talks, Mao further developed his view on literary forms:
Our specialists in literature should pay attention to the wall newspapers of the
masses and to the reportage written in the army and the villages. Our specialists in
drama should pay attention to the small troupes in the army and the villages. Our
specialists in music should pay attention to the songs of the masses. Our
specialists in the fine arts should pay attention to the fine arts of the masses. All
these comrades should make close contact with comrades engaged in the work of
popularizing literature and art among the masses. On the one hand, they should
help and guide the popularizers, and on the other, they should learn from these
comrades and, through them, draw nourishment from the masses to replenish and
enrich themselves so that their specialties do not become "ivory towers", detached
from the masses and from reality and devoid of content or life.36
34 Quoted from C.T. Hsia, 1999,301-302.
35 Ibid.
36 McDougall, 35.
77
In the literary context the meaning of this paragraph was quite clear: workers of
literature and art should learn the indigenous literary and art forms that Qu Qiubai had
already praised in his promotion of "literature for the masses." A "mass line" of "from
the masses, to the masses" had been nailed down not only as the method of the Party
leadership but also as the criterion to judge both the content and the form of literature and
art. That is, the content should draw from the masses, and the form should be acceptable
to the masses. In brief, from content to form, Mao's views on literature and art directly
served his political agenda. Although he was not directly against Western literary forms,
the sinification project was temporarily put aside.
Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), the newly established
PRC was severed from the U.S. and its allies. In the early years ofthe PRC, private-
owned enterprises were allowed to continue during the transition to socialism. This idea
ofNew Democracy was an effective strategy to secure social stability and keep up rapid
development in production.37 As soon as the socialist transition was completed, Mao
began exploring non-capitalist ways of development. Some historians of China regard
Mao's socialism as a "de1inking" practice from the capitalist world system.38 What we
should bear in mind is, despite the fact that China was politically and economically
severed from the West, the latter was always "an absented presence" that determined the
policy-making in every aspect of the former.
37 Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," Selected Works, II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965),339-
384.
38 The term "de1inking" comes from Samir Amin and has been borrowed by Arif Dir1ik in his study on the
development of socialism in China. See Samir Amin, Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World (London:
ZED Books, 1990). Also see ArifDirlik, Postmodernity's Histories: the Past as Legacy and Project
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000), 19-62.
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The "delinking" practice inevitably influenced socialist filmmaking. Western
films quickly disappeared from the Chinese film market, and more and more films
produced by the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist camp were dubbed into
Chinese. Meanwhile, except for film theories from the Soviet Union, Western film
theories were scarcely known in China and had limited influence on Chinese filmmaking.
It was during the Cold War era that the earlier debate on national style began to take on
new significance. In the spirit of Mao's Yan'an Talks, cinematic appropriation of the
folklore culture became the most indispensable part of developing a national style of
Chinese cinema. For instance, an important character in The Dragon-beard Ditch is a
good-for-nothing performer nicknamed Crazy Cheng. He performs Shulaibao, a form of
folk art that is characterized by poetic, fast, rhythmic, comical oral performance. After
being assaulted by a local gangster, Crazy Cheng has escaped to the Dragon-beard Ditch
and lives on his wife's income from peddling cigarettes. After Beijing is liberated, he
devotes himself to the reconstruction of the ditch. At the remodeling celebration, he
praises the CCP government with a Shulaibao ballad:
To all you people, I joyfully state,
The People's Government is truly great.
It mended the Ditch, and took great pains for us though we're not rich.
A first-rate government, loving all poor men,
Help us stand straight and march with great strides and go laughing one,
All workers must strive with their hearts as one.
Must strive together, and work without cease,
Then our land will be great, the people happy, and the world at peace!39
39 Liao Hungying, Dragon Beard Ditch, A Play in Three Acts (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956), 100.
79
This ballad sings out the film's theme-the people's government is for the people. As a
popular form of folk art, Shulaibao was simply a way to make a living in the old society.
When the Party leadership is highly praised through the ballad created by the performer
Crazy Cheng, it is indicated that the folk art's revolutionary potential has been waken up
and flourished. The Communist Party liberated both the performer and the folk art. In this
sense, it is easy to understand why this work earned its prestigious writer, Lao She, a title
of People's Artist.
Besides the revolutionary usage of the folk art, a rediscovery ofthe Chinese past
became one major trend of filmmaking in late 1950s and early 1960s. Cinematic
representations of historical figures including Li Shizhen (1518-1593), an influential
scholar of Chinese medicine; Lin Zexu (1785-1850), a national hero in the Opium War
(1839-1842), and others. Historical events such as the uprising of the Small Sword
Society (1853-1855) and the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) were represented under
the theme of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism. All these historical subjects showed
respect for national culture and contributed to the formation of a national style on the
screen.40
Minority film productions were often categorized as films with distinctive
national styles, which made the development of national style in Chinese cinema a more
complicated issue. Over thousands of years, China has served as home to many ethnic
groups. Disdained as barbarians of one sort or another, minority uprisings against the Han
majority in China happened from time to time. Mongols and Manchus even established
40 They were Li Shizhen (1956), Lin Zexu (1957), Xiaodao Hui (1961), and Jiawu Fengyun (1962).
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their dominance over the Han people in the Yuan (1271-1368) and Qing (1644-1911)
dynasties respectively. After the founding of the PRC, 41 minority nationalities were
officially recognized in the 1953 census, including large ethnic groups such as Manchus,
Miaos, Uyghurs, and Mongols. Later, 55 minority groups were recognized, which
comprised around 10 percent of the total Chinese population. National solidarity is of
great importance in any modem nation-state of multi-ethnicities. The CCP government
set up important minority policies, including establishing ethnic autonomous areas,
helping promote economic and cultural development of the minority groups, and more.
Minority people are free to use and develop their ethnic languages, and to maintain their
own cultural and social customs.41 The PRC's Constitution and laws guarantee equal
rights to all ethnic groups in China, and ethnic minorities are well represented in the
National People's Congress as well as governments at both the provincial and prefectural
levels. Consequently, minority themes occupied a certain quota in the field of socialist
filmmaking.
Another important political reason that facilitated the production of minority
films has been generally neglected. In 1956, Mao issued a new policy-- "Baihua qifang,
baijia zhengmin" (Let a hundred flowers bloom, and a hundred schools of though
contend), encouraging debate and criticism ofthe Party leadership. The so-called
"Hundred Flowers" period brought in a relative political relaxation, making filmmaking
experiments of a wider range of film genres and subjects become possible. A variety of
film productions appeared in this liberal environment, including several satirical
41 One notable preferential treatment ethnic minorities enjoy since the 1980s is that they are exempt from
the "One Family, One Child" birth control policy.
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comedies. By June 1957 it turned out that Mao had allowed "one hundred flowers
bloom" only as a means to lure dissidents out in order to crack them down. The following
Anti-Rightist campaign delayed many films in mid-production, and many others became
targets of criticism. Great pressure was put on filmmaking. After the Sino-Soviet alliance
was terminated in 1957, socialist realism, the Soviet-originated literary orthodoxy, was
replaced by "a combination of socialist realism with revolutionary romanticism," which
further necessitated the efforts of developing national styles in literature and art.42 In
order to keep "politically correct," most films then produced either dealt with the war
theme or served as straightforward political propaganda for the Great Leap Forward
Movement, which made Xia Yan, the leader of the Ministry of Culture, very
unsatisfied.43 He wanted films that could make the audience relax and feel lighthearted.
Minority films became the first consideration not only because they could offer a
different culture scenery that would attract the major Han audiences, but more
importantly, because filmmakers could enjoy a relative artistic freedom in dealing with
minority themes. As I mentioned earlier, minority groups in the PRC could maintain their
own cultural and social customs, which was very different from the Han Chinese since
much of the latter's cultural tradition was criticized as feudalist legacy and abandoned
consequently. In other words, the minority policies meant less party interference and
more artistic freedom, especially in terms of "revolutionary romanticism." This political
background has to be taken into account to consider the popularity of minority films.
42 For related study, see Chen Shunxin, Shehui zhuyi xianshi zhuyi zai zhongguo de jieshou yu zhuanbian
(Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002).
43 Recalled by Gong Pu, one of the scriptwriters ofFive Golden Flowers, in Dianying chuanqi (Story of
Movies), a TV series on Chinese cinema produced by CCTV, 2004.
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About 20 minority films were produced in the 1950s, and the number was increased in
the 1960s. Most of them enjoyed great popularity among the Han audiences, which is a
noteworthy phenomenon.
Produced in 1959 as a "tributary film" for the 10th anniversary of the founding of
the PRC, Wuduo jinhua (Five Golden Flowers, 1959) is one of the most successful
minority films. It tells ofthe lives of the Bai people who live in concentrated
communities in Dali, Yunnan Province.44 A Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture was
founded in November 1956 after the completion of the land reform and socialist
transition. Situated on the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, the Bai area is crisscrossed with
rivers. The river valleys, dense forests, and vast tracts of land form a beautiful landscape
and provide an abundance of crops and fruits. The Bai people are good singers and
dancers. A March Fair, which occurs between March 15th and 20th of the lunar calendar,
is a grand festival of the Bai people. Celebrated every year at the foot of the Diancang
Mountain to the west of Dali city, the fair is an occasion for sporting contests and
theatrical performances. People gather there to enjoy dancing, horse racing and other
games.
Set in Dali, Five Golden Flowers opens with the March Fair. On his way to join
the horse races, Ah Peng, a Bai young man, meets a group of pretty Bai girls who beg
him to fix their broken wagon. He falls in love with a girl named Golden Flower, and she
agrees to meet him again the next year, probably as a test for his love at first sight.
Because Golden Flower is a very common name for Bai girls, the following year Ah
44 Based on the Census of July 1, 1990, the Bai minority is listed as the 14th largest ethnic group with a
population of 1,598,100.
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Peng comes across four girls with the same name. After many set-backs, plenty of
mistakes and numerous jokes, Ah Peng succeeds, at last, in finding the girl he loves.
What deserve special attention in this film are the different professions of the five
girls. Ah Peng's lover is a deputy Commune director, and the other four are a fertilizer
maker, herdswoman, steelworker, and tractor operator, respectively. In other words, they
identify with each other in terms of an equal enthusiastic participation in the socialist
construction. The film echoes the Great Leap Forward Movement. Launched by Mao in
1957, this movement aimed not only to compete with the Western countries, but also to
show the Soviet Union a Chinese approach of economic development. Two important
strategies of this movement are a mass steel-making campaign and the formation of the
people's communes. Correspondingly, the lead heroine in the film is a deputy Commune
director, and Ah Peng a blacksmith. A more obvious plot is about the steelworker Golden
Flower who looks for ironstones in mountains. Ah Peng helps her set up a furnace for
steel-making. Ah Peng's quest to find his lover turns out to be a wonderful opportunity to
stage the Chinese people's passion for the Great Leap Forward Movement. As shown in
this film, even women of minorities are no longer confined at home, thanks to the
women's liberation movement. They are devoting themselves enthusiastically in building
a new Bai community, a miniature of the new China. "It is in the recycling of the
individual's libidinal energy for revolutionary purpose, in the constant displacing of the
individual's life and enjoyment into revolutionary experience that we find politics
working in close concert with aesthetics", argues Ban Wang in his analysis on other two
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"tributary" films produced in the same year, Song ofYouth and Nie Er.45 To me, Five
Golden Flowers makes the concert of politics and aesthetics a visual spectacle through
the power of images and obvious entertaining elements. For instance, comic elements
have been skillfully interwoven in a love story in this film. The main narrative line is a
series of misunderstandings that happen very often in our daily lives. Because Ah Peng
knows only that the girl he is looking for can sing well, he is led to a herdswoman who is
busy taking care of a new-born sheep. Ah Peng stands outside and the woman inside,
they don't see each other. When Ah Peng attempts to express his love for her in song, she
considers him an idler and chases him away with a bucket of water. Later, when Ah Peng
is about to recognize his Golden Flower's voice on the telephone, a wagon pulls down a
telephone pole and the line is cut off. His search for love ends with a happy reunion of
the five Bai girls and their lovers at the Butterfly Spring. When the entertaining comedic
style was combined with picturesque landscapes, melodious music and songs, beautiful
costumes, exotic customs and a romantic love story-an audiovisual treat occurred that
was unthinkable in a highly politicized Han-majority setting. Therefore, Paul Clark
claims that the enormous success of Five Golden Flowers is not surprising. 46 It achieved
big box office revenues in Hong Kong, and even a Taiwanese newspaper reported that
this film was "a crafty communist propaganda." 47
Besides Five Golden Flowers, other popular films on minorities include Liu sanjie
(Third Sister Liu, 1960), Bingshan shangde laike (Visitor on the Ice Mountain, 1963),
45 Ban Wang, 124.
46 Paul Clark, 99-100.
47 Recalled by Gong Pu in Story ofMovies.
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and Ah shima (Ashima, 1964). Third Sister Liu tells how a folksong singer ofthe Zhuang
minority fights against a local landlord. Visitor on the Ice Mountain, one of the most
popular anti-spy thrill films, praises the solidarity between the PLA and the Uyghurs in
defending the new China. Ashima is a legendary love story of the Sani ethnic group in
which a beautiful girl drowns in a flood after having escaped from a forced marriage to
an evil landlord's son. In general, minority films are different from films concerning the
Han Chinese in terms of the entertaining elements.
The representation of the minority groups in this minority films, however, is very
problematic. For example, the Bai people have their own dialect and most can only speak
their dialect, instead of Mandarin Chinese. In Five Golden Flowers, the leading actress is
ofthe Yi minority and speaks Yunnan local dialect, while the leading actor speaks
Cantonese. All of the language differences are ignored in minority films. Mandarin
dialogue is used throughout, aiming to serve the promotion of the standard Mandarin
Chinese across the country. Five Golden Flower opens with the March Fair, which even
though is portrayed as a Bai cultural tradition, is more a cultural exhibition for the Han
people. What has been highlighted is a Bai culture that is exotic to the Han people, not
only in terms of the Bai costumes. In this sense, I find myself in agreement with Dru
Gladney's theory of the relationship between the Han cultural hegemony and the minority
culture as "internal colonialism" and "internal Orientalism." 48 What I want to emphasize
further is, with its unmatchable powerfulness in constructing visual spectacles, the film
medium has played an important role in the formation of Orientalist discourses. In the
48 Dru C. Gladney. "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/ Minority identities," Journal
ofAsian Studies (FeburaryI994): 92-123.
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long history involving issues of colonialism or Orientalism, it is the invention of cinema
and the cinematic representation of the "other" that brings the influence of colonial or
Orientalist discourses in the field of knowledge learning to its apex. Just to mention one
fact: soon after the birth of cinema, Thomas Edison sent his cameramen traveling across
the world to shot short films. Since then, cinema has become an important mass medium
to spread knowledge of the "other," and it is possibly the most effective way.
In Five Golden Flowers, two minor comic figures accompany Ah Peng's love
quest, an artist and a musician, both of the Han nationality. During their fieldtrip in Dali,
both claim to be highly inspired by Bai folk artists. After attending the wedding
ceremony of the tractor operator, the musician says that he has listened to many valuable
folksongs, and the artist claims to have collected many designs of national styles. An
interesting displacement happens here when the Bai culture is defined as one of national
styles. Paul Clark finds it paradoxical that "one of the most effective ways to make films
with 'Chinese' style was to go to the most 'foreign' cultural areas in the nation." 49 Zhang
Yingjin argues that the outcome oflocating "national style" in ethnic cultural practices is
a legitimization of minority people as part ofthe "solidarity" of the Chinese nation, and
minority films functions as "an effective means by which the nation-state objectifies
minority peoples through stereotypes and co-opts them in the construction of a socialist
China." 50 Reasonable if considered from a domestic perspective though, Zhang's point
49 Paul Clark. "Ethnic Minorities in Chinese Films: Cinema and the Exotic," East-West Film Journal I
(June 1987): 15-31,25.
50 Zhang Yingjin. "From 'Minority Film' to 'Minority Discourse': Questions ofNationhood and Ethnicity
in Chinese Cinema," Cinema Journal, (Spring 1997): 73-90, 88-89.
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of view cannot explain why Five Golden Flowers has been highly praised internationally
as an excellent work of art with vivid national style, too. In 1960, at the Second Asia-
African film festival, Five Golden Flowers won the Best Director Award as well as the
Best Actress Award. In the following years, it has been screened in over 50 countries. In
this regard, another dimension has to be added into Zhang's argument, that is, minority
cultures have been used as indispensable elements to establish national styles of Chinese
cinema. This phenomenon actually shows a paradox of minority cultures. On the one
hand, they are identified as minors in contrast to the maj or Han culture; on the other
hand, their marginal existence has been integrated into the very formation of the Chinese
cultural identity. Since the 19th century, the Han culture has been significantly
westernized, especially after the May Fourth Movement. Located mostly in the hinterland
China, minority groups have little contact with the outside world, thus Western culture
hardly has any impact on their development. It is the intactness of minority cultures that
makes them integral ingredients of a national culture in a non-Western context.
A similar emphasis on indigenous cultural heritages also could be found in the
KMT-controlled Taiwan. In the 1960s, against the traditionalist aesthetic that dominated
the literary scene of Taiwan throughout the 1950s and the KMT government's policy of
promoting anti-Communist literature, a group of young writers launched a modernist
literary movement, advocating Western modernist literary techniques and aesthetics. The
tenet of Westernization was criticized in following literary debates. Progressive
intellectuals urged writers to show more respects for their indigenous cultural heritages
as well as greater concern for domestic social issues. By using Taiwanese dialect to
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depict the plight of the poor people and the dilemmas of industrialization and
urbanization, a nativist, socially responsible literature achieved considerable influence in
the 1970s. Er'zi de da wan 'ou (His Son's Big Doll, 1983), a film adaptation of one
representative nativist writer Huang Chunming's works, marked the beginning ofthe
New Cinema Wave in Taiwan. Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang has pointed out that
"Taiwan's Modernist Literary Movement in the 1960s and the virulent Nativist resistance
to it in the 1970s are exemplary ofworld literary history in the 20th century, a significant
component ofwhich is the global spread of Western social and cultural values along with
the expansion of Capitalism."Sl While the American power and the capitalist system were
an "absented-presence" in the PRC, their threatening existence in Taiwan resulted in a
more virulent anti-imperialism and a search for local and national identities.
It was not until the 1980s that the PRC reopened to the West. Consequently, a
belated search of Chinese cultural identity re-emerged among Chinese intellectuals in the
so-called Xunge wenxue (Seeking-for-root Literature), a resistance to and a reflection on
the process of modernization. Han Shaogong is one of the most influential seeking-for-
root writers. His essay "The 'Root' of Literature" is generally regarded by most as a
"manifesto" ofthis new literary wave. He argues that "literature has its root, and the root
of literature should be deeply planted in the soil of a national traditional culture,
otherwise it will be very hard to have the leaves flourishing without a deep-root."s2 He
summons Chinese writers to stimulate national culture, "China is still China among all
kinds of vicissitudes. We have a national selfhood, especially in the aspect of literature
51 Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, 1993, viii.
52 Han Shaogong. "Wenxue degen (The Root of Literature)," Zuojia (March 1985): vo1.6.
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and art, and also in the aspect of a national deep-level spirit and cultural characteristics.
Our mission is to release the heat energy of modern notions and remold and polish the
selfhood."s3 Once again, most of the works of the seeking-for-root movement were
inspired by marginal minority cultures. Different from minority films produced in the
1950s and 1960s that contributed to the formation of national styles, this time, minority
cultures have been rediscovered as a cure for cultural identity crisis. Ironically, the
cinematic representation of this identity search led to the international success of the so-
called Fifth Generation filmmakers, whose works have been criticized by many critics as
self-Orientalism or exhibitionism.
The paradox of minority cultures is not an exclusive Chinese phenomenon. It
happens to any non-Western national culture threatened by Western cultures. As both
cinema and the system of nation-state are products of a Euro-American originated
modernity, the efforts in developing national styles in Chinese cinema, as well as in other
non-Western national cinema, cannot be studied comprehensively without a global
perspective. Sheldon Lu has proposed a transnational perspective that is necessary for
Chinese film studies after the end of the Cold War, which, in my point of view, bears
some symptoms of amnesia, that is, an ignorance of the revolutionary legacy of Chinese
cinema and its aesthetic characteristics. It was the Cold War era that led to the formation
of a vivid national style in Chinese cinema.
53 Han Shaogong. "Wenxue degen (The Root of Literature)," Zuojia (March 1985): vo1.6.
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CHAPTER IV
CHINESE CINEMA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZAnON
In Mao's China, the film industry was part and parcel of the ideological state
apparatus, promoting Party leadership and socialism. Thanks to filmmakers' artistic
endeavors, socialist cinema met with considerable success across the country, and some
of them even achieved a worldwide influence. The Cultural Revolution (1966-76) saw
the greatest setback in the history of Chinese cinema. A total of 589 features and over
1,000 documentary, animation, and educational titles that had been produced in the
preceding seventeen years (1949-1965), as well as 883 foreign features, were banned as
"poisonous weeds" almost overnight. 1 Hundreds of filmmakers were imprisoned or
forced to work at labor camps. Film production came almost to a standstill. After the
Cultural Revolution, the Chinese film industry has rebounded with enthusiasm and force.
Film production has increased annually.
This chapter attempts to analyze how political and economic reforms initiated by
the CCP government have changed the Chinese film industry in a global context. It
begins with a historical review of the film industry reform, as the "open and reform"
policy went deeper in the mid-1980s, and proceeds with the importation of Hollywood
blockbusters since 1994. It will address five research questions: 1) What consequences
have resulted from the film industry reform? 2) How was the political background for the
I ZhangYingjin, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2004), 217.
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promotion of the so-called ZhuxuanlU (Main melody) films? 3) Why did China reopen its
domestic market to major Hollywood film studios in1994? 4) In competition with
Hollywood, what kind of industrial reorganization has taken place in the Chinese film
industry? 5) How have these changes affected film production as well as distribution in
China? Correspondingly, this chapter is divided into five parts. A comparative study of
the power structure in general, and the role of the state in China and in the United States
in particular, may offer insights into the political economy of the film industry in a global
context. In addition to historical and political economic approaches, textual analysis
throughout this chapter will show how the policy changes have been embodied in film
texts.
Film Industry Reform and Its Consequences
From 1949 to 1965, the Chinese film industry had made steady progress despite
several nationwide campaigns against intellectuals in general and workers of literature
and art in particular. Socialist filmmaking was subject to the unrelenting political
demands of the CCP leadership. The Party guidelines were driven to extremes during the
years of the Cultural Revolution. When Jiang Qing (Madam Mao) took control of
literature and art, a new cultural policy was issued to all artists: "giving prominence to
positive characters among all the characters, to heroes among the positive characters, and
to the leading hero among the heroes." Under the so-called "three prominences"
principle, except for a few "revolutionary model play" films, no feature films were
produced from 1966 to 1972. From 1973 to 1976, 76 feature films were produced to
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serve class struggle as well as internal struggles within the Party? For example, Haigang
(On the Docks, 1972) is about the ideological backsliding of a dock worker who is
tempted by an undercover class enemy and re-educated by an old worker and a local
party leader; Juelie (Breaking with Old Ideas, 1975) depicts political campaigns against
those "capitalist roaders" during the 1957 Great Leap Forward Movement.
At the landmark meeting of the Third Plenum of the 11 th Central Committee of
the CCP in 1978, Mao's thoughts of class struggle and a continuous cultural revolution
were renounced, and the Party shifted its attention to economic development. Hundreds
of films that had been denounced by Jiang Qing were rehabilitated and released. In the
Fourth National Congress of Workers of Literature and Art in 1979, Deng Xiaoping
announced that "works of literature and art are a special kind of spiritual creation, and the
Party should not interfere in it." He stated that literature and art should serve "the people
and socialism," and "what to write and how to write can only be answered gradually by
artists themselves in their artistic exploitation." 3 As an effort to recover the film industry
that had been seriously damaged during the Cultural Revolution, the State Council
ratified a report co-issued by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Finance, which,
cited often as Document #198 1979, restored the basic structure of the Chinese film
industry. While the state-controlled China Film was still the sole corporation to manage
film distribution and exhibition throughout the country, a new China Film Export and
Import Corporation was established at the end of 1979 as the only enterprise in China
conducting film export and import in the international market. Before its establishment,
2 Yin Hong and Ling Yan, Xin zhongguo dianyinshi: 1949-2000 (Changsha: Hunan Meishu Press, 2002), 93.
3 China Film Yearbook 1981 (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1982), 19.
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all import and export were assigned to China Film. In practice, the newly established
corporation merely worked as a branch of China Film.
The new leadership of Deng opened a "New Era" (1978-1989) characterized by
economic reform, modernization, and liberalization of thought. A Great Cultural
Discussion, or "Cultural Fever" as it has been frequently referred to, swept over the
nation.4 Filmmakers and critics actively participated in the discussion and launched
debates on the nature of the film medium, including issues such as the relationship
between film and literature, the modernization of film language, and the impact of Italian
new realism. Since science and technology were highly promoted in official slogans,
exploration of filmmaking techniques and film theories became a Party endorsed
movement, which left visible marks on films produced in the New Era. In their efforts to
eliminate the cliche-ridden class discourse, many filmmakers tried to depict the
revolutionary history from new perspectives. For example, set in the civil war, Xiaohua
(A Little Flower, 1979) tells a touching story about two girls who meet during the civil
war and do not know that they are looking for the same person. Finally a PLA soldier is
found to be the brother of both. Instead of presenting a panorama of the war, Jinye
xingguang canlan (Stars Are Shining Tonight, 1980) focuses on a more intimate
relationship between three young soldiers and a peasant girl who steps into their midst.
More filmmakers engaged in reflecting the Cultural Revolution. Films such as Kunao ren
de xiao (Smiles ofa Pained Person, 1979), Tianyun shan chuanqi (Legend of the Tianyun
4 For studies on the "Cultural Fever," see Wang ling, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and
Ideology in Deng's China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) and Zhang Xudong, Chinese
Modernism in the Era ofReforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
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Mountain, 1980), andXiaojie (The Alley, 1981) received favorable response among
Chinese audiences with their vivid representation of the traumatic experiences people
suffered during the ten-year catastrophe. The so-called Fourth Generation filmmakers,
most of whom had received professional training before the Cultural Revolution but did
not begin their career until the 1980s, contributed greatly to this fruitful era of Chinese
cinema. Under an active and prosperous environment for filmmaking experiments, annual
feature productions grew from 67 in 1979 to 144 in 1984.5
As the enactment of the "open and reform" policy brought about many changes in
the economic field, such as the production responsibility system in the countryside and
the rise of private ownership in cities, corresponding changes in the institutional levelled
to a weakening of the central Party leadership over local business. The film industry,
which had long been regarded by the CCP as its mouthpiece, was also affected by the
nationwide political and economic transformation. In 1984, the Third Plenum ofthe 12th
Central Committee of the CCP further decided to let the market playa major role in
developing the national economy. A previous "socialist planned economy" was replaced
by a "socialist planned commodity economy." As newspapers and the publishing industry
began to participate in the grand wave of commercialization, the film industry was also
redefined as a cultural industry rather than a political tool. The government adopted a
policy to gradually cut subsidies and encourage commercialized financing in the film
industry. The state-funded mode of film production had begun to give way to economic
reform. Many film studios were pushed toward the market economy, producing more
entertainment films with competitive market value. Meanwhile, the quick development
5 Zhang Yingjin, 2004, 227.
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of China's television industry and other leisure activities such as watching pirated
videotapes began to attract large audiences. The Ministry of Radio, Film and Television
(MRFT) was established in January 1986, to consolidate and coordinate efficiently the
three major sectors of China's audiovisual industry. As part of the nation's drive for
reform and modernization, the Ministry of Culture handed film studio management to the
MRFT in 1986, which has brought about more enormous changes to the Chinese film
industry, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The consequences of the film industry
reform since 1984 can be examined through changes occurring in three aspects: film
financing, film subjects, and film distribution.
1) Film Financing
The unprecedented financial pressure faced by film studios in China since the
mid-1980s first led to the introduction of the contractual responsibility system. According
to this system, once a contract is signed between filmmakers and the studio, the producers
are free to form their own group and decide how to use the budget and organize the actual
production. If a film makes money, the studio and filmmakers then divide the profit
according to the contract. If the film fails, the studio may punish filmmakers by cutting
their salaries, although it is impossible to cover the loss.6
Gradually, instead of competing for the limited state allocation, film studios and
producers began to raise funds through other channels such as private corporations. Since
only state-run studios could obtain the film quota to produce films, any outside investors
had to affiliate with a studio in order to share the right of film production and make a
6 Wu Xianggui, Chinese Film Industry since 1977, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Oregon, 1992), 160,
273.
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profit. Sometimes a studio simply sold its production rights to collect a flat "management
fee" of around 300,000 yuan.7 As a result, co-productions with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
many overseas investors have become increasingly popular. It was estimated that among
154 domestic products in 1993, 81 were made by non-state investment. 8 All films made
by Shanghai Film Studio in this year were co-productions or independent investment by
outside investors. 9 Generally, international co-productions, with more advanced film
techniques and interesting narratives, were better received than domestic (co-)
productions. Therefore, more overseas investors began to seek for profits in the Chinese
film market, which quickened the process of deregulation in the Chinese mass media
industry. In order to attract more enterprises to invest in film production, the required
percentage for being a co-producer was reduced from 70 percent of total budget to 30
percent in 1996. 10 Then, in December 1997, the MRFT issued a new policy to allow any
provincial and lower level film companies and TV stations to produce feature films,
which ended the 50-year monopoly of film production by the state-run studios and
created a more competitive environment for the film industry.ll Since then, private funds
have been allowed to establish film companies that are no longer under Party control.
Independent film producers began to operate out of the state-run filmmaking system.
7 As film critic Ni Zhen points out, by collecting the "management fee," the studios seized the opportunity
of a continued state monopoly over production and distribution rights and played the state's anti-free-
market policy to their benefit. See Ni Zhen, 1994. 17.
8 Lin Lisheng, "The Economic Changes and Artistic Dividing Line of Films Produced in China in 1990s,"
in China Film Yearbook 1997, 201-205, 203.
9 Zhu Ying, 2003, 82.
10 The 70 percent requirement was set up in 1995. See "Regulation for the Reform of the Management for
Making Feature Films," in China Film Yearbook 1996,24.
11 Yin Hong. "1998 zhongguo dianyin beiwanglu." Dangdai dianying (January 1999): 21-28, 21.
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2) Film Subjects
The economic reform did not fully abandon Party guidelines on filmmaking,
especially during the early years of reform. Although class struggle was no longer the
main theme, filmmaking was still required to serve Party policies, albeit in a more
humanist way. Only a few entertainment films were produced in the early 1980s.
Amongst them, Shaolin Si (The Shaolin Temple, 1982), a joint venture between China
and Hong Kong, became the most successful martial arts classic. Chang Hsin-Yen, a
Hong Kong director, ingeniously employed the Chinese martial arts athletes to perform
main roles in this film. With the debut of then 18-year-old Jet Li, a member of the
national martial arts team, the film tells a story of how a young monk learns kung fu in
the Shaolin Temple and how he and 12 other monks saved the young emperor of the
Tang Dynasty. Interwoven is a love story between the young monk and a shepherdess. A
humorous scene is the mistaken killing of her shepherd dog and the not so mistaken
consumption of the dog meat. Combining kung fu, romance, and comedic elements
together, this film not only was a box office hit in China and Hong Kong, but also was
popular in Southeast Asian countries and the U.S. Aside from sparking Jet Li's film
career, this film also contributed to a renewed interest in kung fu practice amongst young
Chinese.
Greatly inspired by the commercial success of The Shaolin Temple, many martial
arts films were produced, and they occupied the top four positions at the domestic box
office for five consecutive years since 1983.12 For example, Jinbiao Huang Tianba
(Golden Dart Huang Tianba, 1987) is a martial arts film based on a highly controversial
12 Yin Hong and Ling Yan, 143.
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figure Huang Tianba, a famous Robin Hood in the Qing Dynasty. As in the case of Jet Li,
the lead actor, Wang Qun, is also a champion ofthe national martial arts competition.
Other entertainment film genres such as thriller, crime, and comedy have all been
attempted by Chinese filmmakers since the mid-1980s. Among the 136 films produced in
1989, more than 90 were entertainment films. 13 While state-funds were mainly allocated
to major propaganda films, the non-state invested entertainment films were simply profit-
driven cultural productions. Participation of overseas capital in the Chinese film industry
predicted the onset of global capitalism.
3) Film Distribution
The third important consequence of the film industry reform took place in the
distribution system. China Film was no longer obligated to buy every film from state-run
studios after 1987. Instead of a flat fee (700,000 yuan), it paid according to a film's box
office potential. In other words, the price of a film started to reflect its profitability. This
change reduced the market risk of China Film, but studios still could not get enough
revenue to sustain themselves. In order to increase the studios' share of profit from box
office revenues, China Film signed new contracts with film studios in 1988. Four options
of profit allocation were introduced: 1) China Film would grant a minimum guarantee to
a finished film, and a distribution fee (50% of the box office) would be divided between
China Film (71.5%) and the studio (28.5%); 2) China Film would pay for the prints
(9,000 yuan each, raised to 10,500 yuan in 1989) it ordered from the studios; 3) China
Film would acquire a film with a flat fee; 4) China Film would act as an agent for a
13 Wu Xianggui, 164.
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studio on a commission basis. 14 The first three options were selected by different film
studios and the last one had never been employed. But two years later, all studios
changed to the second option when they discovered that they would lose more by taking
any other options. ls Though played to the studios' advantage in the short run, the new
deal still made studios take the risk of losing their production cost if the film could not
sell well. The average cost of a film was 900,000 yuan in 1988. So if a studio wants to
break even, it had to sell at least 100 prints. But as a matter of fact, two thirds of the films
produced in 1988 sold below 100 prints. As Zhu Ying points out, when a mandatory
block booking system was left untouched in the reform, it gave economic incentives to
neither studios nor distributors and exhibitors.16
The mid-1980s also witnessed the debut of the Fifth Generation filmmakers- a
term generally referring to those who began to study filmmaking in Beijing Film
Academy in 1978 and graduated in 1982.
As one film historian points out, the Fifth Generation filmmakers are the last
beneficiaries of the planned economy since their cinematic experiment was carried out
with no pressure from the market. 17 Most films made by the Fifth Generation had poor
market performance, partly due to the lack of successful market promotion. But a more
important reason, as Wu Yigong, president of the Shanghai Film Studio, has observed,
was that some Fifth Generation filmmakers had no consideration of the market and the
14 Luo Yijun, Li Jinsheng and Xu Hong, eds., Zhongguo dianying lilun wenxuan, 1920-1989 (Beijing:
Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 1992), vo1.2, 333.
15 Wu Xianggui, 148.
16 Zhu Ying, 74.
17 Lu Shaoyang, 2004, 72.
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audiences in their artistic pursuit. 18 For example, Huang tudi (Yellow Earth, 1984), the
pioneer work of the Fifth Generation, only sold 30 prints two years after its release.
Daoma zei (Horse Thief, 1985), Haizi wang (King of the Children, 1987), and Wanzhong
(Evening Bell, 1988) sold less than 10 prints. Interestingly, these works achieved great
international prestige, and the Fifth Generation filmmakers therefore have become very
attractive to overseas investors. Both Zhang Yimou's Dahong denglong gaogaogua
(Raise the Red Lantern, 1991) and Chen Kaige's Bawang bieji (Farewell My Concubine,
1993) were co-productions sponsored by Taiwan and Hong Kong capital respectively.
More importantly, the inpouring of overseas capital in Chinese cinema has defined the
latter's commercial nature. In this sense, it is understandable that why Dai Jinhua laments
the fall of the Fifth Generation from its artistic experiment to commercial success as a
"glorious fall." 19
From Entertainment Films to "Main Melody" Films
The reform in the film industry, as Wu Xianggui points out perceptively, "did not
necessarily mean to give the film industry more freedom but rather to grab more profit."
20 While financial freedom did help studios grab more profit, no political freedom was
granted to endanger the Party control. The trend toward entertainment film was seen as a
simple matter of commerce. It did not attract any serious ideological attention in the mid-
1980s. In other words, while the film reform was a profit-motivated reform, the freedom
18 Wu Yigong, "To be a Loyal Artist to the People," in Chinese Film Theory, A Guide to the New Era (New
York: Praeger, 1990), 179-187.
19 Dai Jinhua, "Severed Bridge: The Art of the Sons' Generation," in Cinema and Desire: Feminist
Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work ofDai Jinhua (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 13-48.
20 Wu Xianggui, 147.
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of cinematic representation was still under tight Party control. As the overall mass media
reform was moving toward greater openness and diversity, it suffered frequent political
setbacks, especially during the anti-bourgeois liberalism campaigns in 1987.
In September 1985, Deng Xiaoping had called for both "social benefits" and
"financial benefits" in propaganda, culture, education, and health circles. He claimed "all
enterprises attached to these circles should take social benefits as the only criterion and
produce more products with excellent spiritual qualities.,,21 It was under this new rule that
the Ministry of Culture stressed that filmmaking first of all should be educational.
However, as a direct consequence of the entertainment filmmaking, the "social effects"
were given much less consideration than the "financial gains" in producing a film. In
1986, the Film Bureau issued notices to all studios to limit kung fu and thriller films to
one-seventh of the total number of film productions.22 In the National Filmmakers'
Conference held in 1987, "zhuxuanlii," originally a musical term of "main melody" or
"leitmotif," was used to define an official orientation of the film industry- "tuchu
zhuxuanlu, jianchi duoyanghua" (highlighting the main melody and insisting on
diversity). Under this new guideline, entertainment film productions could be granted
only when the mainstay of filmmaking remained a political tool of propaganda and
education. A special fund was then set up by the MRFT to subsidize "main melody"
films.
However, because of the propitious environment created by the Great Cultural
Discussion, filmmakers and critics were deeply indulged in an imagined intellectual
21 Deng Xiaoping, "Speech in the National Congress of the CCP," in China Film Yearbook 1986, 1.
22 Wu Xianggui, 149-150.
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authority. Consequently, they paid lip service to the political call. In their advocacy of
entertainment films, filmmakers and critics were not only concerned with the market per
se. More often than not, entertainment films were used to oppose the Party guideline,
which was embodied vividly in the 1985-1988 debate on entertainment films. Chen Xihe,
a research fellow from the China Film Art Research Center, has expressed his opinion on
entertainment films in the following words, which was typical among Chinese
filmmakers and critics:
This flood of entertainment films must have been brought about by the changes in
the socioeconomic system, which led people to modify their thinking and to
reconsider consumerism.... Works of art no longer serve only as vehicles for
moral principles and dogmatic teachings, but also bring pleasure and mental
reaction. As long as modern life remains intense and fast-paced, people need
change and relaxation. If there is a difference between "refinement" and
"popularity" in art, then literature probably emphasizes refinement and motivates
thought, whereas film leans more toward popularity, providing relaxation and
. 23
entertainment. ...
His preference for "popularity" instead of "refinement" implied a significant
divergence from Mao's emphasis on popularization. Out of a desire to get rid of the
dogmatic teachings, filmmakers in the New Era wanted to bring audiences relaxation and
entertainment rather than propaganda or education. Due to the deep-rooted socialist
filmmaking tradition, entertainment filmmaking was a mission with formidable
opposition. Zhang Huaxun, the director of the popular martial arts film Golden Dart
Huang Tianba, has confessed that entertainment filmmaking in China was very difficult,
and he felt pressure from all sides. He was accused of pandering to low tastes and
23 Yao Xiaomeng, "The Entertainment Film: Dialogue 1," in Film in Contemporary China, Critical
Debates, 1979-1989 (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 1993), 86.
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pursuing an unhealthy mood in the audience with the amount of bloody terror?4 Criticism
of entertainment films was no less strong than the call for it. Some critics felt sad that
several excellent directors gave up their aesthetic ideals and produced films on such
popular subjects as robbery, murder and hijacking. But more powerful critiques were
focused on the poor quality of entertainment films. Made for profit, though, most of those
rough and slipshod productions were unable to cover the cost. Therefore, a credibility
crisis in domestic entertainment filmmaking was triggered among Chinese audiences as
well as critics. In response to this crisis, Dangdai Dianying (Contemporary Cinema), one
ofthe influential film journals, held a seven-day symposium in late 1988 to discuss the
nature and the future of entertainment films within the overall culture. Chen Haosu, the
editor-in-chief, argued that education was no longer the sole concern of cinema, and a
monotonous overemphasis on propaganda might lead to an underestimation of
entertainment films?5 Song Chong, president of the Beijing Film Studio and director of
several entertainment films, suggested that entertainment films should reinforce the
heroic spirit of the Chinese nation, diminish vulgar tastes and foreign flavors, and
strengthen the healthy trends of the reform era. His speech initiated a comparison of
Chinese and American entertainment films, which yielded several points:
1) Ideology penetrates into the films of both countries;
2) American films emphasize both political benefits and economic profits, while
Chinese films stress the political function;
24 Shen liming, "The Entertainment Film: Dialogue II," in Film in Contemporary China, Critical Debates,
1979-1989 (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 1993), 107-108.
25 Zhang Wei, "Contemporary Chinese Entertainment Films: A Summary of a Symposium," in Film in
Contemporary China, Critical Debates, 1979-1989 (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 1993), 135.
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3) American films, with high investments, aim at a global market, while Chinese
films target only the domestic market with low investment;
4) The Americans use entertainment to realize ideologies, whereas the Chinese
use education to realize ideologies;
5) American films draw upon multiform and modular genres, while Chinese
films are uniform and synthetical. .. .26
This comparison bore great significance because it brought forward a global perspective
to consider the further development of Chinese cinema. With the deepening of the
discussion, the participants concentrated on how to elevate the quality and promotional
packaging of entertainment films to attract audiences. A basic conclusion of this
symposium was that "the entertainment films should be the mainstream in China," which
was directly against the Party's call for producing more "main melody" films.
One type of entertainment films that proved immensely popular was the film
adaptation of Wang Shuo's "hooligan" novels. Probably one ofthe most famous and
successful popular writers in post-Mao China, Wang began to receive increasing attention
starting in the mid-1980s, mainly because of his cynical representation of the life of the
"dregs of society" characterized by dramatic departures from the mainstream cultural
tradition, and subversive parodies of the socialist legacy. Although unacceptable to the
Party authorities, his works have made him a best-selling author in China with over 20
novels and 10 million copies in print, appealing across the spectrum from the business
community to factory workers, students, and elites.27 The year 1988 was called "the Year
26 Zhang Wei, 135.
27 For detailed analysis on the popularity and characteristics of Wang's writing, see ling Wang, High
Cultural Fever (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1996).
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of Wang Shuo" in Chinese film history because four of his novels were adapted into
films. For example, Dachuanqi (Out of Breath, 1988) was adapted from Wang's novella
Xiangpi Ren (Rubber Man). In this film, an ambitious urban youth comes to Guangzhou
to seek his fortune through smuggling. In this southern metropolis, he witnesses a series
of unfortunate events and experiences a number of personal setbacks. The opening
prologue ofthe novella became a voiceover in the film when Ding Jian (the name of the
protagonist) first meets Li Bailing, the female character, and sits down at the backseat of
Li's motorcycle:
Everything began with my first wet dream. At that time I just went to high school,
and I had the same dream time and again. I dreamed of a faceless fleshy woman
who was peeling her soft but heavy skin off like a dancing stripper, revealing
open mouths all over her body. I passed away every time when I had this dream.
It was as lively as a real experience although I was in dream.. .I was a scared boy
when I was young. I grew up and become a man who spends all my days in horror
and gloom.28
This juxtaposition of the female image with the male voice produces a dangerous
tension in their sexual relationship. Social instability is put into the foreground, and the
plight of the marginalized male character is dramatically illustrated through a distorted
expression of the female power. The commercial success ofthe Wang Shuo films echoed
the sea changes occurring in a post-socialist China, which have brought in not only
economic development but also new gender discourses.
The Tian'anmen Incident in 1989 is the most significant political event in the
PRC. The CCP government in the post-1989 China encountered an unprecedented
ideological crisis. After 1989, both the theoretical exploration of the entertainment films
28 Wang Shuo, Xiangpiren (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1987). My translation.
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and the filmmaking practice were officially denounced. Cultural life in China was re-
oriented to a conservative standpoint. In spring 1992, the temporarily cooled-down
reform was revitalized by Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour to Southern China. In 1993,
the Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the CCP issued "The Decision on
Economic Reform," announcing that the object of the reform was to create a "socialist
market economy." It replaced the previous "socialist planned commodity economy" and
legitimized the leading role of the market. Consequently, China's economy in the 1990s
underwent a rapid market-oriented transformation. Greatly affected by materialism and
consumerism, the entertainment industry developed with amazing speed. Popular
magazines, popular music, TV drama, and pirated videotapes swept into people's daily
life. Amongst them, the exponential growth of TV ownership and the spreading
popularity of TV programs became a direct cause for the decline of film audiences. As
TV has occupied the preeminent place in the entertainment industry, domestic film
production under strict ideological control gradually lost the glamour it had achieved in
the mid-1980s.
Succeeding Deng Xiaoping, President Jiang Zeming warned the CCP members
that they should realize the importance of ideological control through the 1989
Tian'anmen Incident. He stated that the party should advocate correct social values and
healthy modest lifestyle, and create a healthy, positive, and progressive social
environment.29 At the National Propaganda Conference held in 1994, Jiang reiterated that
the Party guideline on propaganda is to "promote model heroes in contemporary society
through patriotism, collectivism, and other philosophies that are constructive to the
29 Jiang Zemin. "Speech on the 14th Congress of the CCP," Wenhui Bao, 17 January 1994, p.1.
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reform: modernization, social progress, and ethnic coherence." 30 Based on the previous
special fund set up by the MRFT to subsidize "main melody" films, a national film
foundation was established by the government to promote the production of "main
melody" films. According to the Film Bureau, five percent of the box office revenues
should be turned in as special funds to produce films "on the Socialist revolution,
construction and reform after 1949, or on the revolutionary history of the Party, the
nation and the People's Liberation Army, or on the revolutions since the 1840 Opium
War, particularly after the May Fourth Movement." It also required that 15 percent of all
the films distributed annually must be "main melody" films.3 ]
During the 1990s, "main melody" films have been massively produced to
reinforce the Party's ideological control over its people, including the following themes:
1) films focusing on the revolutionary history since 1840, with some made in a quasi-
documentary style; 2) biographical films of heroic characters, especially communist
revolutionary models; and 3) films representing the achievement of the contemporary
political and economic reform. Different from earlier socialist films that focused on
middle or lower-rank Party members and soldiers, almost all high-ranking CCP leaders,
including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and even Lin Biao, an
officially condemned traitor ofMao, have "starred" in "main melody" revolutionary
films. No longer simple-minded political preaching, these "main melody" films highlight
humanist concerns that were rare to see in socialist cinema. Stories of model communist
30 Jiang Zemin. "Speech on the National Propaganda Conference," Wenhui Bao, 25 January 1994, p.l.
31 "Carrying out the work to Distribution and Release Main Melody Films Well," in China Film Yearbook
1996,25.
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members and Party cadres were also told in a more sentimental way. For example, Mao's
second wife appears in Changzheng (The Long March, 1996), and the film even shows
how the couple was forced to send their newborn baby away under a tough circumstance.
Despite their ideological achievement, state-sponsored "main melody" films
could not improve the overall exacerbated situation of the film industry under a double
pressure from the market and the Party. Many studios relied on loans for production.
Filmmakers took great risk in choosing film subjects other than the "main melody" ones.
Given these constraints, Key Central Document issued in 1993 (Document No.3) began
to break up the 40-year distribution monopoly of China Film, allowing film studios to
distribute their films through local channels. As the distribution system has been
decentralized, China Film still kept the sole right of distributing imported films. At the
same time, this document also permitted exhibitors to raise the price of the film ticket
according to local conditions. The average price of a film ticket jumped from 0.5 yuan to
5 or 10 yuan.32 As some critics point out, changes in the CCP policy toward the film
industry actually reflect the dilemma faced by the Party leadership in grafting the
capitalist market onto the communist system as the Party tried to maintain its political
and ideological control of the nation.33 Without the previous governmental subsidies, yet
still overburdened by the dead weight of a Soviet-style institutional structure, the state-
run studios were pushed to a disadvantaged position in the market economy. The Party's
ideological control further curtailed filmmakers' creative imagination and artistic
32 Wang Zhiqiang, "Comments on China's Film Market in 1993," in China Film Yearbook 1994, 202.
33 Hao Xiaoming, Chen Yanru. "The Chinese Cinema in the Reform Era," Journal o/Popular Film and
Television (Spring 2000): 36-45.
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impulses. As a result, the Chinese film industry experienced distressing declines in both
audience attendance and flow of capital in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Attendance
dropped from 21 billion in 1982 to just under 4.5 billion in 1991.
Hollywood at the Door
As noted in Chapter 2, before the First World War, foreign capital controlled
almost all exhibition facilities in China, and most films exhibited were French films
produced by Pathe and Gaumont. After the war, they were gradually replaced by
American productions, which had dominated the Chinese film market in the years up to
1949, accounting for as much as 90 percent of the market. By the end of 1952, however,
as a direct consequence of the Korean War, Western films were totally withdrawn from
China. Instead, films from socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, North Korea,
Romania, and Albania were introduced into China; many were acquired through film
exchange programs by paying a flat fee. All were voice-dubbed in Chinese and enjoyed
great popularity. Popular foreign films exhibited during the socialist era included Lenin in
1918 (1939), The Gadfly (1955), The Danube Waves (1959), and The Flower Girls
(1972). Both before and after the Cultural Revolution, box office revenue ofthe Chinese
film industry had depended heavily on foreign films. Shi Fangyu, the director of the Film
Bureau, acknowledged in 1984 that foreign imports had been such a vital part of the
Chinese film market that China could not stop importing foreign films for profit.34
In 1978, China Film bought Charles Chaplin's films from a British company, and
re-started importing Western films every year since then. China Film purchased most
34 Shi Fangyu, "Zhongguo dianying shichang," in China Film Yearbook 1984, 123.
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American films through independent distributors with a flat fee of $30,000 to $50,000.
Trade battles accompanied business. During the 1980s, the film trade battle between
China and the United States was mainly around the issue of how to optimize profit for
each side, while the ideological difference was dramatically ignored, although it did not
totally disappear. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a trade
organization ofHollywood major studios, refused to do business with China since
Hollywood majors complained that China Film paid too little. They wanted to split
revenues instead of receiving a flat fee. After a long negotiation, the first deal between
China Film and two Hollywood majors, Paramount and Universal, was signed in 1986
with an import quota of 24 films over three years. China Film would pay a rental fee
(depending on the number of prints) and would grant the studios the right to sell
advertising time (2 minutes per film per showing).35 With this agreement, Hollywood
majors began to reclaim the Chinese film market. The pursuit of mutual interests was the
main motivation that brought both sides to put aside their ideological differences.
China has made efforts to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) since 1986, and attended the Uruguay Round Negotiation held in the same
year.36 As the largest trade negotiation ever, and probably the largest negotiation of any
kind in history, this negotiation covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue.
One of the most debated issues in this negotiation was the international trade of cultural
productions, especially between France and the U.S. The French insisted that in order to
35 James Greenberg. "Par, Universal to Distribute Pies in China," Variety, 12 February 1986,20.
36 China was one of the original members who established the GATT in 1947. After the founding of the
PRC in 1949, Taiwan has taken the seat in GATT, and the PRC became an observer member in 1984 and
re-applied for an official membership in 1986.
III
preserve cultural diversity, cultural productions such as film could not be reduced to
commercial productions to be traded internationally. The French introduced the concept
of cultural exception into international trades, which was shared by other countries such
as Canada. Many Canadians worried that the invasion of American cultural productions
would damage not only the disadvantaged domestic economic development but also the
construction of national identity. The United States, the biggest producer of cultural
productions and services, especially of media productions, on the contrary, demanded
that a full liberalization of trade should be applied to cultural trade, too. As American
ways of thinking and lifestyle have been extensively promoted by Hollywood cinema all
over the world, the film trade became a focus of the debate.
The China case is more complicated than the case of France and Canada due to
the long-lasting Sino-American ideological confrontation. The end of the Cold War and
the advent of globalization forced China to reconsider its position on the international
stage. Euro-American capitalist cultural ideas and values, represented by film
productions, had been violently criticized in socialist China. Despite efforts to re-connect
with the world through the GATT, China has kept searching for "socialism with Chinese
characteristics." In this sense, the concept of cultural exception actually has been applied
in China several decades ago.
After the Uruguay Negotiation, China's request to be a founding member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was intervened by the U.S., partly due to the
lobbyist activities of the MPAA. As Janet Wasko points out, the U.S. film industry does
not rely only on its own resources to protect its business, but receives considerable
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support and assistance from the U.S. government. As the international branch of the
MPAA, the Motion Picture Association (MPA) is often referred to as "a little State
Department." It was established to promote the dominance of American films in the
world market, and to respond to the rising tide of protectionism that either bars or
restricts the imports of American films. As the organization's literature explains, it "has
expanded to cover a wide range of foreign activities falling in the diplomatic, economic,
and political arenas." 37
The connection between the U.S. government and the U.S. film industry cannot
be underestimated, especially in light of the latter's expansion in the European market
after the WWII.38 MPA was unsatisfied with its restricted rights in the Chinese film
market and turned to the U.S. government for support. So far no details are available for
MPA's lobbyist activities. Viewed from hindsight, a new round negotiation between
China and the U.S. must have been taking place after China's request to join the WTO
was refused. In March 1994, the most influential trade journal of American show
business, Variety, declared that China would open its film market to revenue-sharing
distribution.39
This declaration turned out to have come from highly credible sources. In late
1994, the MRFT announced that 10 excellent foreign films, most from Hollywood, would
be released in the domestic market every year on a revenue-sharing basis. Although the
37 Janet Wasko, How Hollywood Works (London: Sage Publications. London, Thousand Oaks and New
Delhi,2003), 122.
38 For more research on this issue, see Thomas H. Guback, The International Film Industry: Western
Europe and America Since 1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).
39 Don Groves. "China Deals for Yank Pix: China Opens Screens' Doors to Revenue-Sharing Distribution,"
Variety, 21 March 1994, 1.
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MRFT defined the criteria for imports as "reflecting up-to-date global cultural
achievements and representing excellence of cinematic art and techniques," in practice,
as we can see, box office potential is the determining element. Warner Brothers was the
first Hollywood major to sign a distribution agreement with China Film.4o The first
imported Hollywood blockbuster, The Fugitive, opened in Beijing on November 12,
1994, with an average ticket price of 20 yuan. However, it was suddenly withdrawn after
one week with various official and unofficial explanations. The official China Business
Times reported that the film was withdrawn because some film industry officials believed
it would allow foreign distributors to "invade" the Chinese film market. Other sources
reported, more precisely, that the problem stemmed from a struggle between the Beijing
Film Distribution Company and China Film over the profit in distributing this film. China
Film booked the film directly with theaters in the Haidian District, bypassing Beijing
Film Distribution Company when the latter's revenue-sharing arrangement was refused.
After losing the battle, Beijing Film Distribution Company took the matter to its parent
unit, the city's Cultural Bureau, and to the Central Department of Propaganda, claiming
that "using socialist money to fatten the capitalist pig" violated Chinese political mores.41
The matter was resolved when the Film Bureau issued Document No. 348, to take
effect on January 1, 1995, clarifying that China Film cannot bypass the local distributors
to distribute imported films. It also allowed authorized local distributors to deal directly
40 Spring Greg. '''Warner Bros. Inks Historic Movie Deal with Chinese," Los Angeles Business Journal, 19
September 1994, 9.
41 Stanley Rosen, "The Wolf at the Door: Hollywood and the Film Market in China from 1994 to 2000," in
Southern California and the World and the World in Southern Cal(fornia (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 49-77.
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with both imported films and domestic films. 42 Therefore, the economic struggle
occurred within the distribution system finally ended with an official reconcilement that
allocated every level of the distribution system a share of the distribution revenue. By
mid-January of 1995, The Fugitive reopened in Beijing as well as in many provincial
theatres. This interesting episode shows that when economic pursuit becomes the primary
concern of the distribution system at every level, a highly centralized distribution system
will break down.
In early 1995, the U.S. and the PRC signed an agreement regarding intellectual
property rights, resolving another debatable issue. Besides The Fugitive, other Hollywood
blockbusters entered into the Chinese market in 1995, including True Lies, Forrest
Gump, The Lion King, Speed, Bad Boys and Die Hard 3. In 1996, China further promised
up to 20 films to be imported on the revenue-sharing basis from the time when China
could enter the WTO, which betrays more obviously that the reopening of the Chinese
film market to Hollywood majors drove a hard bargain for China's entry into the WTO.
Because of Hollywood's global dominance, it has been commonly regarded as
one of the most important symbols of global capitalism. China's reopening to Hollywood
also reveals that the CCP government has become actively engaged in global capitalism,
or more precisely, making profits from global capital through China Film. As a state-
controlled enterprise, China Film was an effective way for the CCP government to
control the whole film industry in the socialist era. It brought back revenues to support
the film industry under the Party guideline, and this function has undergone changes in
42 "Regulation for the Reform of the Management for Making Feature Films," in China Film Yearbook
1996,24.
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post-socialist China. As China has been marching into a market economy, the role of
China Film has shifted to help the CCP government successfully transfer the state power
into business capital. When profits shrink from the declining national film industry, the
Sino-American agreement on a 50-50 revenue-sharing basis makes China Film the big
beneficiary of global capitalism, especially when the ticket prices varies from 15 yuan to
25 yuan, much higher than those ofdomestic productions. In this sense, it is not too
brave to say that the decision of importing Hollywood blockbusters is a conspiracy
between state monopoly ofthe film industry and global capitalism. At the price of having
the national film industry endangered, China Film was able to secure a major share of the
revenues. Additionally, lower levels of the distribution system now challenge the
monopoly of China Film. The intervention of the local distributor in The Fugitive case is
an interesting episode that has brought to the surface conflicts that happened in the
pursuit of profits.
Although Hollywood majors intend to maximum profits in the Chinese film
market, they have to yield to the state monopoly in China. Conflicts, both ideologically
and economically, have accompanied the conspiracy between the CCP government and
global capitalism. In order to curtail the influence of Hollywood films, the CCP
government has adopted highly restrictive policies in carrying out the revenue-sharing
agreement. For example, a strict censorship has been applied to the importation of
Hollywood films. Those containing abundant violence, explicit sex, or politically
controversial themes cannot be imported. Given Hollywood's domination in other
countries, foreign equity investment in film production, distribution, and exhibition is
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banned in China.43 As a matter of fact, the revenue sharing agreement allows the foreign
studios, after payment of tax, other fees and duties, only about 13 percent of box office
receipts. According to the U.S. official data, the total U.S. entertainment revenue from
China in 1997 was a mere $20 million, less than in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, or the
Philippines. Even a blockbuster like Titanic that brought in an unofficially estimated 360
million yuan at the box office in China, generated below 80 million yuan (around $8
million) for 20th Century Fox.44 Ideological and cultural struggles aside, economic
interests are the "main melody" in the Hollywood-China trade. An examination on the
Walt Disney Company's activities in China will be offered as a case study after this
chapter.
The Reorganization of the Chinese Film Industry
Predictably, Hollywood's entry into the Chinese market aroused serious debate on
the future direction of Chinese cinema. Intellectuals, industry people and some
government officials worried that Hollywood imports would dominate the domestic
market and lead to further shrinking of the Chinese film industry. Dai Jinhua published
an article entitled "Lang laile" (The Wolf at the Door) in Befjing Youth Daily to express
her deep concern on the invasion of Hollywood. Since then, "the wolf at the door,"
referring to Hollywood's invasion into the Chinese market and the subsequent dangerous
situation of the Chinese film industry, became an opinion shared by many filmmakers.
43 Brent William. "China's New Pictorial Revolution," Variety, 16 February 1998,9.
44 At the end of July 1998, the total box office of Titanic is $1,835,400,000, while the U.S. gross is
$600,788,188, the overseas box office is $1,234,600,000. The box office in China is said around
$45,000,000.
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Despite the uneasiness about "the wolf," an expected consequence of the
importation was the revival of Chinese audiences' interests in filmgoing. Enthusiastic
Chinese audiences swarmed into the once desolate theaters to experience the spectacular
images created by Hollywood dream factories. Correspondingly, Hollywood films
became the main generators of box office revenue in the Chinese market. Total box
office receipts in the first half of 1995 jumped 50 percent over the same period a year
earlier, and summer attendance at theaters in Beijing increased by 70 percent.
A collateral effect, surprisingly to some film critics' pessimistic prediction was
audiences' renewed interest in domestic film productions. In the 1990s, following the
Hollywood style, many Chinese filmmakers began to favor big budget films, though on a
Chinese scale. Several films produced in this manner, such as Yangguan canlan de rizi
(In the Heat of the Sun, 1994) and Hong yingtao (Red Cherries, 1995) turned out to be
very popular and grossed sizable profits. Based on Wang Shuo's novella, In the Heat of
the Sun recasts the years ofthe Cultural Revolution as "days full of bright sunshine." In
this film, Ma Xiaojun, a coming-of~age young boy, wanders around with his fellows
when their parents are busy with the Cultural Revolution. A girl, Mi Lan, with her plump
female body, becomes the object of sexual desire for those immature boys. Yomi
Braester made an excellent analysis on the dialectic between cinematic narration and
historical memory. He points out that this film is a prominent example of the now-
widespread literary resistance to what Li Tuo derogatorily calls 'the Mao genre' and
Geremie Barme dubs "Maospeak." 45 The resistant stance displayed in this film is
45Yomi Braester. "Memory at a Standstill: 'Street-smart History' in Jiang Wen's In the Heat a/the Sun,"
Screen (Winter 2001): 350-362, 351.
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fulfilled by ironic parodies of socialist culture. As Dai Jinhua argues, such references rely
on the audience's familiarity with films from the "Socialist Camp," especially those
produced by the Soviet Union.46 When the Cultural Revolution is rewritten as a sexual
initiation, it also indicates an initiation of the global consciousness, or more explicitly, the
awareness of a pervasive capitalist culture, and furthermore, the participating desire to be
a member of the globalization. Narrated in a nostalgic tone, it poses a farewell to
revolution and a welcome of globalization. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution as
a narrative background labels this film with a Chinese trademark so that its
"Chineseness" becomes a weapon to fight against globalization. In addition, marketing
strategies learned from Hollywood also helped Chinese film to win back audiences.
In "Hollywood and China as Adversaries and Allies," Wan Jihong and Richard
Kraus analyze the changing political economy of the film industry in China after 1993.
As they observe, from China's perspective, competition with Hollywood is also a process
of learning from and cooperating with Hollywood. Hollywood is a rival because it
competes with the domestic film industry, but it is also possible for the Chinese film
industry to co-operate with Hollywood in terms of improving technology, pushing the
government to relax political control, and fighting against piracy and other unfair
business practices. The Party also can learn from Hollywood on certain issues such as
how to commercialize propaganda with film entertainment.47 A statement made by
President Jiang Zemin supports this argument. Jiang admitted at the National People's
46 Dai Jinhua, Yinxing shuxie (Invisible Writing, Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1999),237.
47 Wan Jihong and Richard Kraus. "Hollywood and China as Adversaries and Allies," Pacific Affairs (Fall
2002): 419-434.
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Congress that he was moved by Titanic, and said: "Let us not assume that we can't learn
from capitalism. Titanic has a budget of $200 million. This is venture capitalism.... I
invite my comrades of the Politburo to see the movie-not to propagate capitalism but to
better understand our opposition, to better enable us to succeed.,,48
The huge revenues brought in by Hollywood blockbusters have undoubtedly
made the CCP government reconsider the potential of the Chinese film industry. As some
critics observe, there is a strong desire to construct large Chinese media conglomerates
that can resist the likely incursion of transnational media corporations.49 As a matter of
fact, a strong horizontal integration has occurred in the Chinese TV industry even before
the coming of Hollywood. In October 1993, Chinese Central Television Station (CCTV)
took over the News Studio, a state-run studio specializing in producing newsreels. In
April, 1995, the Science Studio, another state-run studio specializing in producing
documentaries on new developments in science and technology, merged with CCTV, too.
The "wolf at the door" has quickened the process of integration. In 1996, CCTV opened
its cinema channel to facilitate co-operation with the film TV industries. Following the
integration model of CCTV, Shanghai Animation Studio merged with Shanghai
Television Station, and many provincial-level studios began to merge with local
television stations.
Hollywood invasion, previously regarded as "the wolf at the door," also
encourages the CCP government to strengthen the bonds among the three sectors of the
48 Quoted from Sheldon Lu, China, Transnational Visuality, Global Postmodernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2001), 20.
49 Hu Zhengrong. "The Post-WTO restructuring of the Chinese Media Industry and the Consequences of
Capitalisation," Javnost (December 2003): 19-36.
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film industry: production, distribution, and exhibition. China declared that it would
reorganize the Chinese film industry in order to adapt to the new environment after
China's entry into WTO. A basic strategy is to deepen the film industry reform by
imitating Hollywood system. A number of large integrated film groups have been
established in different regions through purchases or direct administrative decrees. Based
on the Shanghai Film Studio, Shanghai Film and Television Group was set up in 1995.
With its own distribution company and more than 20 theaters, Shanghai Film and
Television Group has succeeded in building a vertical system from production to
distribution and exhibition.
The biggest film group, China Film Group Corporation, was established in
December, 1998. Having re-organized China Film, it also includes the Beijing Film
Studio, Children's Film Studio, China Film Co-production Corporation, China Film
Equipment Corporation, the Cinema Channel of the CCTV, Beijing Film Developing
Factory, Merchandising & Rights Licensing Company, Hualong Film Digital Production
Company, and others. As a state-run film enterprise, China Film Group is fully engaged
in the film industry, from production to distribution, from importation to exportation,
from rights licensing to digital technology. 50 In March 2001, China declared that it would
set up three more film groups based on Zhujiang Film Studio, Xi'an Film Studio, and
E'mei Film Studio. These regional film groups, however, have no way to compete with
China Film Group. Having annexed all the important film resources, China Film Group
has actually become a new monopoly film enterprise in China.
50 At the end 0[2003, China Film Group signed an agreement with Hong Kong Golden Harvest Film Group
to use the latter's overseas distribution system to enter the international film market.
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One important feature of the new wave of mergers in the Chinese film industry
(and other industries) is the unchanged nature of state monopoly. Chinese
conglomerations such as China Film Group are totally different from those in Western
Europe and North America because they are financially supported by the government.
These conglomerations are established through a bureaucratic-led merging process. In
other words, China has to take the way of state capitalism, which is by no means based
on free market competition. The restructuring of the Chinese film industry through
conglomeration reflects the Chinese government's ambition to build a "national team" to
compete with Hollywood in the process of globalization. As Zhu Ying points out, the
survival of Chinese cinema in the face of transnational Hollywood will depend on the
state's ability to provide sensible protective measures and the industry's ability to provide
films that could capture Chinese aUdiences.51
Main Melody Films in the 1990s
In March 1996, another National Filmmakers' Conference was held in Changsha.
At this conference, the pedagogical function and social impact of cinema were once again
addressed. A new production plan was issued for the next five years, requiring 10
successful main melody films per year. In order to protect the national film industry, the
Changsha Conference also mandated a quota that two thirds of screening time should be
reserved for domestic productions. Before 1996, China Film assumed the sole
responsibility in importing and distributing foreign films in China. In order to encourage
studios to produce more successful main melody films, the MRFT made a new policy for
51 Zhu Ying. "Chinese Cinema's Economic Reform from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s," Journal of
Communication (December 2002): 905-21,920.
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film distribution. According to this new policy, if a studio could produce a successful
main melody film, it would be rewarded the right to distribute an imported blockbuster.
In 1996, Changchun Studio, Beijing Studio, and Shanghai Studio were rewarded with
distributing Waterworld, Jumanji and Toy Story I respectively.
Main melody films produced in the second half of the 1990s, under the influence
of Hollywood, are characterized by high technology and refined narrative strategy. Zhang
Jianya, a film director with great interests in film technology and special effects,
produced a Chinese-style disaster film, Emergency Landing (Jinji pojiang, 1999). It was
based on a true flight incident that happened at the Shanghai International Airport in the
previous year. At the beginning of the film, many hints are offered about an approaching
disaster. Then the film suddenly turns to promote the Party leadership and the
cooperation among the crew. Regarding this narrative gap, the scriptwriter Yin Hong
points out that it is actually a film awkwardly hesitating between "main melody" film and
entertainment film. 52
To learn from Hollywood does not mean that the ideological conflict between a
post-socialist China and a capitalist America no longer matters. Some Hollywood films
are no less propagandistic than Chinese official films. The point, rather, lies in how to
represent and package the propagandistic message. For example, after Seven Years in
Tibet (1997) and Kundun (1997) were distributed in the U.S., the Chinese government
felt that it was imperative to refute the defaming description of the Communist Party and
the history of Tibet. The Red River Valley (Honghegu, 1996), starring a famous Chinese
actress and shot in the beautiful Tibet, successfully combines ideological intention with
52 Yin Hong and Ling Yan, 172.
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visual spectacles and refined narrative style. Set at the turn ofthe twentieth century, it
tells the story of a young Chinese girl who escapes from a religious sacrifice, and is
rescued by an honorable Tibetan herdsman. The two fall in love, but problems arise when
she runs into trouble with a glamorous and proud Tibetan princess. Meanwhile, a British
expedition is planning to invade the sacred mountain. Facing the country's common
enemy, the three set aside their disputes and jealousy, joining the militia force to protect
their homeland. Romance, religious rituals, frontier landscape, and nationalist sentiment
are woven together to produce a magnificent picture of Tibet as an undeniable part of
China. Red River Valley is one of the most popular "main melody" films with
considerable commercial success in the late 1990s.
Films that I will label as "main melody" films and discuss in the following
chapters are all chosen from the Huabiao Awards (Palace Columns Awards), a
government award derived from the Excellent Film Awards by the Ministry of Culture in
1957. It has been renamed as the Huabiao Awards since 1994. Every year, in September,
the Chinese government awards ten feature films (along with other categories) produced
in the previous year. Although some may not have direct investment from the
government, once they match the Party hegemony, they will be rewarded and received
many benefits in distribution. For example, Zhang Yimou's blockbuster, Yingxiong
(Hero, 2002), was produced with private investment. Photographed by the award-winning
cinematographer Christopher Doyle, Hero is greatly influenced by Zhang's personal
style. Most viewers were quite satisfied with the film, giving high praise to the eye-
catching colors and impressive scenes. What interests me, however, is its very official
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explanation of history in a successful commercial packaging. The Emperor Qin in
Chinese history was a notorious figure for his cruelty. His aggressive and despotic
manners has been written in numerous historical accounts. However, worship for
emperors has a long tradition in China and has revived in recent years. In Hero, what
appears on the screen is not a brutal despot but a benevolent emperor who has sacrificed
his own fame for the sake of common people's interest. This kind of rewriting of history
serves directly to the ideological transition in China today. After the 1989 Tian'anmen
Incident, the stagnant economic reforms and the increasing number of unemployed
workers have further threatened the social order and the CCP's governance. The common
people's discontent with the CCP has been growing to the edge of explosion. Under this
circumstance, the appearance of many historical TV series with the theme of praising the
celestial emperors was not accidental. In these TV series, the emperor undertakes the
responsibility of governing a great nation and solving all kinds of troubles, and the most
influential one is Yongzhen Wangchao (Emperor Yongzhen). A theme appeared in works
of literature is named "sharing hardship" after a same-titled novella. As Dai Jinhua points
out, actually it is a call for the people to share hardship with the Party. In this perspective,
Hero is a cinematic version of the same story, calling for an understanding from the
common people. In this film, Broken Sword persuades Nameless to give up his
assassination because only the Emperor Qin can stop the war and unify the nation.
Broken Sword has got this ultimate truth from his calligraphy practice-the theory ofa
united nation with no killing. He further insists that compared with the common people's
suffering, Nameless' personal feud couldn't be a real suffering. This kind of logic
125
resonates with the official statement on the Tian'anmen Incident, the unemployment
phenomenon, and other social problems. The suppression of the democratic protest is for
the sake of social stability, and the laid off workers will contribute to a healthy economic
development. In Hero, the emperor complains that no one understands him except
Broken Sword. His personal political ambition is reinvented as an effort to alleviate the
common people's suffering. He successfully vindicates himself with the goal of unifying
others and giving the people a peaceful life, which reminds me of Zha Jianying
perceptive observation of the post-1989 China: "I rule, you prosper, and let's forget all
else." As she explains, as far as the Party is still running the country, and the country is
still enjoying a boom, the boom will quickly erode memories of the past tragedies.53 By
presenting a benevolent Emperor Qin, What is implicitly delivered in Hero is a correct
Party leadership that devotes to national prosperity. In order to achieve this ultimate goal,
both the suppression of the Tian'anmen Incident and the increased laid-off number are
prices that people have to pay, just like Nameless has to be killed at the end ofHero.
Hero's premiere at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing undoubtedly made
clear that the government would support its national distribution. Zhang's transition from
an anti-official filmmaker (several of his films made in the late 1980s were banned in
China) to an official organ is not an exclusive example. As a matter of fact, most "(semi-)
main melody" films are produced by the Fifth Generation filmmakers, and even the Sixth
Generation. Their active engagement in "main melody" filmmaking can be explained
from two aspects. Financially, when state-funds are allocated to "main melody" film
53 Zha Jianying, China Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture
(New York: New Press, 1995), 13.
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projects, filmmakers are prone to accept them since it is better than having nothing to
produce without money. For filmmakers with international reputation such as Zhang
Yimou, although getting financial support form foreign capital and domestic private
capital is an easy task, box office receipt from the domestic market is attractive, too.
Politically, after the Tian'anmen Incident, in order to pass through an ideological
transition, the Party resorts to dominant state ideology such as nationalism and neo-
Confucianism that have been commonly accepted by Chinese people, and filmmakers are
not excluded. Most of them are willing to direct "main melody" film projects. The co-
operation between most filmmakers and the Party has lead to a productive era of "main
melody" films. After a case study on Walt Disney in China, the following chapters will
concentrate on ideological changes that have been reflected in major "main melody"
films.
127
Case Study: Walt Disney in China
As one of the best-known brands in the world, and perhaps "the most
quintessential" one in terms of its synergistic global expansion, the Walt Disney
Company not only has had a profound effect on the American media industry and popular
culture, but has also achieved great success across the world, especially since the end of
the Cold War and the advent of globalization. This case study will address Disney's foray
in the Chinese market, as well as the responses from the CCP government and the
Chinese film industry. The interaction between Disney and China provides a telling
example of what Roland Robertson has termed as "glocalization": the local operation of
global capitalism. After a brief historical review of the Walt Disney Company, I will
examine the company's various activities in the Chinese market. Both the CCP
government and Disney have made economic profits their primary concern; nevertheless,
ideological conflicts occurring between the two sides also betrayed how politics play
behind the moneymaking business. Special attention will be given to the Kundun incident
in 1996. Under the invasion ofDisney productions, China has attempted to revive its
animation industry. A Chinese animation Baoliandeng (The Magic Lotus lantern, 2002)
was produced after the Disney model, therefore cultural imperialism is an important issue
that will be dicussed in this study. The grand opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005
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opened a new page of Disney's victory in the Asian market, but it also brought to the
forefront different forms of local resistance to global capitalism.
The Growth of the Magic Kingdom
When Hollywood films dominated the Chinese market in the 1920s and 1930s,
the Disney Company was still embryonic. In 1923, Walt Disney (1901-1966), the founder
of today' s most powerful magic kingdom, set up a small animation studio called the
Disney Brothers' Studio in California with his elder brother Roy Disney. Walt Disney
Productions replaced the original partnership in 1929. I
According to historians of the company, Walt Disney first developed the image of
Mickey Mouse during a train trip in 1928 and the cross-promotion of Disney's cartoon
characters, the so-called "synergy", happened by chance in 1929. After the Company lost
money in most of its early years, a stationery company executive offered Walt Disney
$300 for the right to imprint Mickey Mouse on school writing tablets. Walt Disney
accepted this proposal. Donald Duck made his first appearance in 1934. They quickly
became well-known cartoon characters. Later, licensed merchandise contributed great
profits to the company? In 1937, Disney produced Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,
the first American feature-length cartoon, with a huge budget of $1.5 million. With a
profit of $8 million within one year, it unleashed a golden age in Disney's history of
1 Many works have been done on Walt Disney and his company, including Walt Disney: An American
Original by Bob Thomas (New York: Hyperion, 1976, revised 1994), Disney's World: A Biography by
Leonard Mosley (Chelsea: Scarborough House, 1985, revised 2002), The Magic Kingdom: Walt Disney
and the American Way ofLife by Steven Watts (University of Missouri Press, 2002), Walt Disney: The
Triumph ofAmerican Imagination by Neal Gabler (New York: Random House, 2006) and etc.
2 For more details on the merchandising of Disney characters, see Gary Cross, Kid's Stzdf: Toys and the
Changing World ofAmerican Childhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
129
animation.3 In the following years, Disney produced more successful animations
including Pinocchio (1940), Bambi (1942), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Peter Pan
(1953), and Sleeping Beauty (1959).
After Walt Disney died in 1966, the company went through a series of crises in
the 1970s and 80s, mainly due to the impact of the TV industry and the dysfunctional
internal management. In 1984, a boardroom coup led by Roy E. Disney (Walt's nephew)
ousted Walt's son-in-law, Ron Miller. After a takeover battle, Michael Eisner (former
president ofParamount) and Frank Wells (former vice chairman of Warner Brothers)
were voted to be new heads of the Walt Disney Company-thus beginning the so-called
Team Disney era.4 The new Disney leadership adopted a series of strategies to adjust its
development. Operating income at Disney jumped from less than $300 million in 1984 to
nearly $800 million in 1987.5 Besides a renaissance oftheir animation productions with
Little Mermaid (1989) and others, Team Disney also produced live-action films such as
Dead Poets Society (1989) and Pretty Woman (1990). Euro Disney was scheduled to
open in April 1992. With staggering real estate assets and some of the world's most
marketable cartoon characters, the Walt Disney Company of the 1990s became an
entertainment giant. Meanwhile, a constant global quest also increased Disney's
international revenues, which grew to 20 percent of its total revenue in 1999.
3 According to www.BoxOfficemojo.com. the total gross box office is $184,925,486, and domestic total
gross is $66,596,803.
4 For details of the takeover, see Ron Grover, The Disney Touch: How a Daring Management Team
Revived an Entertainment Empire (Homewood: Business One Irwin, 1991). Also see James B. Stewart,
Disney War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005). Michael Eisner, chairman of the Walt Disney Company
(1984-2006), also wrote his own book called Work in Progress: Risking Failure, Surviving Success (New
York: Random House, 1998).
5 James B. Stewart, Disney War, 96.
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Academic studies on the Walt Disney Company and its productions are staggering
in a wide range of disciplines, including art, mass media, and economics, and are
conducted in different perspectives, such as feminism, psychoanalysis, and reception
analysis.6 Many studies claim that Walt Disney was a creative genius, yet some recent
studies debunk the "great man" approach by revealing him as a highly conservative,
influential figure of American mainstream values. 7 In addition to the controversial
evaluation of Walt Disney, the cartoon images produced by the Walt Disney Company
have also aroused critics' special attention over years. In How to Read Donald Duck:
Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic (1977), based on Donald Duck comics
circulated throughout Latin America, Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart describe how
Disney's propaganda campaign portrayed the third world as a place to be exploited.
Disney portrays revolutionaries as traitors and the reactionaries and oligarchs as heroes.
For example, vultures are used to represent Hegel and Marx, and dogs dressed up like
Che Guevara and Castro.
With an effort "to shatter commonsense assumptions regarding Disney's claim to
both promoting fun and games and protecting childhood innocence," Henry Giroux
confronts a hegemonic mass media corporation like Disney in The Mouse that Roared.
As he points out poignantly,
It is important not to address Disney's animated films by simply condemning
Disney as an ideological reactionary corporation promoting a conservative
6 For a review ofthe different approaches, see Janet Wasko, Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of
Fantasy (Cambridge: Polity; Malden: Blackwell, 2001).
7 Marc Eliot, Walt Disney: Hollywood's Dark Prince (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993). Despite that
fact that this book has been intensively criticized for its lack of solid proof, mainly relying on hearsay and
urban legends, certain items discussed at length in the book do seem to possibly be true, such as Disney's
suggested anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and his hostile attitude towards the labor union.
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worldview under the guise of entertainment. It is equally important not to
celebrate Disney as the animated version of Mr. Rogers, doing nothing more than
providing joy and happiness to children all over the world. 8
As a matter of fact, Disney promotes both simultaneously. Cloaked by joy and
happiness, what have been sold all over the world are conservative American mainstream
values. For example, female characters such as those in The Little Mermaid and The Lion
King are always subordinate to males, no matter if the men are fathers or husbands.
Females define their power and desire almost exclusively in terms of dominant male
narratives. Messages of racism, sexism, and anti-democracy have permeated all Disney
productions. Henry Giroux picks "Arabian Nights," the opening song ofAladdin (1992)
to show how a racist message is conveyed in typical Orientalist stereotypes:
Oh I come from a land, from a faraway place,
Where the caravan camels roam.
Where they cut off your ear, ifthey don't like your face.
It is barbaric, but hey, it's home.
After a campaign protesting the anti-Arab themes, Disney has changed "Where they cut
off your ear, if they don't like your face" into "Where it's flat and immense, and the heat
is intense." But they still keep the word "barbaric" in the last sentence.9 As Janet Wasko
argues, many of the Disney images represent the dominant gender value, and many have
obvious racial elements. 10 For example, the evil character in Disney production always
has dark skin, while the good character has typical fair skin, no matter they are human
beings or cartoon images.
8 Henry A. Giroux, 1999,90-91.
9 Henry Giroux, 1999,32.
10 Janet Wasko, 2001.
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Disney Re-enters China
During the 1930s and 1940s, Disney productions such as Snow White and
Pinocchio were released in Shanghai and left vivid impressions on many Chinese
filmgoers. The growth of Communism in China and other countries disturbed the
Americans. Walt Disney worked with the FBI in its investigations of Communists in
Hollywood. In 1947, he was one of the cooperative witnesses who testified before the
House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC, 1938-1975) about Communist
influence in Hollywood. He assured the HUAC that some Communists inspired the 1941
strike at his studio. I I After the establishment of the PRC, Hollywood films disappeared in
the Chinese film market. When Walt Disney spent $17 million to build Disneyland in Los
Angeles, which opened in 1955, Snow White and other Disney carton characters were
gradually becoming dim images in Chinese people's memories. Occasionally, these
cartoon images could be found in some dated print materials.
The Chinese film market was not officially open to Hollywood majors until late
1994. However, despite its anti-Communist tradition, the Walt Disney Company was a
pioneer in exploring the Chinese market. It re-entered the Chinese market right after the
enactment of the "open and reform" policy. In the mid-1980s, CCTV released Mickey
Mouse and Donald Duck, which was met with great popularity. Later, Disney
temporarily retreated from the Chinese market due to the copyright controversies. As we
know, the lack of protection on intellectual property rights (IPRs) has become an issue
11 The complete transcript of his testimony can be read at
<www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/06/documents/huac/disney.html>
For more details, see Marc Eliot, Walt Disney: Hollywood's Dark Prince (Carol Publishing Corporation,
1993).
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that is most likely to impinge on the profits of foreign companies in the Chinese market.
The Walt Disney Company, on the other hand, is the most infamous company for its
efforts on IPRs. For example, Disney has threatened legal action against three South
Florida daycare centers for using Disney cartoon characters on their exterior walls.
Therefore, it was not surprising that the first major copyright case in China involving a
foreign party was the Walt Disney Productions vs. Beijing Publisher. In 1987, Disney
made an agreement with a Hong Kong-registered Maxwell Company, granting a non-
exclusive license to the later to publish and distribute Chinese versions of the works of
Disney. In 1991, Maxwell "granted" a license to Beijing Children Reading Material
Publisher to publish and distribute Walt Disney's book in Chinese, which Disney did not
permit. Disney books with Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Snow White has been
published and widely circulated in the Chinese market without a certificate explaining the
ownership of Disney's Copyright. Because Beijing Children Reading Material Publisher
is only a sub-division under the Beijing Publisher instead of an independent legal person,
and the Maxwell Company became bankrupt in 1993, Disney sued Beijing Publisher for
copyright infringement in the Beijing Mediate Court. The Court made a negotiation
between the two sides, and the Beijing Publisher was asked to reimburse a small amount
of money to Disney and stop publishing Disney books. 12
In 1995, after the signing of a Sino-American copyright agreement, Disney, with
other Hollywood majors, re-entered the Chinese film market again. The Lion King
became one of the biggest grossing films in 1995. Excited by this success, Disney began
12 For case details, see Zheng Chengsi, Intellectual Property Enforcement in China, Leading cases and
commentary (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 1997),48-51.
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discussing a wide range of new business deals with the Chinese government, including
issues such as co-production and the possibility of opening a Disney theme park in Hong
Kong. Michael Ovitz, a powerful agent in Hollywood, then the group president of Disney
after Frank Wells' accidental death, spearheaded Disney's foray into China and visited
China many times. 13 With his high-level contacts in the Chinese leadership, he even had a
meeting with President Jiang Zemin in April 1996. No details are available about the
meeting, but a Disney-invested radio program "It's a Small World" was launched in
China.
The Kundun Incident: Ideological Conflicts vs. Money Business
How will a post-socialist China get along with an American corporation like
Disney in the era of globalization? Will the fundamental source of conflict in the new
world, as claimed by Samuel Huntington, not be primarily ideological or primarily
economic? Will the end of the Cold War take away ideological conflicts, leaving nation-
states to simply handle various conflicts between civilizations? Disney soon discovered
that it had to deal with a Chinese situation that was much more complicated than the
clash of civilizations.
In 1997, Touchstone Pictures, a Disney-controlled film studio, produced Kundun,
a film about Tibet and the 14th Dalai Lama. 14 It follows the reincarnation of the two-
13 As the head ofCAA (Creative Artists Agency), Michael Ovitz has been expanding his activities more
like an investment banker and a dealmaker rather than a traditional agent. His most visible role has been as
an adviser to Japan's Matsushita Electric Corporation in its acquisition of Universal, and to Sony
Corporation in its acquisition of the Columbia and Tri-Star studios.
14 Touchstone Pictures (a.k.a Touchstone films in its early years) was established by Disney in 1984. By
producing many PO-rated or even R-rated feature films, Touchstone became a top source of income for
Disney during the 1980s and 1990s.
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year-old Dalai Lama into his adulthood. After the CCP took power in Tibet, the Dalai
Lama travels to Beijing to attend a meeting with Chairman Mao. He expresses that he has
been greatly impressed by the CCP's accomplishment (a previous shot shows that the
young Dalai Lama is interested in socialism), and Mao replies:
Your attitude is good, you know. I understand you well. But you need to learn this:
religion is poison.... It retards the minds of the people and society. It is the
opium of the people. Tibet has been poisoned by religion, and your people are
poisoned and inferior.
What follows in Kundun is the CCP's brutality in trying to crush Tibet's religious and
political traditions. After the Dalai Lama has failed to defend his land and religious
freedom by practicing the tenets of nonviolence, he escapes to India in 1959 and has been
living in exile ever since. The title of the film, Kundun, is a Tibetan word that refers to
the Dalai Lama by his family members, which means "the presence."
The mysterious land of the Tibetan Plateau, the "roof of the world," has offered
all kinds of escapist tales for Western imagination. Again, cinema has played a crucial
role in spreading the exotic image of Tibet in the West. The 1937 film adaptation of
James Hilton's novel Lost Horizon was the first apotheosis of Tibet as a fantastic realm.
The explosive development of the mass media industry in recent years not only has
constructed Tibet a part of the Western popular culture, but has also strengthened the
Orientalist discourse of Tibet in a global scale. IS As Orivlle Schell states in Virtual Tibet,
a study of the Western representation of Tibet, Tibetan fantasies rooted themselves in
almost every form of Western popular entertainment, and Tibet developed a divided
15 An enormous amount of books and documentary films on Tibet have been produced over years. In terms
of feature films, before Seven Years in Tibet and Kundun, other important ones included The Golden Child
(1986) and Little Buddha (1993). Recent productions included Tibet, Cry ofthe Snow Lion (2002) and
Dreaming Lhasa (2005).
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persona in the public mind of the West: "on the one hand, it retained all its associations of
being a paradisiacal Shangri-La; on the other, after China's occupation in the 1950s, it
also came to be viewed as a victimized land and culture laid waste by an invading
colonializing power."I6 Many non-governmental organizations were established to
advocate the independency of Tibet. A few Hollywood celebrities, including Richard
Gere, Harrison Ford, and Steven Seagal, have been ardent supporters of the Dalai Lama.
In 1997, two films on Tibet and the Dalai Lama started production. Based on Heinrich
Harrer's 1953 classic tale, Jean-Jacques Annaud directed Seven Years in Tibet, which
starred Brad Pitt as the Austrian climber Harrer who befriended with the young Dalai
Lama during the political chaos of late 1930s and 1940s. Written by Melissa Mathison,
Harrison Ford's wife, Kundun was directed by the prestigious Martin Scorsese. 17 Being
labeled by the CCP government as a "splittist" who seeks to remove Tibet from China's
control, the Dalai Lama enjoys great popularity in Western countries. The production of
these two Hollywood films turned the fad for Tibetan culture and the Dalai Lama into a
torrent.
The general public interest in Tibet, politically as well as culturally, also means a
potential box office success. This is the main economic reason that leads Hollywood
studios to invest in films on Tibet. Although these two films claimed to provide a "real
Tibet," an interesting fact is that both were not shot in Tibet because of the CCP
government's sensitivity toward the subject. Annaud built his version of Lhasa in
16 Orivlle Schell, Virtual Tibet, Searchingfor Shangri-La.from the Himalayas to Hollywood (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2000), 8.
17 After Michael Ovitz took position in Disney, he brought to Disney a list of creative talent, and many of
them are his former clients. Martin Scorsese is one ofthem.
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Argentina, and Scorsese chose the Atlas Mountains in Morocco. What has been offered
in these two films is nothing but a replica of Tibet. Not to mention that English instead of
Tibetan has been used throughout both films, even Chairman Mao speaks English, too.
Released earlier than Kundun, Seven Years in Tibet encountered an unexpected failure in
the domestic market, only bringing back half of its $70 million budget. However, its
international release collected a huge $93.5 million, partly thanks to Brat Pitt's star power.
Overall, Seven Years in Tibet is a profitable production, and the great percentage of its
international revenue speaks to the importance of the international film market to
Hollywood. 18 This film was banned from being shown in China and both the director and
its starring actors Brad Pitt and David Thewlis were banned from ever entering mainland
China.
Different from the dramatic box office performance of Seven Years in Tibet,
Kundun was involved in a much more complicated political situation. Due to the obvious
anti-Communist messages in this film, the Chinese government was unhappy with Disney,
threatening to rein in Disney's business dealings in China. In December 1996, despite the
risk of economic blockade from the Chinese government, Disney issued a terse statement
that its Buena Vista Inc. would distribute Kundun in North America. 19 This decision was
made out of two considerations: First, Disney could not bury the film with its $28 million
production cost, especially when it might bring in a big box office revenue; Second, when
many Hollywood majors were looking forward to seeing Disney being struck down by
18 According to www.Boxofficemojo.com. Seven Years in Tibet has a worldwide revenue of $131 ,457,682,
including a domestic revenue of$37,957,682 (28.9%) and a foreign revenue of$93,500,000 (71.1 %).
19 According to Oriville Schell, Universal Studios had earlier refused to make a distribution deal with
Scorsese out of fear that China might react hostilely. See Oriville Schell, 297-298
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China, Disney had to take a stand that would earn its leadership plaudits in Hollywood
for "standing up for freedom of expression.,,20
Disney's hasty decision turned out to be a great error. It underestimated the CCP's
vigorous protest against the Hollywood-inspired anti-Communist conspiracy, especially
when a market of 1.3 billion Chinese people is the CCP's best card in playing with all
transnational corporations. Compared with other Hollywood studios, Disney was much
more vulnerable to Chinese pressure because of its economic pursuit in the Chinese
market, including feature films, TV programs, merchandise and toys, and the Disney
theme park project. The CCP government responded with anti-Disney propaganda,
suspending all Disney's business in China, including the cancellation of a high-level
Chinese delegation to Disney's California headquarters. Martin Scorsese was also added
to the list of people banned from entering Tibet. As a matter of fact, what the CCP
adopted in the Kundun Incident was a strategy that has been commonly known in Chinese
as "Shaji gei houkan (Kill the chicken to scare the monkey)." The real intention of the
CCP government was to show the West that China would not allow any form of
"interference in China's internal affairs." Unfortunately, Disney was chosen to be the
poor chicken this time. Compared with Sony Pictures, the parent company of the TriStar
Studios who produced Seven Years in Tibet, Disney undoubtedly is a better symbol of the
West.
It is obvious that Disney will not give up its economic interests in China, the
country with the world's fastest-growing economy, especially in terms of the media
industry-it had to work out a solution to repair its relationship with China. In fact,
20 James B. Stewart, Disney War, 271.
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Eisner was furious with the Kundun Incident, together with other conflicts between him
and Ovitz over the previous year. Therefore, Kundun became an opportunity for Eisner to
fire Ovitz. Then Disney quietly and discreetly hired Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary
of the State, to negotiate with China, The New York Times reported in October 1997.21
Eisner assured the Chinese government that Disney wouldn't promote Kundun
aggressively, and that it would "die a quiet death." 22 As the newspaper observed, it was
not coincidental that Kissinger was brought aboard- by chairman Michael Eisner
directly-as the company was preparing the release of Kundun.
It seemed that Kissinger had successfully assuaged Chinese anger over Kundun
because Disney's next animation production Mulan was permitted to be released in China
in 1999. The film was based upon an ancient Chinese folktale, in which a girl named
Mulan disguises herself as a man and joins the army in place of her old father to fight off
invading northern tribes. The girl Mulan has long been held up by the Chinese as the
personification of duty to family and country. The production ofMulan was not out ofa
purely political concern, that is, holding out the olive branch to the CCP government.
Actually, it was in production during the Kundun Incident. What has to be taken into
account is the increasing percentage that international box office revenue occupies in the
worldwide box office revenue. Compared with the European market and the African
market, it is obvious that the Asian market has the greatest box office potential, especially
after the re-opening of the Chinese market. Since the 1990s, more and more Asian images
have appeared in Hollywood films in order to minimize the "cultural discount" and
21 Bernard Weinraub, "At the Movies, Disney Hires Kissinger", New York Times, 10 October 1997.
22 As a result, with a $28 million budget, Kundun grossed less than $6 million in the United States.
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achieve better box office from Asian countries. Both Jackie Chang and Jet Li have
become Hollywood's shining stars. The production ofMulan adopted the same "global
localization" logic. On the one hand, the theme of Mulan caters into the Orientalist
imagination of the East, especially of an ancient China, among the Western audiences.
On the other hand, as a well-known Chinese legendary character, Mulan would
undoubtedly attract many Asian audiences.
Mulan has been criticized by many for distorting the original spirit of the Mulan
legend, being tailored to the Disney style.23 Different from Snow White or the Sleeping
Beauty, Mulan may be an independent, strong-willed young girl, but the ultimate payoff
for her bravery still comes in the form of catching the handsome son of a general. The
original Mulan Ode ends with Mulan putting on her dress again:
"I open the door to my east chamber,
I sit on my couch in the west room,
I take off my wartime gown
And put on myoId-time clothes."
Facing the window she fixes her cloudlike hair,
Hanging up a mirror she dabs on yellow flower powder
She goes out the door and sees her comrades.
Her comrades are all amazed and perplexed.
Traveling together for twelve years
They didn't know Mulan was a girl.
"The he-hare's feet go hop and skip,
The she-hare's eyes are muddled and fuddled.
Two hares running side by side close to the ground,
How can they tell if I am he or she?" 24
23 Before the Disney adaptation, an early literary debate on Mulan was brought in by Maxine Hong
Kingston's bestseller The Woman Warrior, Memoirs ofa Girlhood among Ghosts (1976). For the debate
between her and Frank Chin, see David Leiwei Li, Imagining the Nation: Asian American Literature and
Cultural Consent (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
24 Translation comes from The Flowering Plum and the Palace Lady: Interpretations ofChinese Poetry by
Han H. Frankel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
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In the film, after Mulan safely returns home, Grandmother is slightly unsatisfied,
complaining to Mulan's mother: "She brings home a sword. If you ask me, she should
have brought home a man." Then the general's son comes to look for Mulan, and the two
women dumbly point to the garden. Grandmother becomes excited now: "Whoo! Sign
me up for the next war!" The poetic ending of the Mulan Ode is replaced with a
wholehearted welcoming of the general's son, which indicates a happy marriage in the
near future. The theme of loyalty to one's family and country is interpreted as an
opportunity to find one's Mr. Right. In addition, the squirrel-like red dragon Mushu, a
typical supporting role in Disney animations, makes the Disney style more visible
throughout the animation although it is unsuited to any mythic fable in China.
Despite the criticism, the $90 million budgeted Mulan achieved a satisfactory box
office-$120.6 million domestically and $183.7 million internationally. "Our best hope
is not to worry about the competition and to focus instead on retaining our own
commitment to excellence and innovation. Mulan, our summer movie for 1998, achieved
that goal, drawing not just enthusiastic notices but the largest audience of any animated
film since The Lion King," remarked Eisner later.25 The success of Mulan, as expected,
led to the production of the sequel Mulan II in 2004.
From Kundun to Mulan, what can be observed obviously is a compromise
between ideological conflicts and economic interests, which, in my point of view, is the
most salient feature of the entertainment industry in the global era. After the release of
Mulan, both China and Disney began to yield to each other for the sake of doing business.
25 Eisner, Work in Progress, 415. Earlier in this book, he claims that The Lion King was a film that played
equally well to every kind of audience. See Eisner, 342.
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The Hong Kong Disneyland project was announced in late 1999. The ideological struggle
between Disney and the Chinese government cannot be fully comprehended if singled out
and viewed separately from the larger picture of the global economic competition.
Global Culture or Cultural Imperialism?
China has a rich tradition of producing animation films. As feature filmmaking,
the animation filmmaking in China was deeply influenced by the West in general, and by
Hollywood in special. In the 1930s, the Wan Brothers, Wan Guchuan and Wan Laimin,
began to produce Chinese animations with an aim of creating films that can "bear the
character of their own countries." 26 After watching Snow White, they produced
Tieshan gongzhu (Princess Iron Fan, 1941), one of their pioneering works of Chinese
animation. In the following years, animated film became one of the main film categories
that developed indigenous Chinese characteristics, such as Jianzhi (paper cuts) and
Shuimo (ink painting). Rensen Wawa (The Spirit of Ginseng) was the winning film at
Leipzig in 1962 and Alexandria in 1979. Danao Tiangong (Uproar in Heaven) also won
the best film award at the London Festival. Established in 1957, Shanghai meishu
dianying zhipian chang (Shanghai Animation Film Studio) became well known for its
excellent animation productions. However, the overall decline of the Chinese film
industry in late 1980s and the 1990s also seriously hampered the development of Chinese
animations. After Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and the Lion King, it was Disney's
Children TV program, "Xiaoshenlong julebu (Club of the Little Magic Dragon)," that
enjoyed the greatest popularity among Chinese children in the 1990s.
26 Marie-Claire Quiquemelle, "The Wan Brothers and Sixty Years of Animated Film in China," in Chris
Berry ed., Perspectives on Chinese Cinema, 2nd edition (London: BFI Publisher, 1991), 175-86.
143
According to China Daily, cartoon-related industries score 1.3 billion yuan ($157 million)
every year in China, only 10 per cent of which is earned by Chinese companies.27
Greatly inspired as well as threatened by the success of the Disney animations in
China, Shanghai Animation Film Studio decided to produce Baoliandeng (The Magic
Lotus Lantern) in 1998. This animated film is based on a Chinese ancient fairy tale about
a child saving his mother through numerous hardships. More than 60 cartoon drawers and
20 background painters joined the creation, which cost about 12 million yuan in total
(around $1.5 million). It set a record in China's animation film industry. Hollywood
production style and promotion strategy were thoroughly adopted in this film. Several
famous film stars were invited to dub for characters' voices, and three top Chinese
singers were invited to sing songs in this film. Inviting the stars to sing songs for an
animation film is nothing new in Hollywood, but it is an adventure in China. It is The
Magic Lotus Lantern that filled in the gaps in this field. The three songs set off the story
quite well: "I Miss You 365 Days a Year" by Li Wen (Coco Lee), "The World in My
Heart" by Uu Huan; and "Love is Just One Word" by Zhang Xinzhe (Jeff Cheung). After
a series ofMTV promotions with famous singers on CCTV and local TV stations, The
Magic Lotus Lantern was first released in Shanghai on July 30 and then nationally
released on August 1st, 1999. As an animation production that had the highest budget in
China's animation film history, it gained box office revenues of over 20 million yuan
(around $2.5 million) and ranked third in the country in 1999, which was considered by
many an unprecedented commercial success.
27 Meng Xi. "Cartoons must draw in more interest," China Daily, 19 August 2001.
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However, compared with previous Chinese animation productions, The Magic
Lotus Lantern cannot be labeled a successful production in terms of its artistic quality. Its
imitation of the Disney style brought home vividly the issue of cultural imperialism.
Cultural imperialism, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu and LOIC Wacquant, rests "on
the power to universalize particularism linked to a singular historical tradition by causing
them to be misrecognized as such.,,28 The particularism with which Bourdieu and
Wacquant are concerned is the particularism ofthe U.S. society, especially the global
expansion of the American academic discourse. Other theorists prefer media imperialism
to cultural imperialism. From the perspective of the media industry, the global expansion
of American popular culture, as represented by Hollywood productions, is the most
telling example of cultural/media imperialism. Efforts against cultural imperialism in the
third world have a long history. Originally written to encourage the Chilean people to
resist foreign cultural productions, How to Read Donald Duck is one of the best-known
studies of cultural imperialism focusing on Disney. 29 As a co-effort of scholars across
the world, Dazzled by Disney?: the Global Disney Audiences Project offers a panorama
of the "pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity" of Disney through 12 national profiles.3D
One of the most important issues in this project revolves around the debate on cultural
imperialism. In order to correct the one-way imposition paradigm of cultural imperialism,
28 Pierre Bourdieu and LoIc Wacquant. "On the Cunning ofImperialist Reason." Theory, Culture, and
Society 16.1 (1999): 41-58.
29 Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, 1971.
30 Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips and Eileen R. Meehan, eds., Dazzled by Disney?: The Global Disney
Audiences Project (London and New York: Lecester University Press, 2001). The 12 national profiles
include Australia, Brazil, Demnark, France, Greece, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, United
Kingdom and United States. However, China, with its biggest population in the world, is not included in
this project.
145
several researchers emphasize the need to balance the local with the global. For example,
in the Denmark profile, the author argues that parts of Disney lore are very much
incorporated as aspects of the national media culture because translation and dubbing
serve to enhance the "nationalization" of Disney productions. This argument reminds me
that Li Yang, the Chinese dubbing actor for Donald Duck, should be granted special
credits for his excellent dubbing performance. He was nicknamed "Uncle Donald Duck"
by many Chinese children.
Compared with the "nationalization" of Disney productions, however, a more
problematic phenomenon occurring in China and many other countries is a
DisneyficationiDisneyization of the animation industry. Both Disneyfication and
Disneyization are neologisms derived from the name of the Walt Disney Company to
describe the massive spread of the principles of Disney theme parks throughout society. 31
Here I borrow these two terms to describe a homogenizing process in which diverse
animation filmmaking traditions will disappear gradually under the powerful influence of
the Disney animation film style. That is, in their imitation of Disney, indigenous
animation traditions are abandoned and what is left is a homogenized Disney style.
The Magic Lotus Lantern is a telling example to observe the invasion of cultural
imperialism. The fairy tale of The Magic Lotus Lantern originated from a Tang dynasty
Dunhuang Bianwen (Transformation text) entitled Mulianjiumu (Mulian Saves His
Mother). In the story, Mulian (Sanskirt-Mahamaudgalyayana), a follower of Buddha,
31 Sharon Zukin uses the former term in her book The Cultures ofCities (Blackwell Publishing, 1996), and
the latter was popularized by Alan Bryman in The Disneyization ofSociety (Sage Publications, 2004).
Disneyfication of urban space is explored in Jeff Ferrell's Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban
Anarchy (St. Martin's Press, 2001).
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tries his best to save his mother from the deepest hell to which she has been sent for
renouncing the tenets of Buddhism. 32 After having been combined with many romantic
folklore elements, the Buddhist text transformed to a fairy tale commonly known as
Chenxiangjiumu (Chengxia Saves His Mother) or Baoliandeng (The Magic Lotus
Lantern), in which the mother is a goddess who breaks the rules of the Heaven by
marrying a mortal scholar. After giving birth to a son named Chenxiang, she is
imprisoned beneath the Hua Mountain by her elder brother, Erlangshen, a strict and
powerful god. When Chenxiang grows up and finds his ancestry, he battles his uncle and
eventually succeeds in freeing his mother.33
The following paragraph appeared in Variety, offering a compliment of this
Chinese animation production:
Gleefully borrowing animation techniques from sources as disparate as old-style
Disney and native practitioners such as the Wan Brothers, "Lotus Lantern" is a
bright, very telling of a Chinese folk tale that you don't need a Ph.D. in Asian
literature to decipher. With the background clearly explained at every stage and a
trim running time, this would make a perfect kidvid for Western markets in
dubbed versions.34
The influence of the Wan Brothers comes directly from the borrowing of the
Monkey King from Uproar in Heaven. Rather than "its iconography, leaps of
imagination and simple innocence" that marks the film as absolutely Chinese, traces of
the "old-style Disney" and many Hollywood influences can be found throughout this film.
32 For a study of the Mulian story and the Mulian Opera, see Bell Yung et al. Harmony and Counterpoint:
Ritual Music in Chinese Context (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
33 With its premiere in 1957, The Magic Lotus Lantern is the first grand dance drama in contemporary
China, a symbolic presentation of the art form in China's history. It was a graduate work by the first
choreography class of the Beijing Dance School. In 1959, The Magic Lotus Lantern was made into an art
film and was highly acclaimed.
34 See Derek Elley's review of Lotus Lantern in Variety, 2 October 2000.
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In the opening scene, a white scarf floats in the sky, crossing rivers and mountains, just
like the dancing white feather that opens Forrest Gump. When camera slowly moves
closer to the goddess, it is surprising to see that her face is just a cartoon version of Xu
Fan, the actress who dubs the voice of this character. Later, when Erlangshen comes to
punish his rebellious sister, his face is surprisingly faithful to Jiang Wen, the dubbing
actor of Erlangshen. A commercialized star system has been vividly revealed in the art
design of the main characters.
With the help of the magic lotus lantern, the goddess defeats her brother and
marries her lover. Seven years later, we see Chenxiang playing with his mother on a boat
when the boat is moving smoothly among beautiful lotus. Thanks to an appropriation of
skills from the Chinese art, it becomes one of the most impressive shots ofthe film. Like
a colorful version of the traditional Chinese landscape painting, this shot presents a happy
mortallife-- "Happiness is staying with your mother."
After Erlangshen kidnaps Chenxiang, the goddess is forced to accept punishment,
being imprisoned underneath the Hua Mountain. Much of the central plot describes the
son's efforts to free his mother. He is accompanied by a lovely monkey. As in most
Disney animated productions, minor characters, always personifications of small animals,
such as Mushu in Mulan, Flounder in The Little Mermaid, and Blue Genie in Aladin, all
play important roles in unfolding the plot and helping the main characters to fulfill their
missions. Two songs appear in a typical Disney style, too. "I Miss You 365 Days a Year"
follows the boy's quest for the Monkey King, because only he knows how to beat
Erlangshen. Accompanied by song, Chengxiang travels day and night, as time flies from
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one season to another. After experiencing many difficulties in his journey, a grown-up
Chengxiang continues his quest. The second song "The World in My Heart" shows how
different cubs grow up and play with Chengxiang. Similar scenes with songs are not hard
to find in Lion King or Tarzan. Furthermore, similar to the portrayal of the northern
minority with dark skin in Mulan, in his journey to save his mother, the boy befriends a
tribal girl, and her brown skin color makes her look more like an American Indian. A
following scene of fire dancing bears more visible traces of the Western tribal culture.
When the tribe helps Chenxiang recover a magic ax he needs, the musical number here,
even the Variety reviewer realizes, "looking like Busby Berkeley meets the Maoris, is as
ridiculous as anything Hollywood might dream Up.,,35
Chang Guangxi, director of the film, boasted that The Magic Lotus Lantern would
be a landmark in China's animation filmmaking. It was the first full-length Chinese
animation film to follow the international practice of creating the music and dialogue
before the cartoons are drawn. "Digital stereo recording system and three-dimensional
computer-aided special effect technology were employed," said he.36 What is greatly
neglected, however, was an artistic exploration of the rich Chinese animation tradition.
Although incorporating elements from Chinese folktales such as "the heaven dog eats the
moon" or "the Monkey King was born from a stone," Chinese artistic aesthetic is hardly
embodied in the overall visual design of The Magic Lotus Lantern. The fact that many
Chinese audiences enjoy Disney animations does not necessarily mean that they will
35 See Derek Elley's review ofLotus Lantern in Variety,2 October 2000.
36 See "Drawing A Crowd in China: Success of Magic Lotus Lantern," in The Hollywood Reporter, 31
August 1999.
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welcome a Disneyized Chinese animation film. As shown in the Global Disney
Audiences Project, for some Disney resisters, the company epitomizes "commercialism,
materialism and mass production.,,3? A globalized culture actually is a commercialized
culture, and the pursuit of capital is its primary motivation. Capitalism has played an
omnipotent role in promoting the notion of "globalization" during the post-Cold War era.
In this sense, the resistance to cultural imperialism is part and parcel of the resistance of
global capitalism.
Conclusion
China is becoming the largest market for Disney's global expansion in the next
several decades. In the company's 1999 annual report, Eisner noted: "Hong Kong
Disneyland could help redefine our entire company for consumers in the most populous
region on the planet." Hong Kong Disneyland, including a Disneyland-style theme park
and two hotels, was scheduled to open in September 2005. As many were still haunted by
the shadow of the Asian economic crisis, the project was expected to create new
economic growth and provide more job opportunities. It was the first time that a Disney
theme park received direct government funding. Hong Kong invested $2.8 billion in
return for a 57 percent stake.
The opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005 was a milestone of Disney's
victory in the Asian market. As Disney's 11th theme park in the world, Hong Kong
Disneyland attracted numerous visitors from Asian countries. But its opening has also
brought different forms of local resistance against global capitalism to light. An anti-
37 Janet Wasko et al. 2001, 332.
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Disney campaign has been launched in Hong Kong. Dishini bushi Ieyuan (Disney is Not
a Happy Land) is the title of a book published by several Hong Kong intellectuals. 38 A
club namedXiaoxin miqi (Caution of the Mickey Mouse) aims at reminding people the
bloody exploitation made by the transnational corporations. However, their public effect
is still limited. During the Chinese New Year holidays in February 2006, Hong Kong
Disney had to close its gate to hundreds of visitors holding pre-purchased tickets because
it had reached the maximum accommodation capability soon after its opening.
Although Disney is a relative laggard compared with more aggressive rivals likes
Time Warner and Viacom in expanding the Chinese market, it also means that Disney
has the biggest potential in the future. Before the opening of the Hong Kong Disneyland,
Disney's headquarter of the Asia-Pacific region had moved to Shanghai and started its
first Chinese-language film project, Baohulu de mimi (The Secret ofthe Magic Gourd),
which marked a new step of Disney's "Global localization" strategy. The Broadway
musical The Lion King was staged in Shanghai in July 2007. "We look at this as an
important tool to build our brand in China," Disney's China managing director Stanley
Cheung told Reuters in an interview in February 2006. He claimed that the company had
not made any deal to build a park in Shanghai, but rumors spread that a Shanghai
Disneyland would open in 2010, the year Shanghai is scheduled to hold the World Expo.
China is becoming a big arena where all transnational corporations attempt to secure a
share. How the Chinese government will play the role of the host in their competition is
an open question. Some scholars are optimistic on this issue. In her reflection of the Hong
38 Shi Xiangpeng andYe Yincong eds., Disney is not a Happy Land (Hong Kong: Jinyibu Multi-Media Co.,
1999).
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Kong Disneyland, Mirana May Szeto points out that maybe the only possibility of taming
global capital lies in China, since China is such a huge market that Disney has to pay
special attention and adjust its marketing policy.39 Viewed from an economic perspective,
her assumption is highly possible, and the Kundun Incident is a perfect note of this
assumption.
What concerns me most, however, is not only the issue of building a nationalist
economy in the global era, but also the mission of preserving a national culture. Due to
Disney's omnipresence all over the world and the fact that more and more Chinese
children grow up with a Disneynized imagination, little room will be left for a more
indigenized as well as more diversified world of animations, and the world of culture in
general. As a direct response to the invasion of Disney, more and more Chinese begin to
recall old Chinese animations that they watched in their childhood. Japanese and some
European productions released in 1980s' China also become the objects of nostalgia,
because at least they represented a diverse tradition of animations. Recently, the declining
box office of Hollywood blockbusters in the Chinese film market speaks to the same
issue. The prosperity of the domestic TV drama productions also offers a potential
possibility for the national film industry to triumph over Hollywood. It is too risky to
arrive at a quick judgment that the invasion of Hollywood will only damage the national
film industry. Besides an economic concern, in facing of cultural imperialism, how the
Chinese film industry, including Chinese animation, could keep its Chinese
characteristics in the process of global modernity is an important issue.
39 See an interview conducted by Cheng Qijin, "Who is Picking a Hole in Mickey Mouse," in Nanfang
Daily, 30 September 2005.
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CHAPTER V
THE POLYPHONIC NARRATION OF HISTORY IN "MAIN MELODY" FILMS
What is history? Historians have different ways to define history as a discipline.
Among them, R.O. Collingwood's definition in The Idea ofHistory has been generally
accepted for the past several decades. According to him, the object of history is actions of
human beings that have been done in the past; and history proceeds by the interpretation
of evidence for the sake of human self-knowledge.! The prime duty of the historian,
argues Collingwood, is "a willingness to bestow infinite pains on discovering what
actually happened" not only in terms of the "accuracy in facts" but also in terms of how
to interpret facts through "a historical imagination.,,2 Historians have produced
voluminous studies that either revise or argue against the proceeding accounts. The
constructive activity of interpreting facts bridges distance between history and other
disciplines of the humanities, especially philosophy and literature. The resemblance
between the historian and the novelist, as Collingwood was well aware of, reaches its
culmination in the sense that both work with imagination. Despite the fact that a
historian's picture is meant to be true while a novelist's task is to construct a coherent
story that makes sense, the past is reconstructed through narration. The reconstruction of
I R.G. Collingwood, The Idea ofHistory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 9-10.
2 R.G. Collingwood, 55-56,242-249.
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the past is not only an exclusive task of historians. Sometimes historians have to resort to
literary skills to fulfill their historical narration, which was exemplified by the great
Chinese historiography Sima Qian and his highly praised work Shiji (Records of the
Grand Scribe).3
Events happened in the past have been a dominant subject of literature. Although
history provides a well-organized way to access the past, readers in general are prone to
be more impressed by historical novels, such as those written by Walter Scott, than by
big volumes of history. In the field ofliterary studies, against the formal analysis of
works of literature in New Criticism, Stephen Greenblatt, the founder ofNew
Historicism, suggests that one should oppose to "a historicism based upon faith in the
transparency of signs and interpretative procedures" and be suspicious of liberatory
narratives since "the work of art is itselfthe product of a set of manipulations.,,4 Being
caught up in the circulation of power, all cultural products are a part of larger discursive
structures that can offer clues to the ideological mechanism of a given time period. In
Nation and Narration, Homi Bhabha specifically illustrates the ambiguous relationship
between literary narration and ideological construction:
It is the project ofNation and Narration to explore the Janus-faced ambivalence
of language itself in the construction of the Janus-faced discourse of the nation.
This turns the familiar two-faced god into a figure of prodigious doubling that
investigates the nation-space in the process of the articulation of elements: where
meanings may be partial because they are in medias res; and history may be half-
made because it is in the process of being made; and the image of cultural
3 For a study of Sima Qian, see Stephen W. Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the
Writings ofSima Qian (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1995).
4 Stephen Greenblatt, "Towards a Poetics of Culture," in The New Historicism (New York: Routledge,
1989),1-14,12.
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authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of
"composing" its powerful image.5
Bhabha's notion of the "half-made" history is of particular relevance here because
the rewriting of history has become an important cultural phenomenon in post-1989
China. In Mao's China, class analysis and economic constraints in determining historical
outcomes were held as chief tenets of Marxist historiography.6 After the Cultural
Revolution, while class struggle was no longer the primary task of the CCP government,
historical materialism was still the orthodox philosophy in China. Since the late 1980s,
however, historians have tried to reinterpret the history ofthe late Qing and the
Republican China in order to reexamine Chinese modernity. New Confucianism has
become a hot topic subsequent to the rise of capitalism in East Asia. Literary critics have
begun to challenge the Party-endorsed literary history by re-canonizing certain literary
classics. In the film industry, historical subjects continue to be the most plentiful
resources that can be conveniently reinterpreted to legitimize the Party leadership, and to
overcome the post-1989 ideological crisis. American film theorist Brian Henderson has
commented on the meaning of narrative works: "Finally the operation of a myth... always
has to do with the time which the myth is told, not with the time that it tells of.,,7
As one can expect, the way in which the revolutionary history is being told in
"main melody" films is different from the previous years. In this chapter, I will examine
how different narratives have been employed in "main melody" films to retell the
5 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 3.
6 See ArifDir1ik, Revolution and History: The Origins ofMarxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
7 Brian Henderson, "The Searchers: An American Dilemma," in Bill Nichols ed., Movies and Methods: An
Anthology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976),429-49,434.
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revolutionary history in modern China, and what kind of ideological function these
narratives have achieved.
Mikhail Bakhtin defines Dostoevsky's novels as polyphonic novels by the
relationship between narrator and character, in which the character's voice is never
ultimately overpowered by that of the narrator. They co-exist independently, both
working as valid voices in the novels. As its opposite, most "monologic novels" have the
word of the narrator taken final authority.8 I would like to borrow the Bakhtinian notion
of "polyphonic" to describe the co-existence of different historical narratives in "main
melody" films, especially in terms that neither could be overpowered by others. In
socialist China, the theme of "only the CCP can save China" or "only socialism can
develop China" represented a monologic narrative in cinema, as shown in The White-
haired Girl, The Dragon-beard Ditch, Five Golden Flowers, and many others. In
contrast, the cinematic representation of the modern Chinese revolutionary history in
"main melody" films, borrowing Bakhtin's account of polyphonic novels, has employed
a set of polyphonic narrative styles. How the polyphonic narration of history in "main
melody" films underpins the ideological transition in 1990s' China is the focus of this
chapter.
The Great Decisive War: Making Revolution into Epic
Modern Chinese history is always a dominant theme in Chinese cinema. In
socialist China, cinematic representation of the Party-led revolutionary history
contributed greatly to the legitimacy ofthe CCP regime. For example, Nanzheng beizhan
8 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984).
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(From Victory to Victory, 1952) re-stages a series of battles between the PLA and the
KMT troops in 1947. Set in Anti-Japanese War, Xiaobing Zhang Ga (Little Soldier
Zhang Ga, 1963) features the growing up of a boy hero; Didao Zhan (Tunnel Warfare,
1965) portrays the brave struggle of Chinese people in central China who fought
Japanese soldiers through various underground tunnels. War films produced during this
period always featured ordinary soldiers or low-ranking officers as the protagonists.
Rather than seeing them as propaganda, the audience "tended to identify with the heroes
and marvel at their courageous deeds and unrelenting revolutionary spirit.,,9
Chinese cinema did not feature the Mao character, the great savior of the Chinese,
as well as other high-ranking CCP leaders, until a 1978 film production Dahe benliu (The
River Runs). In this film, Chairman Mao inspects the Yellow River and meets the
heroine, a woman cadre who has fought with the KMT in the river region. Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai also appears at the end of this film when a flood is threatening people living
near the river. Since then, Mao and other CCP leaders have been featured in several films
such as Fengyu xia zhongshan (Storm from the Zhong Mountain, 1982), Sidu Chishui
(Crossing the Chi River, 1983), Weiwei Kunlun (The Great Kunlun Mountain, 1988). The
fact that the high-ranking CCP leaders did not appear in Chinese cinema before the
Cultural Revolution deserves special attention. The Cultural Revolution brought the
Chinese society into chaos. After the ten-year catastrophe, in order to strengthen
confidence in the CCP regime, the appearance of Mao and other leaders on screen has
become part and parcel of the ideological mechanism to glorify the CCP leadership.
9 Zhang Yingjin, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2004), 193.
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In late 1980s, a "Mao Fever" swept through Chinese society, catering to the rising
popularity of the revolutionary history in cultural consumption. The emergence of this
"Mao Fever" was closely linked to the political and economic climate of China when
many were dissatisfied with the statue quo and expressed nostalgia for the past,IO The
bestseller Zouxia shentan de Mao Zedong (Mao Zedong: Man, Not God, 1989) offered an
image of Mao both as a great statesman and an ordinary person. This double-narrative
strategy has been further promoted in "main melody" films. The Central Department of
Propaganda requested that "main melody" films should represent "major revolutionary
historical events." Therefore, from the birth of the CCP in 1921 to the world famous
Long March in 1935, from the political struggle between the Communists and the
Nationalists during the second civil war (1945-1949) to the founding of the PRC in 1949,
the CCP-Ied revolutionary history has been fully represented in "main melody" films
such as Kaitian pidi (The Birth of a New Age, 1997), Changzheng (The Long March,
1996), Dajuezhan (The Great Decisive War, 1991), and Kaiguo Dadian (The Founding
Ceremony, 1999). Instead of portraying the war through stories of ordinary soldiers and
low-ranking officers, "main melody" films aim to re-stage grand warfare from a
panoramic perspective, featuring Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Vi, and other
high-ranking CCP leaders as the main heroes. For example, compared with Wanshui
qianshan (The Long March, 1959) that describes how a group of the Red Army soldiers
overcame many difficulties in the Long March, the 1996 "main melody" film
Changzheng is extended to two episodes, with a total running time of two and a half
10 For an analysis on the "Mao Fever," see Dai Jinhua, "Redemption and Consumption," in Cinema and
Desire: Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work ofDai Jinhua, 172-188.
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hours. It opens with a bird's-eye shot of a bombardment on the Xiang River,
accompanied by a solemn voiceover: "In the early winter of 1934 AD, on the age-old
planet where the people live, on the land of south China, occurred an astounding war."
The bombing scene lasts for 4 minutes, exhibiting the severities of the war, and the
camera then cuts to the Soviet adviser Li De (Otto Braun) and his Chinese comrades. The
low-ranking instructor and captains ofa Red Army battalion in the 1959 production are
replaced by the CCP leadership represented by Mao in the 1996 production. A same-
titled 24-episode TV series, produced in 2001, adopts the same way of narration,
featuring almost all high-ranking CCP officials. Both the 1996 film and the 2001 TV
series, like many other "main melody" war productions, have gained considerable
popularity.
Historical narration in these "main melody" productions is characterized by
glorifying the success of the CCP leadership. From off-stage to on-stage, from minor
roles to protagonists, the emerging of high-ranking CCP leaders on Chinese screen
indicates the necessity of ideological transition in post-socialist China. In a certain
degree, the newly produced "main melody" historical war films can be categorized into
"epic films" because the cinematic narration of the CCP-Ied revolutionary history bears
similarities with epic poetry, and Hollywood epic filmmaking tradition as well.
As a broadly defined genre of poetry, the epic retells the life and works of a
heroic or mythological person or group of persons in a continuous narrative, such as the
Iliad and the Odyssey in the West, or Gesa 'er wang (The Epic of King Gesar) in the East.
The composition of epic poetry or of long poems in general, has become uncommon in
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the modern world. The meaning of the term epic then has evolved to refer to prose works
that are characterized by great length, multiple settings, large numbers of characters, or
long span of time, such as War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy, or Ulysses by James Joyce.
Corresponding to epic poetry, epic film generally refers to films that have a large
scope, often set during a time of war or other conflicts, and sometimes taking place over a
considerable period of time. From D.W. Griffith's Birth ofa Nation (1915) to David
Lean's Lawrence ofArabia (1962), from George Lukas's Star Wars (1977) to the more
recent Troy (200 1) starring Brad Pitt, Hollywood has a long tradition of epic filmmaking.
"Main melody" films on the CCP-Ied revolutionary history share characteristics with
these epic films, especially in terms of grand war background, heroic characters and
extraordinary length. While the major reason for the Hollywood epic production is
economic- collecting higher box office receipt with spectacles- why has the Chinese
revolutionary history been retold in an epic style? What kind of ideological messages do
these "main melody" epic war films carry? To answer these questions, it would be
worthwhile to consider the ideological significance of the epic in general.
According to Longman Companion to English Literature, epic poetry can offer
"inspiration and ennoblement within a particular cultural or national tradition." The epic
always carries a peculiar and complex connection to national and local culture, especially
in terms of its political potency. In a study on the development of 19th century Balkan
literature, Margaret Beissinger points out that the systematic collecting of epic poems
among Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, and Romanians did not begin until the 19th century.
Coinciding with the rise of nationalism, aspirations for liberation, and the formation of
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national or revival literature, literary epic became an important means for forging a sense
of male-dominated nationhood. 11 Other critics also point out acutely,
.,. [O]ne of the purposes of epic literature is to present a national or religious
identity in times of change. It is the peculiar ability of the epic to derive its basis
from very real events but to transmute the ingredients into a timeless form; the
past has always excited man's imagination more than the tangible present, since
. . h' d 12Its gIVes 1m greater scope to ream....
Post-1989 China has been facing one of the most important periods of change in
the history ofthe CCP's governance. In a profit-driven post-socialist China, the ideology
of self-sacrifice has been exposed as an expired propaganda. Under the unprecedented
ideological crisis, the previous war films featuring the sacrifice of the ordinary soldiers
no longer can sustain the identification between the ordinary people and the CCP regime.
In an era that literature has been increasingly marginalized vis-a.-vis visual culture as the
dominant form of cultural consumption, in order to fill in the blank left by the wearing
out of the self-sacrifice for the sake ofthe nation, the epic war film has become an
effective replacement, especially when government subsidies are ready to produce visual
spectacles that were unimaginable before. Partly thanks to the attractive visual spectacles,
epic war film constitutes one of the newly formed ideological state apparatus in China.
According to the "Parry-Lord Theory," an active current in 20th century oral
literary studies established by Milman Parry and Albert Lord, epics most likely have six
main characteristics: a) the hero is of imposing stature, of national or international
importance, and of great historical or legendary significance; b) the setting is vast,
11 Margaret Beissinger, "Epic, Gender, and Nationalism, the Development ofNineteenth-century Balkan
Literature," in Epic Traditions in the Contemporary World, The Poetics o/Community (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 69-86.
12 Derek Elley, The Epic Film: Myth and History (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 12.
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covering many nations, the worlds or the universe; c) the action consists of deeds of great
valor or requiring superhuman courage; d) supernatural forces--gods, angels, demons--
interest themselves in the action; e) a style of sustained elevation is used; f) the poet
retains a measure of objectivity.13 "Main melody" epic war film has successfully
transplanted the major characteristics of epic literature onto the silver screen.
The most telling "main melody" war film is the large budget trilogy The Great
Decisive War, produced in 1991. It exhibits how the CCP won China by defeating the
KMT and its affiliated American forces through three major military campaigns in
1948-the Liaoshen campaign, the Huaihai campaign and the Peking-Tianjin campaign.
After the Japanese surrender of 1945, military clashes between the Communists and the
Nationalists afflicted many parts of China and finally developed into a civil war (the so-
called Liberation War by most Chinese historians). By March 1948 the Nationalist
army's situation was becoming desperate. Both Mukden and Changchun in Manchuria
were surrounded by Communist troops and could be supplied only by Nationalist air
force planes. In the Liaoshen campaign, conducted from September 12 to November 2,
1948, the PLA forces conquered the Manchurian provinces then swept into North China.
Mao Zedong announced that the Communist armies were going to shift from a strategy of
predominantly guerrilla warfare to one of conventional battles in open country. In the
following Huaihai campaign, after successfully cutting off and destroying one of the most
powerful battalions of Chiang's army force, the PLA managed to seize and hold Kaifeng,
the city on the Yellow River that guarded the key railway junction in central China, for a
13 For related essays, see Milman Parry's posthumous work, The Making ofHomeric Verse (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1971), and Albert Lord, The Singer ofTales (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
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week before the KMT reinforcements counterattacked at the price of a huge casualties.
The situation for the KMT was getting worse when the U.S. government decided not to
provide any military aid. While Chiang made all kinds of efforts to coordinate his fellow
generals to fight against Mao, Mao took advantage of the internal division within
Chiang's camp. In the Peking-Tianjin Campaign, after Tianjin was captured in January
1949, the PLA successfully persuaded the KMT general who commanded Peking to
surrender. After the three military campaigns, the KMT lost its most powerful army force
and North China to the CCP. South China was soon taken over by the PLA and Chiang
d T · 14retreate to aIwan.
The Great Decisive War opens with a bird's-eye view of Mao walking on the
north plateau. Then he stands in face of the rising sun, the sound of ice breaking echoing
afar. An introductory voiceover comes when the camera cuts to the melting down of the
frozen Yellow River:
August A.D. 1945, Japan announced its surrender. The Chinese people eventually
gained the first complete victory of anti-invasion wars in modern times. However,
our ancient Orient country, after plenty of war sufferings, was soon facing choices
of two fates and two futures. The KMT reactionary force headed by Chiang Kai-
shek attempted to establish a state under landlord and bourgeoisie dictatorship,
while the CCP, according to the historical development and the will of the people,
aimed to set up a China of New Democracy....The war ended long ago. Both
victory and defeat have become history. But if we have time to restore the war in
a chessboard, we can still feel the marvelous of the military arrangement; feel the
force of every step in the game.
Based on this sublime tone, great efforts were made in The Great Decisive War to
represent the three military campaigns that unfolded in 142 days. Each campaign is shot
in two episodes. Consisting of three sections, with a running time of more than 9 hours,
14 For more details about these three military campaigns, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search/or Modern
China, 2nd ed. (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), Chapter 18, The Fall of the Guomindang State, 459-488.
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the trilogy reflects not only the military confrontation between the CCP and the KMT,
but also their struggles in fields such as politics, economics, and foreign affairs. It is the
first time that such an epic war film with complex narratives and numerous characters
produced in the history of Chinese cinema.
Instead of focusing on individual battle sequences, the main narrative line in The
Great Decisive War is constructed through the political confrontation between the CCP
and the KMT. Much of the trilogy deals with military strategies adopted by the two
opponent parties, and polarized and represented by their respective leaders: Mao Zedong
and Chiang Kai-shek. The struggle between the progressive CCP and the repressive KMT
is represented as an inevitable historical destiny that led to the eventual triumph of the
CCP under Mao's superior leadership. Consequently, the camera moves alternatively
between the two opponent sides. For example, Huaihai Campaign, the second section of
the trilogy, begins with a casual conversation between Mao and Zhou Enlai in the
Xibaipo village. They draw out basic strategies to take over Kaifeng and Xuzhou, the
cities that guard the key railway junctions. Then the camera cuts to Chiang's house in
Nanjing. Madam Chiang is comforting her husband about the loss of the northeast, and
Chiang is planning to launch a battle again. This kind of comparative representation is a
basic narrative device used frequently throughout the trilogy. The camera cuts back and
forth time and again between Mao and Chiang when both announce their strategies in
their respective military conference. The ideological function of epic narrative in "main
melody" films such as The Great Decisive War testifies Bakhtin's comments on epic as a
master discourse par excellence:
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The epic, as the specific genre known to us today, has been from the beginning a
poem about the past, and the authorial position immanent in the epic and
constitutive for it (that is, the position of the one who utters the epic word) is the
environment of a man speaking about a past that is to him inaccessible, the
reverent point of view of a descendent. In its style, tone and manner of
expression, epic discourse is infinitely far removed from discourse of a
contemporary about contemporary issues addressed to contemporaries. IS
Based on the cinematic representation of the revolutionary history, the "main
melody" epic war film shows how the ruling Party tries to maintain the status quo by
idealizing a past that is "utterly different and inaccessible," to borrow from Bakhtin
again. It defies the possible act of questioning the status quo by immersing the audience
into nostalgia for the irrevocable past.
The Great Decisive War was produced by August First, an important PLA film
studio in China. While the average feature film production cost was 1 million yuan, the
trilogy has a huge budget of 100 million yuan. Meanwhile, the film shooting was assisted
by thousands ofPLA soldiers. Both the budget and the participation of the PLA
contributed to the most impressive feature of the trilogy: many grand-scale battle scenes
that are unprecedented in the history of Chinese cinema. Before The Great Decisive War,
August First produced many successful war films-but none of them can compare with
The Great Decisive War. One ofthe most breathtaking battle scenes in Liaoshen
Campaign is the general attack of Jinzhou, one of the most important cities in Manchuria
in term oftransportation. A long shot shows artillery carts lay outside Jinzhou, ready to
fire. As a voiceover describes, "it is the first time in the history of Chinese war that a
thousand cannons are roaring at the same time toward the same target." Under the
covering fire of the artillery column and the tank column, thousands of PLA soldiers start
15 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 13-14.
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to attack Jinzhou. The battle scene lasts for more than ten minutes, interrupted by mid-
shots of both the PLA and the KMT leaders in their headquarters respectively.
Besides a visual representation of the exciting battle sequences that can match,
and sometimes even can overwhelm, the literary narrative of grand warfare in epic
literature, the poetic voiceover enhances the epic style of the trilogy. Like the opening
scene of the trilogy, after exhibiting how the CCP takes over Jinzhou within 31 hours, a
voiceover comes to accompany another bird's-eye view of the city:
In those days flying birds have got used to gunshots, and the sky with powder
smoke, but they have never seen the whole city trembling, shaking, tilting, and
rotating. They could not image the ancient city Jinzhou was thus bathing in the
flames so impassionedly.
Hollywood influence is discernable in "main melody" filmmaking, especially in
term of the cinematic creation of war spectaculars. In order to show the vast scale of war,
the traditional Hollywood master-shot is used extensively to produce visual richness. In
addition, high-angle bird's-eye shots appear frequently in the trilogy to create a grand
effect. Inspired by Hollywood narrative style, Chinese filmmaker have also designed
cinematic details that could create strong emotional power. In a battle near Jinzhou, a
young soldier dies in the front, his red scarf flying into the air. This red scarf, originally
owned by a newlywed woman who has donated all her betrothal gifts to the front, is a
symbol of the good relationship between the army and the people. As the director
mentions, they were inspired by the ending shot of Schindler's List, where a girl in red
dress walks alone against a black and white background. In Liaoshen Campaign, slowly,
the red scarf falls down to the burning battlefield, where a whole battalion of soldiers has
166
died in gunfire. It not only represents the people's wish to liberate China, but the huge
price they have paid for this grand cause.
"The epic telos of tears," argues Thomas Greene, can create a community of shared
moumers. 16 The unnumbered dead soldiers in combat leave the audience in sorrow. The
sorrow was formerly an effective way to identify the audience with the revolutionary
cause and the CCP leadership. But as I have mentioned earlier, this sort of ideological
interpellation no longer works in post-1989 China, when the bond between the Party and
the people has been put into question. Consequently, the sacrifice ofname1ess soldiers in
"main melody" war films is represented as a magnificent visual background, and high-
ranking CCP leaders occupy the foreground. It is the great CCP leaders that are shining
as a galaxy in the film. I? The success of The Great Decisive War, to a great extent, is due
to the trilogy's humanist representation of the CCP leaders. As embodied by the
abovementioned bestseller Mao Zedong: Man, Not God, Mao in The Great Decisive War
is represented as both a great leader and an amiable father. In Huaihai Campaign, before
Mao's elder son Mao Anying and his girlfriend Liu Siqi go to join the land reform team,
Mao tells Siqi not to be afraid of dogs in the village, and puts his coat on Anying's
shoulder: "You wear it in daytime, and Siqi can take it as a quilt as night, so you two can
go through the winter." The same humanist concern can be found in many other epic
films. In The Founding Ceremony, when Mao's son comes to talk about his plan to get
16 Thomas Green "The Natural Tears of Epic," in Epic Traditions in the Contemporary World (Berkeley:
University of California Press), 189-202.
17 Although the 1952 production From Victory to Victory was praised as a model of "epic scope",
mentioned Zhang Yingjin in Chinese National Cinema, in terms of the cinematic representation of the CCP
leadership, it was different from the "main melody" films in the 1990s. See Zhang Yingjin, Chinese
National Cinema, 100.
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married, a friendly family atmosphere is constructed on screen. Mao approves his
marriage and wants to schedule a time to see the daughter-in-law. However, after Mao
finds that the marriage is against the newly issued Marital Law because the girl is under
18 years old, he instantly withdraws his approval. His son angrily protests: "When you
married my mom, she was not yet 18 years old." This anecdotal plot brings Mao's family
issues to light in addition to his military decisions, making the image of Mao more
believable. After the ideology of constructing Mao as the savior of China and the red sun
of the East expired, the image of Mao is re-erected as a flesh and bones human being.
As in epic poetry, "main melody" war epic attempts to retain a measure of
objectivity. The moral judgment that has been a salient feature of the previous war
films-that the CCP is a progressive force and the KMT reactionary-is represented
through the operation of military strategies. The same emphasis on leadership occurs on
the KMT side too. In The Great Decisive War, the failure of the KMT is described as a
result of its internal strife: most of the KMT generals are suspicious of others and cannot
cooperate with one another although they know clearly that all ofthem are in the same
boat. Not all KMT generals are stereotyped as totally corrupt. Even Chiang himself is
sometimes represented in a positive light. An interesting plot is that several KMT
generals play mahjong together in an air-raid shelter. They all despair of winning war
over the Communists. When Chiang Kai-shek comes to visit the front without
notification, they are worried that Chiang will excoriate them. Surprisingly, Chiang asks
who lost the game and plays for him, and wins the player's money back. Before he
leaves, he says, "You are not good at playing mahjong, and I'm not good at fighting the
168
war. The task of keeping the Communists from crossing the Yangtze River will fall on
your shoulders." Deeply moved by Chiang's words, the general swears that he will fight
to the death. Not merely presented as the head of the KMT who successfully mobilizes
his underlings, Chiang is also represented several times in the trilogy with his family
members. At the beginning of Liaoshen Campaign, Chiang first appears as a grandfather,
talking about Chinese culture with his grandsons. In Peking-Tianjin Campaign, at the end
of December 1948, we see Mao's daughter comes to ask for a birthday gift, which is
followed with another shot of Chiang celebrating Christmas with his family.
In order to achieve objectivity, an important historical character that cannot be
ignored in this trilogy is Lin Biao (1907-1971), the executive commander of the Liaoshen
campaign. Lin rose to political prominence during the Cultural Revolution, climbing as
high as Mao's designated successor and comrade-in-arms. In 1971, according to the PRC
official account, Lin planned a coup and escaped after the assassination of Mao was
aborted. His plane crashed, and all on board were killed. Since then, Lin has been labeled
as a traitor and never politically rehabilitated. The Great Decisive War is the first time
that Lin appears on the silver screen as a Communist leader who has achieved great
military victories. In Liaoshen Campaign, in order to prevent his army from suffering a
high number of casualties, Lin often uses strategies that are different from Mao and the
politburo's decisions. However, the character is not stereotyped as a headstrong leader.
Roasted yellow beans, his favorite snack, are used as a prop to illustrate his personality.
When he cannot make a military decision, he chooses to eat many beans while thinking.
After an order is delivered, he is happy to pick up the bean again. Despite his failed coup
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in 1971, the film presents Lin Biao as an excellent military leader in the civil war period.
By representing the historically disputable character in a positive light, the cinematic
rehabilitation of Lin Biao indicates a significant ideological message, that is, the
historical narration in the whole film production is more objective than before. 18
Stalin had a high evaluation of the CCP's military campaigns. He said that
600,000 PLA soldiers defeating 800,000 KMT soldiers was a real miracle. The ending
voiceover of Huaihai Campaign borrows his comments, annotating that "38 years later, a
senior researcher of the U.S. Army traveled all the way across the Pacific Ocean to study
the Huaihai campaign battlefield, attempting to discovery the mystery." Although there is
no supernatural force present in modem warfare, the CCP is granted mythical power,
which further enhanced the epic characteristic of the trilogy. Despite the fact that
historical accuracy is the prime concern in "main melody" epic films, this very
metamorphosis of history into myth is worth pondering. It serves the ideological
transition ofthe time. As symbolic tales of the distant past, myths in general are
connected to people's belief systems or rituals. Nothing can be better appropriated by the
ideological mechanism than the long-lasting effect of myths. Since myths are
undecipherable miracles, one can do nothing but appreciate the glory of the myths. It is
thus no surprise that The Great Decisive War gained considerable popularity in China,
winning three major Chinese film awards: the Huabiao Award, the Golden Rooster
Award, and the Hundred Flowers Award. The success of The Great Decisive War enables
18 As the director Li jun mentioned in a essay, whether The Great Decisive War can portray the Lin Biao
character faithful or not is one of the audience's biggest concern. See his interview in Dangdai dainyin
(Feb, 1992),38-59,43.
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other similar productions such as the 2-episode Dazhuanzhe (The Great Turning Point,
1996), and the 4-episode Dajinjun (The Great Military Advance, 1996-1999).
My 1919: Personalizing History in Postmodern China
Germinated in the cultural soil of Western post-industrial or late capitalist society,
postmodernism has been accepted by many scholars as a valid description of the cultural
phenomena that have occurred in most Western countries over the last two decades. Since
the early 1990s, Chinese postmodernism has attracted many domestic and oversea
Chinese intellectuals as well as some Western scholars in China studies. In
Postmodernism and China, a collection discussing the applicability of postmodernism in
grasping the condition of contemporary Chinese societies, an agreement has been arrived
by most of its contributors-with the global expansion of capitalism, postmodernism is
no longer a monolithic Western phenomenon; instead, it has generated different fornls
both in the West and in the East. 19 Therefore, Chinese postmodernism, despite the fact
that it is not a cultural dominant in China yet, has become a valid category to examine
certain cultural phenomenon in China.
In his work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Jean-Francois
Lyotard refers to what he describes as the postmodern condition, which he characterized
as increasing skepticism toward the totalizing nature of "meta narratives" or "grand
narratives":
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward
metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the
sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the
metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of
19 ArifDirlik and Zhang Xudong, Postmodernism and China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).
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metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied
on it. The narrative function is losing its factors, its great hero, its great dangers,
its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative
language elements--narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so
on [...] Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?2o
Postmodernist thinkers have associated postmodernism with the end of grand
narratives. However, grand narratives are hardly absent post-socialist China, as shown in
many "main melody" films. As renewed grand narratives, these epic films still hold "its
great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal" in a central position. One
important feature of Chinese postmodernism, in my point of view, is the juxtaposition of
grand narratives and alternative narratives that become visible in the 1990s, including
theories of modernity, the revival of Confucianism, feminism, and others. Together, they
contributed to the formation of a multi-layered social discourse that is no longer
dominated by a single class analysis. The ideological function of alternative narratives is
no less important than that of grand narratives. In the following part, by examining how
history is retold from a personalized perspective in a "main melody" film My 1919
(Wode 1919, 1999), I will argue that the consumption of history is becoming a new
strategy that resides legitimacy in a post-socialist and postmodern China.
The year 1919 is one of the most important dates in modern Chinese history
because of the May Fourth movement. The movement grew out of the Chinese people's
great dissatisfaction with the Paris Peace Conference. The Chinese warlord government
(1912-1927) joined the First World War on the side of the Allied Triple Entente in 1917.
After the war ended with the Allies' victory in 1918, an international conference
20 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv-xxv.
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organized by the victors of the war for negotiating the peace treaties took place in Paris
on January 18, 1919. The Chinese warlord government sent a delegation to the
conference with three goals: 1) to return Chinese territorial integrity of Shangdong; 2) to
abolish the Twenty-one Demands Treaty with Japan; and 3) to annul all imperialist
privileges in China. After the last two requests were refused by the super power under the
name of maintaining the world peace before the conference began, the Treaty of
Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong to Japan. When the news of the
Shandong resolution reached China in early May of 1919, it immediately triggered a
student protest in Peking, which were followed by mass demonstration in many cities.21
Though many historians consider the movement as the outgrowth of anarchism, the CCP
official account regarded it as the outset of the "new democratic revolution" in China.
The betrayal of Versailles reinforced the nationalist sentiment amongst the awakened
Chinese, and paved the way for an unprecedented mass enlightenment movement.
Marxism was systematically introduced into China during this period, and became the
CCP's most important theoretical weapon in the following years.
However, in My 1919, a "main melody" film dedicated to the 50th anniversary of
the PRC, this significant historical moment is represented in a way that is very different
from the Party-approved interpretation.
First, My 1919 chose Gu Weijun (V.K.Wellington Koo, 1888-1985), a disputable
political figure, as its protagonist. Gu was one member of the Chinese delegation to the
Paris Peace Conference. He defended China's rights on Shangdong, and many Westerns
21 For more details on the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement:
Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
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recognized him as an outstanding diplomat, which laid down the base for his future
diplomatic career.22 An interesting fact is that, despite his diplomatic achievements in
Republican China, Gu was once charged a war criminal by the CCP in 1949. His name
was on the list of war criminals mainly due to his service in the KMT government.23 As
one of the most outstanding diplomats in modem China, and a witness of many important
historical events, Gu finished an 8-volume memoir in his late years, which was translated
and published in Chinese in 1982.14 The CCP never issued any statement on his political
status until his death. The appearance of Gu on screen, just like the case of Lin Biao,
indicates that, compared with the previous political-bias historical account, a more
objective perspective will be offered to reexamine one of the most significant historical
events in modem China.
In the past, the corruption of the warlord government and its failure in foreign
affairs were considered the main reasons that sparkled the May Fourth movement. In My
1919, however, the far-off events at Versailles and the Chinese delegation are brought up
in a positive light. The film opens with a celebration of the ending of the WWI on
November 11,1918, in Europe. A black and white documentary effect is used to build a
22 For studies on Gu's contribution to modern China's diplomacy, see Willian L. Tung, v.K. Wellington
Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy (Taipei: Biographical Literature Press, 1978). Also see Chu Pao-
chin, v.K. Wellington Koo, A Case Study ofChina 's Diplomat and Diplomacy ofNationalism, 1912-1966
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981). The most recent scholarship is Stephen G. Craft's v.K.
Wellington Koo and the Emergence ~fModern China (The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).
23 Because Gu begun his diplomatic career in the Chinese Warlord government, he had been put on the
wanted list by the KMT government too. See Jin Guangyao, Gu Weijun zhuang (Shijiazhuang: Hebei
renmin chubanshe, 1999),255. Also see Xiao Gan's Gu Weijun Zhuan (Beijing: zhongguo wenshi
chubanshe, 1998), 290.
24 Reminiscences ~fWellington Koo was originally recorded in English and collected in Columbia
University library.
174
real historical sense. Then the screen cuts back to color- a mid-shot shows Gu sitting in
a carriage. His voice-over introduces the historical background of his mission in Paris:
The First World War has ended. As a member of the victorious allies, China will
take part in the Paris Peace Conference. I have the honor of being one of the
representatives of the Chinese delegation ... I have been studying the international
affairs as well as China's foreign affairs during the WWI. I'm regarding the
oncoming conference as an extraordinary opportunity for China. I wish that China
could take this chance to recover from its diplomatic defeats of the last one
hundred years.
Throughout this film, Gu is portrayed as an excellent diplomat who is always
ready to fight for China's rights, and he pursues a diplomatic way to achieve this goal.
One episode occurs during a visit to Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France.
When Gu and the head of the Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, arrive at the minister's
residence, the minister is just finishing his fencing practice and still wears his fencing
uniform. Although they are coming to seek Clemenceau's support to maintain 5 seats for
the Chinese delegation in the conference, Gu politely suggests that they should start the
meeting after Clemenceau changes into formal attire. In the meeting, Gu refused to sit
down because he will have no seat if the seats allocated to the Chinese delegation are
reduced to 2. Gu is highly praised in this film for the great efforts he has made for the
nation despite the fact that his mission is destined to be a failure due to China's
unfavorable position on the international stage. Consequently, the warlord Chinese
government that is represented by Gu and his fellows is no longer totally corrupt. This
kind of cinematic rewriting of history is one of the most significant cultural phenomena
in post-1989 China. Not only the warlord government and the Nationalist government
appear in a positive light, even emperors of the Qing dynasty and their feudalist
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patriarchism have been interpreted anew in many TV dramas.25 The highly politicized
socialist discourse is replaced by a more liberal one. The ideological transition in post-
1989 China, to a great degree, has been first achieved in the cultural field through "main
melody" films and "main melody" TV dramas.
Set against the backdrop of the Paris Peace conference, My 1919 not only draws
most of its historical facts from Gu's memoir, but also adopts the memoir's first-person
narrative style, which is the second key point that deserves special attention. This is not
to say that first-person narrative as a literary technique is rare to see in cinema, but
generally it is affiliated with an individual's experience of growing up, such as the first-
person narrative in Forrest Gump and Memoirs ofA Geisha. What is interesting in My
1919, however, is its first-person narrative of a major historical event. It echoes a rising
trend of "Jishi wenxue (Documentary Literature)" in 1990s' China that satisfied the
reader's natural curiosity and voyeurism in a way that serious literature or even popular
novels never could, and a major part of the "Documentary Literature" was on the life of
Zhiqing (an abbreviation of intellectual youths, or sent-down youths) during the Cultural
Revolution. Characterized by sensationalism, this sort of Zhiqing literature provides its
readers anecdotes that are not recordable in the official account. Consumerism quickly
takes ground when readers have been motivated by a desire to learn more about the past
that goes against the grain of the official account. My 1919 caters to the wave of
consumerism even though its personalized rewriting of history is still confined by the
contemporary political situation. Or, in other words, the first-person narrative in My 1919
actually makes history a cultural artifact that can be consumed in post-socialist China.
25 The most influential one is Yongzheng Dynasty, which I have mentioned in Chapter 4, 126.
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Rather than challenging the socialist historiography, what has been achieved in My 1919
is a commercialization of history.
An interesting case to observe the relationship between personalization and
commercialization is a pop song from the early 1990s entitled Wade 1997 (My 1997). In
this song, a girl is making wishes for the return of Hong Kong in 1997:
.. .I have spent longer time in Canton because my boyfriend is in Hong Kong,
He can come to Shengyan but I cannot go to Hong Kong...
1997 please come quickly! So I can go to Hong Kong;
1997 please come quickly! So I can stand in Hung Hom Coliseum;
1997 please come quickly! So I can go with him to see the midnight show....
For the composer and the singer of this pop song, Ai Hng, 1997 would be the time she
could travel freely to Hong Kong, meeting her boyfriend and enjoying the dazzling
world. The colonial history of Hong Kong and its return to mainland China have no
political meaning for her. What she cares, and what most Chinese will care, too, is how
Hong Kong would bring changes to their personal life. My 1919 bears an analogy with
this song not only in terms of their similar titles. As embodied in the song, what is
obvious in the film is a same attempt of appropriating the grand history to personal goals,
although its nationalist thrust cannot be ignored, which I will discuss in next chapter.
While Hong Kong is the symbol of a dazzling commercial world in My 1997, My 1919,
shot in Paris, offers the audiences an exotic Western scenery, and part of this film uses
foreign languages to create the exotic mood. In addition, it has an interesting cinematic
representation of Chinese men and French women. Gu lives with a noble French family,
an old French lady and her daughter Jeanna, and Jeanna has a good impression of Gu.
When Gu comes to pick up a friend in the train station, he is flirted with by several
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French prostitutes. Meanwhile, surprisingly to most Chinese audiences, the head of the
Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, has a beautiful French wife. May Fourth Movement,
in contrast, is only briefly mentioned. Therefore, in terms of visual effect, My 1919 is a
film of Paris in 1919 rather than one of China in 1919. This exoticized visual
representation implies not only a "farewell to the revolution" but also a warm welcome of
Western capitalism.26 It is the commercialization of the revolutionary history that makes
this farewell-welcome gesture a postmodernist one.
According to historical records, under great domestic pressure, after the Western
powers decided to hand Shandong to Japan, the Chinese delegation did not attend the
ceremony when the powers signed the treaty. China's failure in the Paris Peace
Conference was regarded as a national humiliation in orthodox Chinese history.
However, the film provides a fictional scene in which Gu not only attends the final
session and refuses to sign the treaty, but also delivers a public lecture to express his
outrage:
I'm very disappointed. The super committee disregarded the right of Chinese
people and sold out China to Japan... What right do you have to betray the
Shandong Province of China to Japan? ... Such a treaty of betrayal and
humiliation, who may accept? Therefore we refuse to sign the treaty. Please
remember, Chinese people will never forget this humiliating moment.
At the beginning of this film, the director has tried to create a faithful-to-history effect by
a quasi-documentary opening shot. The first-person narrative also aims to strengthen its
historical accurateness against grand narratives. Will the fictionalized last scene ruin its
26 Bidding Farewell to Revolution actually is the title of the book written by Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, two
famous Chinese intellectuals after the 1989 incident, in which they conclude the cultural atmosphere in
contemporary China as "bidding farewell to revolution." See Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, Gaobie gemin (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Tiandi Book Inc, 1995).
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previous efforts? I would like to argue that the juxtaposition of the fact and the fiction is
an essential part of a postmodernist rewriting. Those who have no knowledge of this
historical event may tend to believe that Gu did deliver the lecture full of nationalist
sentiment, which speaks to the power of the film medium in constructing our way of
knowing. For those who know exactly that Gu's lecture is merely a fiction, there is no
harm in indulging in an illusion of parodying history. As a matter of fact, postmodernist
parody is one of the most salient features of contemporary Chinese culture, and it is
always related to sensitive political issues.
The third interesting point in My 1919 is its overall critical attitude on the student
movement. Triggered by the Paris Peace Conference, the May Fourth Movement was
defined by Mao as the beginning of the new democracy revolution, and was often
mentioned together with the massive protest against the Gang of Four in 1976. However,
after the Tian'anmen Incident in 1989, the Party needs to revise the legitimacy of the
student movement. Since students were the main participants of the May Fourth
movement in 1919, a film about this year will probably awake the audience's memory of
the 1989 incident.27 Therefore, in My 1919, the May Fourth movement is briefly
introduced with several quasi-documentary shots. Instead of directly representing student
movement at home, a subplot is introduced through a fictional Chinese student leader in
France, Xiao Kejian. As Gu's childhood friend, Xiao is described as a passionate and
immature young student. Due to his political activities, he has been arrested when his
27 One example is the restaging of Lao She's Teahouse after 1989. In the play, the teahouse owner is
confused with the student movement under the KMT control: "they said it was a student protest, now how
does it become a riot?" Ironically, the same change happened to the 1989 student movement too. I was
sitting in the audiences, hearing people bursting into laugh at his confusion.
179
wife comes to visit him. Gu has to take care of her, while complaining to her, "What else
can he do? Going on strike, organizing protest, and finally being arrested... what he did
could not contribute to the county and the society." After Xiao is released, he throws
himself again into protests against the unfair Shandong resolution. While Gu is seeking a
professional, diplomatic way to strive for China, Xiao engages in student activism, from
printing and distributing pamphlets to organizing public lectures. He even hides two guns
in his apartment, which indicates that he is ready to take terrorist action protesting the
Versailles Treaty. By contrasting how Gu and Xiao take different approaches to defend
China's rights, it is not accidental that Gu's approach is shown positively and Xiao's
approach negatively. Xiao's lack of concern for his wife makes him more a negative
radical political activist, especially when this attitude contrasts sharply to that of Gu' s,
who not only loves his son and cherishes the memory of his deceased wife, but also takes
good care of others around him. What is promoted here is family value that was denied in
socialist cinema. Xiao ends up burning himself in front of the Versailles when he finds no
effective ways to protest the Versailles Treaty. His suicidal image in flames is contrasted
with scenes ofGu's powerful public speech condemning the injustice of the Treaty,
which, according to Xiao Zhiwei, implies "a rejection of popular nationalism as
associated with excessive emotions and radicalism" in contemporary China.28 Xiao
Zhiwei further argues that the director Huang Jianzhong's distaste for this character (Xiao
Kejian) reflects "the new thinking about the revolutionary legacy among China's
intellectuals" as represented by the trend of "bidding farewell to revolution." An
28 Xiao Zhiwei and Yin Hong, "The Revisionist History in Recent Chinese Films: A Case Study of My
1919," in 100 Years ofChinese Cinema: A Generational Dialogue (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2005), 97-111,
101.
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important point that he does not scrutinize is the implicit relationship between the
character ofXiao and the 1989 student demonstration. To make the point more clearly,
the negative representation of Xiao in the film is a supplement of the official account of
the 1989 student movement. Combining sympathy with criticism, My 1919 indicates
implicitly that students' ardent patriotism is unpractical and useless in reality.
Days without Lei Feng: From Socialist Hero to Ordinary Hero
Lei Feng was a well-known name for those who grew up in China during the 60s,
70s and 80s. Born in 1940, Lei Feng was brought up by the Party after his parents died in
1946. He joined the PLA and became a model soldier that was fully dedicated to
Socialism. He died in 1962 when a telephone pole, knocked down by an army truck,
killed him while he was directing the truck. On March 5, 1963, Chairman Mao published
his inscription "Learn from Comrade Lei Feng." Since then, Lei Feng has been further
promoted by propaganda nationwide as a selfless socialist hero. March 5th has become
the official "Learn from Lei Feng Day." Story of Lei Feng was widely taught in
elementary schoo1.29 Over decades, Lei Feng has been used as a model to educate the
Chinese people in terms of self-sacrifice and altruism. Posters bearing his image were
also produced in large quantities.
Soon after his death, Lei Feng's life was adapted into film. Lei Feng was
produced by August First Film Studio in 1965. Released on March 5th, this film aims to
promote the Lei Feng spirit: serving the people wholeheartedly. It tells how Lei Feng, as
a good student of Mao Zedong thoughts, tirelessly studies Chairman Mao's writings and
29 For example, in the early 1980s, when I was studying in an elementary school, I was asked to recite the
story ofLei Feng for the June First Children's day celebration,
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does good deeds. Leifeng zhige (The Song of Lei Feng) was finished in 1978. In this film,
after joining the PLA, Lei Feng is eager to go to the battlefield to avenge his parents.
Gradually, he realizes that he ought to do whatever the Party asks. As "a screw that will
never rust," he put his limited life into the endless serving for the people. The term Huo
Lei Feng (literally alive Lei Feng) has become a noun (or adjective) for anyone that is
seen as selfless, or anyone that goes out of their way to help others.
The Song ofLei Feng was a major propaganda film in the 1980s, widely released
to combat moral erosion after the Cultural Revolution. As one can expect, the Lei Feng
spirit has been gradually swept away because of the newly introduced individual
economic incentives. Many people thought the Lei Feng spirit was "foolish" and
anachronistic. For example, The Song ofLei Feng still features how Lei Feng defends
socialism and the people's community. In order to keep up with the political changes, the
Party needed to update the Lei Feng image for a better propaganda effect. In 1989, a
documentary film Lei Feng shishei (Who is Lei Feng) was produced to promote the Lei
Feng spirit.
As more and more young Chinese have no idea whom Lei Feng is, a "main
melody" film Likai Leifeng de rizi (Days without Lei Feng, 1997) brings him back to
people's mind. Different from the films listed above, in Days without Lei Feng, the
protagonist is Qiao Anshan, the driver who accidentally knocked down the telephone
pole that caused Lei Feng's death. After left the army, Qiao got married and has been
working as a driver. Although most people knew that he was Lei Feng's comrade-in-
arms, few knew that it was he who accidentally killed Lei Feng.
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The production of Days without Lei Feng has an interesting story. In 1996, a
scriptwriter of the Changchun Film Studio, Wang Xingdong, finished an 8-espisode TV
drama script based on his interview of Qiao Anshan. The theme of his script is how Qiao
Anshan inherits the Lei Feng spirit in his life after he retires from the PLA. Unable to
find a producer in Changchun, Wang came to Beijing and made contact with the newly-
founded Forbidden City Film Company. This company is a special case among the state-
run film studios because of its special ways of organization and operation. Although there
are several film studios located in Beijing, none of them is under the administrative
control of the Beijing City Hall. While both Tianjin and Shanghai have their own film
studios, the Beijing Film Studio and many others were under control ofthe Ministry of
Culture before 1996. They were handed to the MRFT (Ministry of Radio, Film and
Television) after 1996. It is said that the Beijing City Hall has been eager to establish its
own film studio to compete for awards in domestic film festivals. 3o Viewed with
hindsight, economic concern is a more important motive for the Beijing City Hall to
establish a local-controlled film studio. With supports from the upper levels, the
Forbidden City Film Company is co-invested by the Beijing Bureau of Culture and the
Beijing Bureau of Radio and Television; the vice-director of the Beijing Bureau of
Culture became the company's first leader. They were looking for an excellent film script
as the company's first product, which had to be a "main melody" film with great
commercial potential. Days without Lei Feng turned out to be the one that fit perfectly to
the company's expectation. In order to make its premiere on March 5, 1997, the 35th
30 Chen Tao. "Zijinchen de mimi (The Secrets of 'The Forbidden City')," Caijing (May 1999): 5-13.
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anniversary for Mao's inscription of "learning from comrade Lei Feng," the film was shot
.. k 31III SIX wee s.
At the end of The Song ofLei Feng, the audience is told that Lei Feng dies at his
post. Days without Lei Feng begins with the accident: on the Memorial Day of 1996, the
protagonist Qiao Anshan visits Lei Feng's cemetery in Shengyang, as he does every year.
In a sepia-colored documentary style, Qiao Anshan recalls how he accidentally killed Lei
Feng. Since Lei Feng had been erected as a model soldier at that time, in order to protect
Qiao, his name is not revealed in any news release.
The narration ofthis film is made up with three major plots. In the first plot, the
camera cuts to 1978. Qiao has retired from the PLA and becomes a bus driver. One day,
he turns down his leader when he tries to take advantage of the bus transportation.
Several episodes occur on the bus that day: an old woman looks for her gold ring; a thief
steals a passenger's money, and a pregnant woman needs to go to the hospital. Qiao is
represented as an honest, warm-hearted driver that is always ready to help others. After
sending the woman to hospital, he makes the thief returned the money. A ticket collector
finds the gold ring on the bus and, inspired by Qiao's Lei Feng spirit, she decides to
return it to the owner. Lei Feng's dedication to socialism is out of sight in this plot. What
is highlighted in the Lei Feng spirit is a willingness to help others, moral honesty, and
righteousness. All of the three qualities are highly cherished in a profit-driven China due
to the very lack of them.
The climax of the film comes from the second plot set in 1988. A young couple
accidentally hits an old man and runs away. A sedan driver stops and then drives away as
31 Chen Tao. "Zijinchen de mimi (The Secrets of 'The Forbidden City')," Caijing (May 1999): 5-13.
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well, because of the possible trouble. It is Qiao Anshan who picks up the old man and
sends him to the hospital. However, he gets himself into big trouble when the old man's
sons and daughters do not want to pay the medical costs, charging Qiao as the hit-and-run
driver. The old man is afraid that his children will abandon him in the hospital,
identifying Qiao as the man who has hit him. Qiao's teenager son suggests his father not
to do good deeds any more since everyone is talking about money. He even concludes
that those who learn from Lei Feng are stupid. After a TV reporter interviews Qiao and
broadcasts his story, the sedan driver finally shows up at the TV station to help Qiao get
out of trouble, and the real criminals are brought to justice. But Qiao's wife is outraged:
what would have happened if the real criminals had not been arrested? This plot ends
with Qiao sitting in the Lei Feng cemetery, being confused about the outcome of his good
deed. As the most touching part of this film, this plot moved many audiences into tears,
not only because of the actors' excellent performances, but also because ofthe lost Lei
Feng spirit-a mutual belief among people. When money becomes the primary concern
in people's philosophy of life, social justice is suspended. The moral corruption in
contemporary China has been vividly shown in this plot.
The last plot is set in 1995 when Qiao and his son work in long distance
transportation. His son refuses to stop when some people ask for help. He has learned
enough lessons from his father's bad experience. When a bloody-faced man tries to stop
their truck, his son quickly realized that there are gangsters who intend to blackmail the
drivers. He warns his father, "We should be very careful on our way. When you drove
with Lei Feng, there was not this kind of situation." Qiao cannot argue back since his son
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is absolutely correct on this point. The truck then gets stuck and nobody stops to help.
They have to spend the night on the roadside. Next morning, when Qiao and his son start
to unload the truck in order to drive it out of the mud, a group of young volunteers come
to help. It turns out that their leader is a school principal that was lectured by Lei Feng
and Qiao Anshan when she was a student. She organizes her students to do volunteering
work every weekend. Qiao is happy to announce: Lei Feng is still alive.32 What we can
see here is a successful update of the Lei Feng spirit to volunteering work, a concept that
is more consistent with contemporary society.
From Lei Feng to Qiao Anshan, from "a socialist screw" to young volunteers,
Days without Lei Feng bridges the distance between the selfless socialist heroes and the
ordinary people, renewing the Lei Feng spirit under new situation. It is not a disavowal of
the socialist heros, but a promise that everyone could become a hero, a self-disciplined
and self-fulfilled hero in post-socialist China. Socialism is a history that produced
numerous heroes, and post-socialist China still needs heroes-but they will be
represented as the ordinary people who dedicate themselves to individual moral
perfection, no longer serving any political slogans.
The narrative style in Days Without Lei Feng is closely related with the overall
media representation of ordinary people's daily life in post-1989 China. CCTV launched
a program called "tell stories of the ordinary people" in October 1993, and it has had an
unprecedented viewing rate. In The Practice ofEveryday life, Micheal de Certeau
examines the ways in which people individualize mass culture, altering things from
32 Wang Xingdong and Chen Baoguang, Likai Lei Fengde rizi (Days without Lei Feng), Beijing: Jiefangjun
wenyi chubanshe, 1997. Also see Mia Turner. "After He killed Lei Feng," Time (June 1997): 9-13.
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utilitarian objects to street plans to rituals, laws and language, in order to make them their
own. What happens in "tell stories of the ordinary people", however, is an opposite
process in which people's everyday life has been selected and encoded by the mass media
as a representative moment. Examined from perspectives of both psychoanalytical and an
ideological operation, the account of people's daily life on screen can exert a subtle
influence on how the ordinary people will identify themselves. Generally, they will
consider these stories more truthful and closer to their real life than other ways of
narration. When this highly encoded virtual reality is broadcasted to the audiences, and
making most of them identify with the images on the screen, what is intentionally
concealed or successfully bypassed in this visual narrative technique is who the teller is
and according to what criteria a story is told. As Wang Hui has pointed out, this program
is a TV collaboration of independent producers, state propaganda apparatus and
enormous commercial capital.33 The emergence of "the ordinary people" in this program,
argues Luo Gang, only provides a "mirror image" that the audience will identify with.34
The same ideological operation can be found in Days Without Lei Feng, too. When Lei
Feng was promoted as a PLA model, logically it was impossible that every PLA soldier
could become Lei Feng, and what was promoted is just to "learn from comrade Lei
Feng." When Qiao Anshan, a person that carries out the Lei Feng spirit is represented on
screen, this image is much closer to the ordinary people. What he has encounters in his
life, as being told in the film, may happen to many people. In an era that socialist heroes
33 Wang Hui, "The Significance of Cultural Studies," injiuying yu xinzhi (Jilin: Liaoning Educational
Press, 1996),34-45,42.
34 Luo Gang. "Jiangshu laobaixing ziji de gushi? (How to tell stories of the Ordinary people?)," Tianya
(Feburary 2000): 17-21.
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are becoming dysfunctional, the new heroes are the ordinary people that are selectively
represented by mass media, a newly formed symbol of power in post-socialist China. The
conspiracy between mass media and ideology in writing histories of ordinary people is
not an exclusive Chinese phenomenon. Both Dustin Hoffman's Hero and Tom Hanks'
Forrest Gump are familiar Hollywood examples to most American audiences. In the Lei
Feng case, however, what is discemable is the embarrassing situation of ideological
transition. It seems that Lei Feng comes to post-socialist China by a time machine, only
finding that everything has become totally different. As he faces many difficulties to
adjust to a new sphere, it is the cinematic representation of Qiao Anshan that successfully
integrates him into post-socialist China.
Another important "main melody" filmmaking trend in post-1989 China is the
documentary or quasi-documentary film productions. Documentary has been generally
considered as an instrument of information, education and propaganda. In socialist China,
many politicized historical documentaries were made to glorify socialism. Short scientific
documentaries were frequently shown with feature films. Since the late 1980s, more and
more "main melody" documentaries of important historical figures or major historical
events have been produced, drawing considerable audiences. Among them, Zhou Enlai
Waijiao Fengyun (Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy Legends, 1997), a documentary on the Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai's excellent diplomatic strategies in the 1950s was the most popular
one. In addition to several biographical films and TV series on Zhou's life, this
documentary focuses on Zhou's diplomacy, exhibiting the newly-established PRC's
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diplomatic achievements. Jiaoliang (The Bout, 1995), another documentary recording of
the Korean War and the negotiation was one ofthe top 10 box office makers in 1995.
Both, to some extent, appease Chinese people's dissatisfaction with China's passive role
in contemporary international affairs. Put aside the fact that the objectivity of the
documentary genre is problematic, the popularity of such a documentary narration of
history mainly comes from the audience's thirsty for more historical facts that were
unrevealed before. Meanwhile, it also offers a consumable socialist history. This topic
deserves a special study and cannot be covered in this chapter. What I want to draw
attention here is that both documentary and quasi-documentary narratives play important
roles in rewriting the revolutionary history in contemporary China.
From revolutionary epic to historical memoir, to stories of the ordinary people,
the narration of history in "main melody" films exhibits a Bakhtinian polyphonic
characteristic: the co-existence of many voices instead of a monologic one. As each
character in Dostoevsky's work represents a voice of an individual self, distinct from
others, the above discussed three major narratives of history in "main melody" films
carry out different ideological functions respectively, aiming to complete the ideological
transition in post-1989 China. The ideological operation of polyphonic historical
narratives in "main melody" films also bears an analogy with Bakhtin's polyphonic
concept of truth. For him, truth is a number of mutually addressed albeit contradictory
and logically inconsistent statements. It cannot be expressed with "a single mouth," but
requires many simultaneous voices. The polyphonic narration of history in "main
melody" films is characterized by the same simultaneity. Different ways of narration do
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not simple complement each other. More often than not, they are contradictory and
logically inconsistent. It is the very co-existence of many voices that serves the
mechanism of ideology. After polyphony, Bakhtin further introduces the concept of
carnival to better describe a situation in which distinct individual voices are heard,
flourish, and interact together when regular conventions are broken or reversed. This
carnival situation, to some extent, is a perfect description of the situation in contemporary
China, in which the co-existence of different narratives creates an illusion of many free
choices in a quickly commercialized Chinese society. When people get intoxicated in the
carnival, ideology works. On the other hand, the co-existence of different narratives also
means more interstices will be produced to observe the ideological operation, especially
when the transition from old ideology to new ideology is interrupted by both socialist
legacy and people's concrete living experience, which I will discuss in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CHINESE NATIONALISM AND ITS CIJ~EMATIC REPRESENTATION
The collapse ofthe Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist countries
marked the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. Surprising to scholars
who predicted either the end of nation-states or clash of civilizations, nationalism has
become one of the most powerful forces in the modem world. In China, as faith in
Marxism and Maoism has declined, a strong nationalist sentiment re-emerges. In this
chapter, by examining the cinematic representation ofthree important historical events in
"main melody" films: the Opium War in 1840, the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s, and
China's nuclear testing in 1964, I will illustrate how nationalism has been constructed as
an effective ideological discourse in contemporary China, and how Chinese intellectuals
have been involved in this ideological construction. Chinese nationalism was the product
of Western imperialism and its global expansion. A review of the historical origins of
Chinese nationalism and its development will shed light on the changing ideological
functions of the nationalist discourse at different historical conjunctures. In semi-colonial
China, nationalism unified Chinese people of different classes, especially during the anti-
Japanese war. In a globalized post-socialist China, by using the past to interpret the
present and create the future, the CCP appropriates nationalism to conceal domestic
social conflicts and overcome the post-1989 ideological crisis. Meanwhile, when
nationalism becomes a diplomatic force defending Chinese national interests against
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global capitalism, as a form of local resistance supported by Chinese intellectuals,
nationalism can also bring home vividly the often ignored historical lineage between
colonialism, imperialism, and global capitalism.
The Opium War and the Origin of Chinese nationalism
According to Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, the term "nationalism" is
generally used to describe two phenomena: I) the attitude that the members of a nation
have when they care about their national identity, and 2) the actions that the members of
a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. Built on the
philosophies ofliberty, equality, and fraternity, the French Revolution has been regarded
by most scholars as the beginning of the modern nation-state system, where nationalism
came into existence. When the new French Republic was at war with most of Europe,
responding to the deep popular sentiment for political independence, nationalism became
a determining force to unify the French people.
Based upon analysis of European history, the definition that nationalism arises
when nations seek to become modern nation-states, as some scholars correctly point out,
does not apply very well to China. I Due to a variety of crises caused by both domestic
and international factors in the second half of the 19th century, the birth of Chinese
nationalism predated the founding of a modern Chinese nation-state. Strictly speaking,
"China" did not exist as a modern nation-state until the founding of the Republic of
China in 1911. Before 1911, the Qing Empire (1644-1911), founded by the Manchus, had
ruled the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups for almost three hundred years. Until the
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),141.
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18th century, Europe was an "underdeveloped" region that could not compete with
China's more "developed" commodity production including porcelain utensils, silk
textiles, and so on. As Enrique Dussel has pointed out, China is an example that
demonstrates the degree to which European world hegemony was impossible before the
Industrial Revolution.2 Despite the rise and fall of different dynasties, China as a cultural
nation was never challenged by others. A pre-modem cultural nationalism was formed in
imperial China through contacts with those "barbarians." However, after the Industrial
Revolution empowered the Western countries, Celestial China gradually became a super-
sized market for Western capitalism. In order to balance a huge trade deficit with China,
the British began to grow opium in India in significant quantities starting in the mid-18th
century, and an illegal opium trade flooded into southern China, mainly through the East
Indian Company.3 Viewed from this perspective, the dynamics that finally led to the
Sino-British conflict in the Opium War is nothing but the aggressive expansion of
Western capitalism.
In contrast to the fast development of European countries and their growing
economic interests in the East, the Great Qing Dynasty, the once glorious empire, was
plagued with rampant corruption, a steady decentralization of power, rebellions, and
economic disasters. Faced with the social and economic problems associated with opium
use, the Qing government prohibited the smoking of opium in 1729 and reaffirmed its
ban on opium use in 1799. The decree had little effect to slow down opium use and trade.
2 Enrique Dussel. "World-System and 'Trans'-Modemity," Nepantla: Views from South 3:2 (2002): 221-
244.
3 Before the trade deficit, the financial drain on Europe's silver had been already squeezed by European
wars.
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In 1838, the British were selling 1,400 tons of opium annually to China. In March 1839,
the Daoguang Emperor appointed Commissioner Lin Zexu to control the opium trade in
Canton. After Lin confiscated and burned nearly 1,200 tons of opium, the British sent
warships and soldiers to attack China's coastal towns. Armed with modem muskets and
cannons, they threatened Beijing, the capital of the Qing Dynasty. The scared Emperor
dismissed Lin and sued for peace. The Treaty of Nanjing became the first unequal treaty
in the history of China.4 Since 1840, Chinese people had witnessed a series of military
defeats and the consequent humiliation. The Western invasion in the following years and
the unequal treaties imposed on China made the "foreign" seem more devilish than
angelic. Some scholars argue that the concept of modem nationalism did not enter into
the Chinese mind until the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).5 In my point of view,
the origin of Chinese nationalism could be traced back to the First Opium War in 1840
when the intrusion of Western gunboats coincided with the decline of the Qing Dynasty.
Engels has pointed out that the people's war in southern China after the first Opium War,
as all struggles against the foreigners, was a popular war for the maintenance of Chinese
nationality.6 It was against this historical background that the Qing court started the Self-
Strengthening Movement (1861-1894) with a hope that a strong nation could protect its
4 Under this treaty, the Qing government was obliged to pay the British government 6 million silver dollars
for the opium that had been confiscated by Lin Zexu in 1839 (Article IV), 3 million dollars in
compensation for debts that the Hong merchants in Canton owed British merchants (Article V), and a
further 12 million dollars in compensation for the cost of the war (Article VI). The total sum of21 million
dollars was to be paid in installments over three years and the Qing government would be charged an
annual interest rate of 5 per cent for the money that was not paid in a timely manner (Article VII). In
addition to the huge compensation and other indemnities, five ports were opened for foreign trade, and
Hong Kong was ceded to the British "in perpetuity" (Article III).
5 Guoqi Xu, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and National Identity; China from 1895 to 1919," in Chinese
Nationalism in Perspective. 102.
6 Engels, "People's War in China," in Marxism and Asia. 123-124.
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sovereignty against Western aggression. Threatened by an awareness of national
extinction in a ferocious social Darwinian world, the nationalist sentiment aroused in
China was a direct response to colonialism and imperialism. No matter how pre-modem
or underdeveloped a country was, their attitudes and actions against imperialist
aggression should be recognized as modem nationalism.
Transforming Sorrow to Celebration: Nationalism in The Opium War
The Opium War opened China's "Century ofHumiliation." China's defeat in the
first Sino-Japanese War further reinforced the consciousness of Wangguo miezhong (the
loss of one's state and the extinction of one's race) among Chinese people. Looking back
on the development of Chinese nationalism from 1895 to 1937, Jing Tsu
reconceptualized the production of a Chinese identity "predicated not on idealized images
of empowerment and plentitude but, rather, on their absence." 7 As he argues,
"humiliation, despite its dishonorable beginnings, has inaugurated a productive condition
for national and cultural identity in China in the 20th century.,,8 In a study of China's new
nationalism, Peter Hays Gries also points out that the crucial national narrative, or more
precisely, the continuously reworked narrative of the "Century of Humiliation" from the
mid-19th century to the mid-20th century is central to the contested and evolving
meaning of Chinese nationalism today.9
7 ling Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making ofModern Chinese Identity, 1895-1937
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 226
8 ling Tsu, 223.
9 Gries Peter Hays, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (University of California
Press, 2004), 45.
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Both the first Opium War and the first Sino-Japanese War have been represented
frequently in Chinese literature and cinema to promote nationalism. Made in 1959, the
film Lin Zexu depicts Chinese people's heroic resistance to British imperialism. In this
film, Commissioner Lin Zexu enjoys popular support in his efforts against Western
opium smuggling. A film on the navy battle in the first Sino-Japanese War, Jiawu Fengyu
(The Naval Battle of 1894) was produced in 1962, focusing on Deng Shichang, a patriotic
official who tragically dies with his crew when their ship is hit by a Japanese torpedo. In
both films, China's defeat is explained in terms of the incompetent Qing government and
its corrupted high officials instead of its backwardness in technology and weaponry. In
The Navel Battle of1894, Deng Shichang is presented as a national hero. By condemning
the rampant corruption of the "feudal" system, the film suggests that the war could have
been won if passionate patriots like Deng Shichang would have had their way. One
interesting plot in Lin Zexu is how the Cantonese fishermen help Lin capture Danton, the
British merchant, in order to force him to hand in his opium. Once hearing that Lin will
arrest all the British opium merchants, Danton manages to escape with the aid of several
corrupt Qing officials. A young fisherman discovers their plan but fails to catch them.
Then, an older fisherman organizes a team to inspect all the boats, and the team finally
catches Danton. One of the playwrights, Ye Yuan, has claimed that this plot was added
into the original script in order to convey the idea that "the true master of the history is
not Lin Zexu, but Chinese people who stand behind him.,,10 Consequently, the film does
not end with a defeat. After Lin has been dismissed, the film continues with another long
10 Lin Zexu: From Script to Film (Beijing: China Cinema Press, 1962),214. Both Zheng Junli and Zhao
Dan, the director and the lead actor of this film, had undergone political criticism in the Wuxun campaign.
Therefore, they had to be very careful in standing with the people.
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shot, in which a banner of "Pingying tuan" (Annihilate the British League) waves over
the people who are preparing to fight against the British. A voiceover claims: "From this
day onwards, Chinese people start the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist struggle," which
became an orthodox account of the Opium War in scholarly historical writings as well as
works of literature and art produced in socialist China.
The colony of Hong Kong was the most lasting legacy of the Opium War. In
1860, the colony was extended into the Kowloon peninsula. In 1898, the Convention of
Peking further expanded the colony with a 99-year lease of the New Territories. Although
the Chinese government, under different regimes, had insisted that Hong Kong is Chinese
territory, it was not until 1984 that an agreement on the future of Hong Kong between the
U.K. and the PRC governments was signed after long negotiations. According to the
Sino-British Joint Declaration, China would resume its sovereignty over Hong Kong on
July 1, 1997.
In 1994, an electronic clock was erected on the east side of the Tian' anrnen
Square in order to countdown the seconds for Hong Kong's return. In the center of the
Square is the Monument to the People's Heroes, which was constructed during the 1950s
in memory of the martyrs who laid down their lives for the revolutionary struggles. On
the pedestal of the monument, eight huge bas-reliefs carved out of white marble tell eight
revolutionary events, and the first one describes a scene ofthe First Opium War-
Chinese people fighting against the British. From this bas-reliefs to the countdown clock,
a meaningful time-space structure was formed to observe a different interpretation of the
Opium War in nationalist discourse. The marble relief features Chinese people's
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revolutionary spirit. However, as this historical event was concreted in the white marble,
China's defeat in the Opium Was became a long-ago historical fact. On the other side, the
countdown number on the electronic clock, flashing every second, became a new
attraction of the Square. It seemed that the electronic clock was speaking to the marble
relief with a triumphal gesture: "The time to wash away the national humulation is
coming."
As a film dedicated to the return of Hong Kong, a great event in Chinese history,
The Opium War offers another telling example to observe the changing nationalist
discourse in an era of globalization. The film begins with the text: "Only when a nation
really stands up, can she reflect and face squarely her history of humiliation." This
inscription deserves special attention in terms of the contrast it makes between "stand up"
and "history of humiliation." In October 1949, at the founding ceremony of the PRC,
Mao declared that Chinese people eventually stood up. Obviously, the "standing up" in
the text does not refer to Mao's 1949 declaration. Instead, it refers to the economic
prosperity that China achieved in the 1990s. In other words, it is economic rather than
political criteria that decide whether a nation stands up or not. This "economic
determinism" is the inevitable consequence of global capitalism, and what is erased in
this new worldview is the anti-imperialist history.
Compared with the narration of mass resistance in the 1959 production, The
Opium War offers a favorable description of Lin Zexu as "the first Chinese who opens
his eyes to the world." Besides his Chinese cultural superiority, Commissioner Lin is also
eager to learn the essences of modern Western knowledge to improve China. However,
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this kind of awareness comes too late; British gunboats have already appeared in the
China Sea. After being dismissed, Lin leaves his globe to the Emperor, hoping him to
know that there are many powerful nations in the world and the Qing Dynasty could no
longer afford to be out of touch with this reality. As revealed by the Lin character, the
narrative of The Opium War starts to shift from a mass resistance to a reflection of
China's undeveloped modem technology. The defeat of the Qing Empire in the war is no
longer merely explained by its corrupt government, but China's backward situation,
which, in tum, legitimizes the CCP's "open and reform" policy in contemporary China.
It is the great achievement brought in by the "open and reform" policy that contributes to
China's standing-up today.
Xie Jin, the director of The Opium War, is one of the most famous film directors
in China. Despite a strong humanist-based critique on the leftist Party policy in his post-
Cultural Revolution works, Xie Jin is a strong advocate of the "open and reform" policy.
For example, one of his well-received films made in the 1980s is Furong Zhen (Hibiscus
Town, 1986), a melodrama following the life and travails of a young woman who lives
through the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. By borrowing a moral perspective from
Confucianism to criticize the extreme leftist ideas and justify a new concept of the self-
sufficiency in the new economic order, as Nick Browne observes, the film actually
finished the ideological task of introducing the legitimacy of individual entrepreneurship,
a shift in the Party's policy toward economic development. ll Xie's personal political
stance determines that The Opium War first of all will endorse the Party's commitment to
11 Nick Browne, "Society and subjectivity: On the Political Economy of Chinese Melodrama," in New
Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics, 53.
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openness and economic development today. Therefore, the most striking revision in The
Opium War, the Qi Shan character, becomes understandable. As the chief negotiator of
the Qing court after the dismissal of Lin, Qi was charged as a national traitor in many
historical accounts. In Xie's film, however, Qi's appeasement ofthe British is explained
in terms of his pragmatism and realistic assessment of China's inferior military force. In a
meeting with local officials including Lin Zexun, Qi argues that he is saving China from
its quick doom by seeking a truce:
Now everyone talks about fighting to death. Why don't I hear anyone saying
"fight to victory?" I am a member of the imperial family and have received many
favors from the Emperor over years. Don't assume that I am afraid of death. If
any of you can assure me a victory in the end, I will be the first to go into the
battlefield ....
Compared with Lin's heroic anti-imperialist spirit, the Qi Shan character in The Opium
War, argues Xiao Zhiwei, represents a trend of "rational nationalism" in contemporary
China, which emphasizes openness and modesty towards the West. According to Xiao,
"rational nationalism" is different from the extreme nationalism characterized by strong
anti-West sentiments. 12 The key message of this film, in my point of view, lies not in the
promotion of rational nationalism against extreme nationalism. Both Lin Zexu and Qi
Shan, after being re-interpreted, albeit to different degrees, work as mouthpieces of the
reformists in contemporary China. When the closed-door policy of the Qing court is
criticized by a cinematic presentation of many Qing officials who indulged in a Sino-
centric worldview, what is highly praised is the CCP's policy of openness, which is
absent in the film narration but present in its reception context.
12 Xiao Zhiwei, "Nationalism in Chinese Popular Culture: A Case Study of The Opium War," in Exploring
Nationalisms o/China (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 43.
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The rewriting of the Qing court, as I have mentioned, has been an important
cultural trend in 1990s China, and The Opium War is one telling example. The narration
of the "Century of Humiliation" in this film opens with an urgent official document
asking Lin Zexu to report in Beijing. Compared with the previous negative representation
of the Qing court, both historically and literally, what Xie Jin presents is a good Emperor
Daoguang who is deeply disturbed by the evil effects of opium and wants to ban it at any
cost. A gloomy dark blue light washes over the Forbidden City, creating a smothery
atmosphere. It is here that the Emperor orders the execution of Lin's mentor, an opium-
addicted official Lu Zifang. Lu's last confession is "His majesty puts me to death to show
his determination to ban opium," which firmly places the film in the genre of heroic
tragedy. After Chinese people's resistance against the British failed due to a corrupt
government and military inferiority, a shot of the Treaty text is followed with another
dark blue scene of the Forbidden City, and Emperor Daoguang kneels down in his
ancestral temple, wailing miserably. His sons kneel after him one by one, and the
youngest one is dozing off. Outside the temple, a heavy rainstorm washes over a stone
lion with bloody eyes. Echoing the beginning inscription, another text appears on the
screen: "On July 1, 1997, the Chinese government reclaimed sovereignty over Hong
Kong. It has been 157 years since the Opium War." Both the Emperor's wailing and the
final text show the Qing court as a victim of Western imperialism. Criticism of the
court's corruption is not as strong as that in Lin Zexu.
Besides an obvious sympathetic attitude to Emperor Daoguang and Qi Shan, The
Opium War also emphasizes the heroic resistance of the Qing army. In the film, the
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British approaches Dinghai, a southeast coast town, and threatens a local Qing official:
"If you don't agree, we will wipe you out!" The official shows great courage by facing of
advanced Western weapon, replying: "I have never seen such a big ship, and such
powerful cannons, but we must resist. The soldiers of the Great Qing would rather die
than surrender." In the Dinghai battle, no single Qing soldier surrendered to the British.
Keeping this in mind, I cannot agree with Xiao Zhiwei that this film has more to say
about the Qing government's ill-preparedness for the war than about the British
wrongdoing. 13 On the contrary, rather than claiming China's ill preparedness for the war,
The Opium War shows more the aggressiveness of British imperialism, mainly through
the evil scheme set up by Captain Charles Elliot. When China's defeat in the Opium War
is represented as a historical tragedy, raging wrath goes towards colonialism and
imperialism, which echoes the strong nationalist sentiment against the U.S.-led global
capitalism.
Another striking difference between Lin Zexu (1959) and The Opium War (1997)
has to do with the way in which foreigners are portrayed. Throughout Lin Zexu, the
Westerners are portrayed as treacherous "foreign devils." In contrast, the representation
of the British in The Opium War has been viewed by many as displaying a lack of
historical "bias.,,14 For instance, in the 1997 production, the same Danton has a daughter
named Mary who shows deep sympathy to the Chinese plight and strongly opposes the
opium trade. However, Rebecca E. Karl argues that this film creates its "bias" more
totalistically, and thus more effectively than did the earlier Lin Zexu by "an attempt to
13 Xiao Zhiwei, 2002, 45.
14 Ibid.
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recolonize Chinese history with the promise of an alternative mode of 'liberation': a
universal history of sameness rather than a claim to an alternative universalism of
socialist difference.,,15 I found myself in agreement with Karl while watching the young,
vigorous Queen Victoria in The Opium War. This character constructs a mirror to reflect
the old, indecisive Emperor Daoguan, albeit not without "critique of capitalist
expansionism in the form of British imperialism.,,16
Based on an insightful account of the unremittingly favorable depiction of
Western culture and the negative characterization of Chinese culture in early post-Mao
China, Chen Xiaomei argues that Chinese intellectuals' appropriation of Western
discourse-what she calls "Occidentalism" - can actually have a politically and
ideologically liberating effect on contemporary non-Western culture. 17 However, as Dai
Jinhua points out, this Occidentalism was soon drawn upon by the Party to legitimize the
transformation of the Chinese socialist system, to evade its inherent structural ideological
contradictions. Therefore, a temporarily overlapping space between the official ideology
and the anti-official Occidentalism has been formed. 18 The collusion between
intellectuals and the regime is embodied vividly in Xie Jin's The Opium War. For
example, a conversational scene between Queen Victoria and her officials is set in a
sunny garden and then moves indoors. A warm, bright light is set throughout the whole
scene. Queen Victoria has required that the English merchants must not ship opium to
15 Rebecca E. Karl, "The Burdens ofHistory: Lin Zexun (1959) and The Opium War (1997)," in Wither
China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 229-262.
16 Rebecca E. Karl, 2002, 245.
17 Chen Xiaomei, 1995,5.
18 Dai Jinhua, Preface of Chen Xiaomei's accidentalism, 2.
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China. But after learning that Lin Zexu is determined to ban opium, she insists, "we must
teach them a lesson of free trade" because "whoever gets hold of China will have the
entire East, the 19th century." While most Chinese will probably disagree with Rebecca
Karl that the "lesson of free trade" in this context is an "unimpeachable Historical Logic",
I'm not sure if they will feel surprised when the importance of China is remarked upon by
a British Queen, because such a way of narration has gained great popularity in post-
socialist China. Isn't that part and parcel of the recolonization of Chinese history?
Right before the conversation, a hot debate occurs in the British Parliament about
whether or not they should go to war with China. While some are joking that the Qing
Navy is only made up by indefensible fishing boats, one member raises to praise
Confucius and Zhuangzi as well as the profundity of their thoughts. When China has to
resort to the West to blazon its superiority, the dilemma of China's modernization project
is brought to light. On the one hand, the project is a forced response to, and a competition
with Western countries; on the other hand, discourses of Chinese modernity often invoke
the authority of the same West that has deeply humiliated China. From theory to practice,
modernization in China is becoming a process of recolonization.
The Opium War had a huge budget of 100 million yuan (more than $12 million),
and its three-year production involved in a group of leading intellectuals. Released in the
summer of 1997, the box office receipt was reported to have reached 720 million yuan,
the biggest box office in China ever. 19 Of course this commercial success could not be
achieved without Party-organized group viewing. Although not directly funded by the
19 At that time, the average cost of a Chinese film was about 3 million yuan (equivalent to $300,000), so
The Opium War was the most expensive film ever made in China before 1997.
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government, the film was commonly considered a piece of government propaganda. The
large amount of money required for producing The Opium War was raised by Xie Jin
privately from Chengdu Huitong Bank?O All Chinese banks are either governmental
banks or semi-government owned. With the deepening of the economic reform, Chinese
banks are required to look after their own financial interests. The fact that Huitong Bank
willingly financed the production of The Opium War not only means that the high-level
management of the Bank fully identified with the reformist messages in this film, but also
indicates that the Bank expects a profitable return based on market survey?1 As in the
case of Hero, as soon as the Central Department of Propaganda found The Opium War
fitting well to the Party line, full support was given to aid the film's national distribution
and exhibition.
The cinematic representation of the "Century of Humiliation" in The Opium War
evokes a strong nationalist sentiment in terms of "national sorrows," which, according to
Ernest Renan, "are more significant than triumphs because they impose obligations and
demand a common effort.,,22 When the representation of "national sorrows" occurred at
the same time of "national celebration," the former's ideological function has to be
reexamined. In the years surrounding 1997, the return of Hong Kong to China was
represented in Chinese media as a historical moment that could "wash away a century's
humiliation." Besides a series of government-organized celebrations, a spontaneous mass
20 Ou Niao and Fei Ming. "Yibujupian de dansheng (The Birth ofa Blockbuster)," Dianying shijie (1997):
vol.7, 8-9.
21 Ou Niao and Fei Ming. "Xiying Xianggan huigui, xixue bainian guochi (Welcome the Return of Hong
Kong, Avenge a Century's Humiliation)," Dianshiyuekan (1997): vol. 7, 21.
22 Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 17.
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celebration happened in the Tianan'men Square on June 30, 1997. Between the tragic
failure of the Qing government in the film and the mass celebration in 1997 China, what
is visible is a process that is similar to yiku sWan or "recalling past bitterness and
savoring present sweetness," an ideological operation that was applied in socialist China
in order to promote the legitimacy of the CCP's leadership. During the land reform
period of early 1950, Chinese peasants were organized to recall their sufferings in the old
society and share the sweetness of the new China. A compliment to the Party leadership
in the era of reform, "textually absented" in the cinematic narration though, is an evident
"presence" in its receptive context, and this very presence is reinforced by the mood of
celebration. By presenting the return of Hong Kong under the CCP regime as a symbol of
China's standing-up, the CCP made the best use of this moment to overcome the post-
1989 ideological crisis.23 The whole propaganda project of the Hong Kong return was
characterized by a strong nationalist pride. Deng Xiaoping was recalled again as a great
national leader whose "one country, two systems" policy facilitated the return. A vivid
contrast between a weak Qing Empire who ceded Hong Kong to the British and a
powerful CCP government who reclaims China's authority in Hong Kong has been well
constructed in 1997 China. The recall of the "bitterness" China suffered in The Opium
War will definitely legitimize the CCP leadership that brought in the "sweetness" of the
Hong Kong return.
23 Immediately after the 1989 Tian'anmen Incident, the whole nation was devoted to the 1990 Asian Games,
which is one of the CCP's efforts to overcome the legitimacy crisis because "international sports, as the
most important form of metaphoric war between nation-states, often have a nationalist focus." See Thomas
Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 1993),
101, 110. His point of view offers a good note to understand the enthusiasm among Chinese people in all
kinds of international sports.
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National Anthem and Chinese Intellectuals' Crisis Consciousness
Compared with the belated consciousness of modernization among the Qing
officials, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 had transformed Japan from a feudal and
comparatively backward society into a modern industrial state. Sino-Japanese conflicts
occurred frequently over the control of Taiwan and Korea, which led to the breakout of
the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894. The most disastrous battle in the war was the defeat
of the Chinese Beiyang Fleet by the Imperial Japanese Navy.24 After the war, The Treaty
of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895. In addition to a huge indemnity, China recognized
the total independence of Korea, and ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan?5
The first Sino-Japanese war exposed the weakness of the Qing Empire compared with not
only the Western world but also its Asian neighbor, Japan. It resulted in the beginnings of
revolutionary activity against the Manchu rulers in China.
After China's disastrous defeat by its Asian neighbor Japan in 1895, fears for
China's survival as an independent country mounted. It was during this period that
Chinese nationalism developed along with urgent appeals to the Qing court for more
radical reform. When Japan defeated Russia in 1904, China was both astounded and
celebratory, using Japan as an accessible model to modernize China. Various new
concepts from the West entered the Chinese minds, often through Japan. Gradually,
24 Established in 1888, the Beiyang Fleet was the best-equipped modem navy in Asia. As an important
project of the Self-strengthening Movement, the development of the Beiyang Fleet was seriously
handicapped by corruption. After the purchase of ammunition stopped in 1891, the funding was embezzled
to build the Summer Palace in Beijing. Therefore, the Beiyang Fleet was soon listed after the Imperial
Japanese Navy.
25 Originally, Liaodong Peninsula was ceded to Japan too. Later, in order to obtain rights to operate
Japanese ships on the Yangtze River, to operate manufacturing factories in treaty ports and to open four
more ports to foreign trade, Japan gave up the Liaodong Peninsula in exchange for another 450 million yen.
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Chinese intellectuals arrived at a consensus that a resolution of all the crises required a
strong nation-state.
Among Chinese intellectuals, Liang Qichao played an important role in
disseminating the idea of nationalism in China. In 1899, Liang used the term goumin or
"national" to analyze the lack of the democratic citizenship in China: "In our
country, .. .the people do not know that they belong to a state while the state does not treat
its peoples as nationals. " In order to replace chenmin or "subjects to the Emperor," he
suggested the concept ofguomin that would make people feel that they were members of
the state.26 According to Liang, only when individuals would become xinmin (new
nationals) would China be organized into a strong and healthy nation. He insisted that the
Manchu are certainly members of the Chinese political community and denigrated anti-
Manchu ideas as "small nationalism." Liang's idea, as Rebecca Karl has pointed out in
her study on the formation of Chinese discourses of nationalism in relation to the non-
Euro-American world, responded to a strong trend of Asianism then that emphasized
mutual assistance among all peoples who were engaged in struggles for national and
cultural independence in Asia.27
After the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, China was obsessed with
being accepted as an equal member in the family of nations to actively engage in world
affairs. The international dimension of Chinese nationalism, that is, Chinese people's
perception of China's position in the nation-state system, is one of its most important
26 Originally published in Qiyibao by Liang Qichao, quoted from Hong-yuan Chu and Peter Zarrow,
"Modem Chinese Nationalism: The Formative Stage," in Exploring Nationalism ofChina (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 2002), 22.
27 See Rebecca Karl, Staging the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
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characteristics.28 In order to make its new international approach known to the world, the
newly established Republican China published a document titled "Manifesto from the
Republic of China to All Friendly Nations." By criticizing the Manchu regime's failure to
face the new world configuration because of its outdated Sino-centric idea, the document
informed the world that China "cherished the hope of being admitted into the family of
nations not merely to share their rights and privileges but also to cooperate with them in
the great and noble task called for in the up building of the civilization ofthe world." 29
In 1924, Dr. Sun Vat-sen, the founder ofthe Republic of China, further developed his
idea on nationalism in his "three principles of the people," which speaks to the very
historical imperative of nationalism in modem China:
... [T]he Chinese people have only family and clan groups; there is no national
spirit. Consequently, in spite of four hundred million people gathered together in
one China, we are in fact but a sheet of loose sand. We are the poorest and
weakest state in the world, occupying the lowest position in international affairs;
the rest of mankind is the carving knife and the serving dish, while we are the fish
and the meat. Our position now is extremely perilous; if we do not earnestly
promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred millions into a strong
nation, we face a tragedy-the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.
To ward off this danger, we must espouse nationalism and employ the national
spirit to save the country.30
China's long struggle for autonomy culminated more painfully in the Anti-
Japanese War (1937-1945), which did more than anything else in creating a strong
Chinese nationalism with a lasting presence up to today. The development of Chinese
28 Zhang Yongnian, 1999, xi.
29 Xu Gouqi, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and National Identity: China from 1895-1919", in Chinese
Nationalism in Perspective, 101-120.
30 Sun Yat-sen, The Three Principles ofthe People (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 5.
The proposal of "national survival" made earlier by Dr. Sun Yat-sen for Tongmenghui (the Revolutionary
Alliance) was a call that could be better described as anti-Manchu ethnic nationalism, or "small
nationalism" in Liang's definition.
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nationalism during the war era is not the focus of this study. Rather, I am more interested
in examining how Chinese nationalism, crystallized in Chinese intellectuals' crisis
consciousness during the war era, offers Chinese intellectuals a discursive ground to
consistently play the role of enlightening the masses in post-1989 China.
The 1989 Tian'anmen incident suffocated the independent voice of the
intellectual group. Starting in the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have been quickly
marginalized in a commercialized society. By presenting the birth of the national anthem
of the PRC in 1935, a critical moment when China was facing the Japanese invasion, the
"main melody" film Guoge (National Anthem, 1998) was one of the many efforts that
aimed to bring the marginalized Chinese intellectual group back to the central stage via a
nationalist discourse.
Arise, You all who refuse to be slaves,
With our very flesh and blood, let us build our new Great Wall.
When the people of China are at their most critical moment,
Everyone must roar defiance.
Arise, Arise, Millions of hearts with one mind,
Brave the enemy's gunfire, march on!
"March ofthe Volunteers," written by Tian Han and composed by Nie Er, was a
song that first appeared in Fenyun emil (Sons and Daughters in a Time of Storm, 1935), a
left-wing film directed by Xu Xingzhi. In this film, two young Chinese are exiled to
Shanghai after Japan has occupied northeast China. Xin Baihua, famous for his patriotic
poems, is pursued by a rich widow, while his friend Liang Zhifujoins the anti-Japanese
war. After hearing that Liang has died on the battlefield, Xin gives up his cozy life and
follows the steps of his friend by joining the army. Inspired by the heroic death of his
friend, Xin creates a poem entitled "March ofthe Volunteers," which was then composed
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as a song to mobilize Chinese people to join the anti-Japanese war. The song was
appointed as the acting national anthem on October 1, 1949.31 In 1998, Wu Ziniu, one of
the Fifth Generation filmmakers, was assigned to direct a film on the life of Tian Han,
who wrote the lyrics of "March of the Volunteers." The original intention of the film on
Tian Han, as one of the scriptwriters mentioned, like the 1959 musical biographical film
Nie Er, would be biographical. Born in the Hunan province, Tian Han was a famous
leftist scriptwriter in the 1930s. He served in various anti-Japanese capacities during the
war. He was jailed during the Cultural Revolution and died in 1968. In 1979, Chinese
authorities posthumously rehabilitated him. Supervised by the Ministry of Propaganda in
the Hunan Province, the script was slowly tailored as a "main melody" film dedicated to
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the PRe.32
National Anthem opens with a long shot night scene: after the 1931 Mukden
incident, the last train from northeast China passes through the Shanhai Passage, and
several Japanese soldiers erect a milestone of Manchuria, evoking an intense atmosphere
of national crisis. Then the camera cuts to Shanghai where a train loaded with refugees
from northeast China enters the crowded station. Tian Han and his fellow members of the
Dadao Troupe are doing fieldwork at the station for an anti-Japan stage play. After they
become acquainted with a couple of student lovers from the northeast, they invite them to
contribute their real life experience to the troupe members. What the film delineates
from the beginning is Tian Han's strong nationalist concern and how he carries out this
31 Nie Er, the composer of "March of the Volunteers", drowned in Japan before Sons and Daughters in
Storm released. For a reading of the 1959 biographical film Nie Er, see Ban Wang, Chapter 4.
32 See Zhang Jipin. "The production of the Script for National Anthem," Dangdai dianying (1999): vol.5, 6-
7.
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concern through anti-Japanese cultural activities. After Japan attacked Shanghai in 1932,
Tian Han realized that film was the most effective medium to record the anti-Japanese
war. Besides filming documentary footages ofthe war, he began to write a film script
entitled Sons and Daughters in a Time a/Storm. However, the Nationalist Party arrested
him soon after he finished the script. It was Xia Yan who completed the shooting script.
The premiere of the film coincided with the day ofTian's release from the prison. In
order to maintain Tian Han in the lead role, the cinematic narration in National Anthem is
not conducted in a faithful biographical way. It portrays Tian Han as the acting director
of Sons and Daughters in Storm, and he writes "March of the Volunteers" after the
student lovers join the Northeast Volunteer Army and die in the battlefield. The
consequence of these two shots deserves special attention because the representation of
Tian Han's creative work after the death of the soldiers indicates that anti-Japanese
cultural activities are as important as the martyrs' sacrifice, if not more important.
Created at a moment of national crisis, "March of the Volunteers" represented
Chinese intellectuals' artistic contribution in building an unconquerable Chinese
nationality. Despite their different historical background, the same symbolic significance
is evident in "La Marseillaise" in France as in "March of the Volunteers" in China. The
lyrics of "La Marseillaise" speak of the bloody battles of the French Revolution and call
for its citizens to take up arms. Debates were carried out on whether or not to alter the
lyrics to suit a more peaceful time, but the original words of "La Marseillaise," capturing
the spirit ofthe French revolution, remain the same. Similar debates happened to "March
of the Volunteers" in China as well. During the Cultural Revolution, when Tian Han was
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imprisoned, "March of the Volunteers" was therefore banned. As a result, there was a
period of time when "The East Is Red" was used as the unofficial national anthem. An
altered lyric of "March of the Volunteers" was then used after 1978. The original song
was formally named national anthem of the PRC in 1982. The production of National
Anthem in post-1989 China not only reveals the Party's effort in building a national
consciousness, but also demonstrates the role that Chinese intellectuals have played to
construct nationalist discourse in contemporary China.
Since the May Fourth era, Chinese intellectuals-writers, artists, critics, and
educators-have assumed a position at the vanguard of "enlightenment" and "national
salvation" for the uneducated masses. Left-wing filmmakers in the 1930s, as Laikwang
Pang argues, contributed greatly to the formation of a collective subjectivity.33 After a
series of political campaigns launched by Mao to reeducate intellectuals, an elite
intellectual group rose again to a preeminent position in the so-called New Era (1976-
1989). Through the "Great Cultural Discussion" or simply the "Cultural Fever,"
intellectuals actively participated in the national project of modernization. Born in the
"Cultural Fever," the Fifth Generation filmmakers initiated a modernization of the
Chinese cinematic language. The Tian'anmen democratic movement, to a certain degree,
reflected the ideological bifurcation between the Party and some intellectuals. In the field
of filmmaking, there was a continuous challenge of Party censorship. In 1994, seven
filmmakers were banned by the MRFT, which further displayed the tension between the
intellectual group and the government.
33 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 2.
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When the intellectual group as a whole was quickly marginalized by the
commercial wave in the 1990s, some, including a few Fifth and Sixth Generation
filmmakers, began to seek a truce with the CCP regime in order to regain their discursive
authority. The advent of globalization, especially the importation of Hollywood films
since 1994, made the collaboration more imperative. Nationalism became an effective
ideological discourse that both the intellectuals and the CCP government started to
promote in contemporary China. To some extent, it is market potential that has brought a
consensus to the reformist government and some filmmakers.
In the 1980s, Wu Ziniu was known for his persistent cinematic exploration of the
anti-Japanese war. Against the discourse of patriotism and heroism, he wanted "to
represent war from a higher angle," and his war films were characterized by humanism
and anti-war internationalism.34 In 1994, when he decided to shoot Nanjing Datusha
(The Rape ofNanjing, 1995), nationalist sentiment emerged through a cinematic
representation of one of the most violent historical moments in the anti-Japanese war. Wu
believes that an education consisting of humiliation and hatred is necessary for a
nationality that had undergone many catastrophes.35 In other words, what is embodied in
his works is an intellectual's consistent pursuit of educating the masses.
Before National Anthem, Wu Ziniu had never directed any "main melody" films.
However, he has a positive view on "main melody" films. As he puts it, both audiences
and filmmakers have certain misunderstandings of "main melody" films and therefore
label them as vulgar works that only glorify achievement and promote government
34 For an overview ofWu's filmmaking, see Zhang Yingjin, Screening China, 176-190.
35 Wu Ziniu. "My intention of filming National Anthem," Dangdai Dianying (1999): vol. 5, 5-6.
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policies. In his point of view, some excellent Western blockbusters are essentially "main
melody" because oftheir obvious patriotic messages. In National Anthem, Wu sets out to
describe the sacred mission of promoting national culture that was shouldered by Chinese
intellectuals during the war. He quoted a sentence from Tian Han, "A nation without
crisis consciousness is hopeless and helpless." Facing the disappearance of spiritual value
and idealism in Chinese cinema after the full commercialization of the Chinese film
industry, Wu emphasizes that crisis consciousness and national spirit are necessary to
further develop and strengthen China in a more complicated world. 36 Although crisis
consciousness in National Anthem refers to the Japanese invasion in the 1930s, the film
also indicates a message about the threat of commercialization and the fate of China
today. The scriptwriter agrees with Wu that the theme of this film is not only anti-
Japanese, but also a consciousness of national crisis that has gone through the history of
modern China since the Opium War. So they co-design a scene in which the imprisoned
Tian Han lectures several college students on the catastrophic history of modern China.
The scene resumes the position of intellectuals as the spokesmen of history. Therefore,
the production of National Anthem is more an appropriation ofthe "main melody" film
for the intellectuals' use-to reclaim the marginalized intellectual group a discursive
authority by revisiting moments of national crisis.
In order to emphasize the role of culture and intellectuals, plots of song, stage
play, and film shooting constitute the main body of National Anthem. In addition to the
creation of "March ofthe Volunteers," the representation oftwo Japanese songs in this
film deserves special attention. The first one is a Japanese Navy song, sung by Japanese
36 Wu Ziniu. "My intention of filming National Anthem," Dangdai Dianying (1999): vol. 5, 5-6.
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soldiers when they are training in Shanghai, which Tian Han can hear in his apartment.
The second one is "March of Manchuria";
Look over at the war memorial!
There the bones of our heroes.
Died in the war between Japan and Russia,
Are long buried.
Stained with a red river of blood.
The evening sun shines upon it,
Soaring high over the endless plain??
"March of Manchuria" was a hit song in 1932 Japan, identifying Manchuria with
the Russian-Japanese War. In National Anthem, it is sung by several Japanese in
Shanghai. Angrily, Tian Han asks them to stop singing. As Laikwan Pang correctly
points out in her study on the Chinese left-wing cinema movement, music itself is a great
propaganda tool in terms of its direct emotional impact and availability, and the Left-
wing films' social criticism and wish for changes were also effectively put forward
through the manipulation of film songs.38 In National Anthem, the importance of song is
used to legitimize the importance of Chinese intellectuals and their cultural activities. By
contrasting "March of Volunteers" with "March of Manchuria," the film implies a
continuous cultural struggle led by Chinese intellectuals.
In addition to National Anthem, co-written by Wang Xingdong, the scriptwriter of
Days without Lei Feng, the Forbidden City Film Company produced Gongheguo zhiqi
(Flag of the Republic, 1999), a film recalling the birth of the national flag of the PRC. As
in National Anthem, the role of the Chinese intellectual in the nation-building project has
37 English translation of lyrics comes from Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the
Culture afWartime Imperialism (University of Califamia Press, 1998),92.
38 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 216.
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been brought to foreground through a cinematic representation of the designer's strong
nationalist sentiment. Other well-known intellectual figures, such as Jiang Zhuying
(1939-1982), a scientist who devoted his life to scientific research after the Cultural
Revolution, Zhan Tianyou (1861-1919), a national hero for his role in building China's
railroad system, and Shi Guangnan (1940-1990), a composer that is awarded "the
people's musician," have all been featured in "main melody" films. 39 From the role of
awakening people's consciousness at times of national crisis to the role of modernizing
China, from whole-hearted dedication to China's scientific research to an invaluable
contribution to the development of national music, these films embody filmmakers'
desire to reestablish the central position of the marginalized Chinese intellectual group in
post-socialist China.
The Magnificent Birth and "China Can Say No!"
The dilemma between modernization and Westernization is the most problematic
issue facing Chinese political and intellectual figures. The tension between the struggle
for national dignity and independent economic development in 1990's China results in a
backwash against the trend of excessive Westernization and commercialization. The
complexity and ambiguity of Chinese modernity can be found in two conflicting
orientations: on the one hand, it pursues modernity by participating in the global
economic system; on the other hand, it attempts to maintain a distance from the system
by resisting total integration and emphasizing the uniqueness of its national identity.
39 Jiang Zhuying was produced in 1993 and Zhan Tianyou in 2000, both are biographical films. Loosely
base on the life of Shi Guangnan, Chuntian de kuangxiang (Rhapsody of Spring) was a musical produced
in 1999.
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Inspired by Japan Can Say No (1989), the Chinese bestseller Zhongguo keyi shuo bu
(China Can Say No, 1996) cannot be ignored if we want to examine the trend of anti-
Westernization in China today. Subtitled "The Political and Sentimental Choices in the
Post-Cold War Era," China Can Say No was published at a time when much of the
growing discontent in China was resulted from the supposedly renewed Western-
primarily American-attempts to "contain" China. The Tian'anmen Incident in 1989
certainly chilled Sino-U.S. relations overnight. Attributed to the U.S. Congress, Beijing
lost its 1993 bid to host the 2000 Olympics. When Lee Tung-hui, President of the
Nationalist Party at Taiwan, visited Cornell University in 1995, Chinese outrage soon
escalated into a military practice in the Taiwan Strait. Written by five young journalists
and poets, China Can Say No advocated tough responses to the West. Saying 'No" to
political, economic, and cultural influences from the U.S., Japan and other nations
seemed justified to many Chinese who believed that these countries try to hinder China
from becoming a world power. A primal scene that is revisited time and again in this
book is the Opium War. In 1997, The Plot to Demonize China, a book focusing on real
and imagined anti-China schemes in the Western press, became another national
bestseller. Although the publication of this book had no official support, official
endorsement came quickly after it gained popularity.
Under such an anti-Western atmosphere, the fictional ending of My 1919, in
which Gu attends the final session of the Paris Peace Conference as the only Chinese
delegate and refuses to sign the treaty, and delivers a public lecture to express his
outrage, is understandable. Another interesting point in this film is the conclusive caption
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appeared at the end of the film: "On June 28, 1919, Chinese people finally for the first
time said NO to the imperialist powers!" Obviously, it is inspired by the bestseller China
Can Say No.
In order to celebrate the 50th mmiversary ofthe PRC, Hengkong Chushi (The
Magnificent Birth, 1999), another "main melody" film made in the same year of My 1919,
offers a cinematic expression of "China Can Say No" as well. From the filmmaking team
to its production style, The Magnificent Birth is a typical "main melody" production.
Compared with the imagined NO gesture in My 1919, The Magnificent Birth revisits one
ofthe most proud moment in the history of modem China: the birth of China's first
nuclear bomb in the 1960s, representing China as a powerful nation-state in terms of its
military capability. Made by Beijing Film Studio, this highly publicized film was
enthusiastically supported by the Central Department of Propaganda, the MBFT, and the
Nuclear Industry Corporation of China. Zhang Wannian, vice-chairman of China's
Central Military Committee, paid special attention to the film and offered handwriting of
the title. The director, Cheng Guoxing, also belongs to the Fifth Generation filmmakers.4o
40 He was assigned to the Beijing Film Studio in 1982 and started to make films and TV programs in the
mid-1980s. Before The Magnificent Birth, Chen had produced several important "main melody" films,
including Yijia liangzhi (Two Systems in One Family, 1994), Kong Fansen (Kong Fansen, 1995), and Hei
yanjing (Colors of the Blind, 1996). Two Systems in One Family, borrowing Deng Xiaoping's "One nation
two systems" policy on Hong Kong's return, is about a marriage between a Beijing girl and a Hong Kong
businessman; Kong Fansen features a CCP cadre who works and dies in Tibet, and Colors o/the Blind tells
how a blind girl becomes an athlete. Other films Chen directed include Shanhun pili (The Mountain Soul,
1987), Qinghuo (Love Puzzle, 1990), Lihun dazhan (The War of Divorce, 1991), Linshi baba (Temporary
Daddy, 1992), Bianwai zhangfu (A Back-up Husband, 1992), and Qiqing shagua (The Love Lorn, 1993).
He also directed a "main melody" TV drama series Jueze (Decision, 1998), which was remade into film
entitled Shengsijueze (Life and Death Decision, 2000), which I will discuss in the last chapter. Besides his
film career, Cheng is politically active. He was a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) and became a member of the CCP in 2004.
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A hostile Cold War environment is constructed by a series of documentary
footages at the beginning of The Magnificent Birth: One year and five months after the
Korean War, the U.S. and Taiwan sign a mutual defense treaty. In face of the nuclear
threat from the U.S., China decides to produce its own nuclear weapon. A group of
soldiers secretly moves into the northwest desert to prepare for China's nuclear testing
program.
During the Cold War era, both the U.S. and the other Western countries were
physically absent in China, which would create narrative difficulties in The Magnificent
Birth since the presence of a national enemy is necessary to create a nationalist sentiment.
Therefore, the Soviet Union becomes the main target in the narration of The Magnificent
Birth. First, in choosing the nuclear experimental site, Feng Shi, a PLA general who has
just returned from the Korean battlefield, debates with an expert sent by the Soviet Union,
claiming "our Chinese has no fear of difficulties, and no difficulty can prevent us from
making the nuclear bomb." When the Russian expert repeats that the Soviet Union can
protect China, and China only needs hydrogen bombs, General Feng replies with a
Chinese saying: Dieyou niangyou buru zijiyou, meaning "that father and mother have it
(nuclear bomb) is not as good as possessing it yourself." Although he knows nothing
about nuclear science, he shows a strong will to achieve national military independence.
The harsh situation of nuclear testing worsened when the Sino-Russian dispute ended
with a full withdrawal of Russian experts from China in 1959, which has been
dramatically represented in the film. An episode happens between a Russian expert and
his Chinese translator during a rainy night: the expert says that it is always the taller
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person holding the umbrella. This implicit political statement angers his Chinese
translator. As this plot implies, what China is facing is not only American imperialism
but also chauvinism from the Soviet Union. Therefore, a theme that is repeated several
times by different characters in this film is "China cannot stand up straight without the
nuclear bomb."
The main narrative of this film, as one can expect, is not the final success of the
nuclear testing, but the difficulties overcome by the Chinese. The success of nuclear
testing in China has long been constructed as a myth, especially because it was conducted
during the era of a three-year long natural disaster (1959-1961) in Mao's China due to the
Great Leap Forward Movement and other political and natural reasons. Because of the
high confidentiality of nuclear testing, it is impossible to show the scientific details in a
feature film like The Magnificent Birth. Instead of focusing on scientific aspects, this
myth is narrated as a co-operation between the soldier group and the scientist group.
After the withdrawal of the Russian experts, Chinese scientists have to dig out half-
burned documents and re-calculate the data by abacus. One striking scene occurs in a big
hall of the Institute of Nuclear Bomb: Chinese scientists sits side by side, with abacuses
on the table, and the sound of the movable counters echoes in the hall. They do not have
time to eat; steam buns are left beside the abacuses. It is under such harsh conditions that
they finally prove the data from the Soviet Union incorrect. For audiences today, it is
hard to imagine that the success of China's first nuclear bomb was achieved with the
abacus, a traditional Chinese invention. When this historical fact is displayed on the
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screen, as a way to visually signify the uniqueness of China, it also contributes to the
cinematic representation of Chinese nationalism.
A meaningful part in this film, besides the theme of nationalism, is the cinematic
representation of the Chinese intellectual group, as represented by Lu Guangda, a
scientist who was in charge of the nuclear testing. As in National Anthem, the
representation of Chinese intellectuals takes a symbolic role, speaking to the
contemporary situation. Since the founding of the PRC, Chinese intellectuals' confidence
in the CCP government has been seriously undermined by their traumatic experiences in
the anti-Rightist campaign in 1957, the ten-year Cultural Revolution, the anti-Bourgeois
campaigns in the early 1980s, and the 1989 Tian' anmen Incident. One important
ideological task of The Magnificent Birth is to fix the problematic relationship between
the intellectuals and the Party through the magnificent birth of the nuclear weapon, a
splendid moment that could not be achieved without contribution of many Chinese
scientists. The heroes in this film are two groups that are indispensable for the final
success of the nuclear test, the soldier group and the scientist group, with their respective
leaders, general Feng Shi and scientist Lu Guangda. By restaging the "high spirit" of the
1950s and the early 1960s, a decade of passion, ideals, altruism, and patriotism, The
Magnificent Birth presents a harmonious relationship between the army and scientists by
describing their cooperation for the sake of a common cause in a sentimental way.
Lu Guangda in The Magnificent Birth is an American-educated scientist who has
returned to China after the founding of the PRe. He is soon assigned to carry out the
nuclear project. In order to carry out the nuclear experiment, Lu has to leave his wife,
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who cannot know anything about this high-confidential project due to her problematic
family background. They have been separated for several years and Lu makes no
complaint, fully devoting himself to nuclear testing. When General Feng comments that
ifLu stays in the U.S., it is possible that he can win the Nobel Prize, Lu offers a simple
answer: "I have promised, I would like to be anonymous for my whole life." This
character is based on a real life Chinese nuclear scientist, Deng Jiaxian (1924-1986). He
studied nuclear science in the u.s. and returned to China in 1950, spending 28 years in
the forefront of developing China's nuclear weapons. In the last months of his life, while
dying of cancer, Deng's secret experience in nuclear testing was revealed in media. Since
then, Deng has become well known as the founding father of China's atom bomb and
hydrogen bomb.
As many intellectuals, Deng was criticized during the Cultural Revolution. In the
film, this experience is rewritten in a plot in which Lu accidentally encounters one of his
former classmates from the U.S. at an airport. Since his classmate is also a nuclear
scientist who works for the American government, Gu is soon suspected to have betrayed
China's nuclear secrets to the Westerners. Consequently, he is asked to stop working at a
critical moment of nuclear testing, pending further decision. When general Feng attempts
to make a guarantee for Deng's patriotism, his supervisor refutes: "How could you make
such a guarantee on behalf of a ten-year project with thousands of people's painstaking
efforts?" Finally Gu is cleared and goes back to nuclear testing site. However, when the
vehement criticism on intellectuals in general during the Cultural Revolution is rewritten
as a necessary decision for the sake of protecting the nuclear confidentiality, the Party's
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wrongdoing on intellectuals has been excused. Furthermore, when general Feng
persuades the authority to resume Lu's position, a message of the mutual confidence
between the army and the intellectual group is evident. Earlier, because of the three-year
natural disaster, the nuclear testing site is running out of food, general Feng decides to
secure food for scientists first, soldiers second, and Lu suggests that the scientists will
share food with soldiers anyway. This plot presents a cooperative effort between the
intellectual group and the army for the sake of the nation. Nationalism becomes a
unifying discourse to consolidate the intellectual-army cooperation.
A more interesting representation of the Party-intellectual relationship comes
from a minor character of this film-Lu's wife, Wang Ruhui. She and Lu were
classmates. However, even though she is a nuclear scientist, she cannot join the testing
because her father has business contacts with the U.S. Army, although her parents
divorced and she grew up with her mother. After being separated from her husband for
several years due to this suspicious family background, she is asked to give lectures on
nuclear science. Obviously, this indicates that her background has been cleared. She is
surprised after the door opens to a room of PLA generals. When they all stand up to show
respect to her, and the respect causes her to burst into tears. For me, this scene has much
to say about the intellectuals' forgiveness to the Party's wrongdoing in the name of
China's modernization. Wang Ruhui, as she is called in the film, represents Chinese
intellectuals that have been criticized and suffered during the Cultural Revolution and
other political campaigns. When the Party allows them to contribute to the nation-
building project, they willingly put away all personal sufferings. Wang finally joins her
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husband at the nuclear testing site at the end of the film. As the mushroom cloud blooms
out in the sky, she stands by her husband, cheering in tears. This scene can also be read as
a call for intellectuals' continuous contribution to development of the post-socialist China
after 1989.
After a decade-long experiment, China shocked the world with the successful test
of its first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964- a great achievement that forever changed
the geopolitical landscape of the world. In the film, a meaningful shot precedes this
historical moment. When soldiers and scientists are waiting for the arrival of the bomb at
the launching site, General Feng recalls to Lu his Korean War experience: "Our weapons
were too backward and we had to suffer a lot in the war. But our Chinese are never afraid
of Americans. They bully us from time to time. I really want to shout out 'No! Damn
you!' " Feng speaks Chinese all the time except the word "No," which, spoken in English,
echoes the anti-Western nationalist sentiment that China Can Say No represents.
The 1999 revisiting of the detonation of China's first nuclear bomb in 1964, like
the narration of "the history of humiliation" in The Opium War at the moment of Hong
Kong's return, once more provides a powerful image of the CCP regime.41 On March
1986, China stated that it had not conducted atmospheric testing for years and announced
a permanent end to its aboveground testing. However, a positive evaluation of the nuclear
testing from Deng Xiaoping has been offered in both The Magnificent Birth and
41 In addition to The Magnificent Birth, a documentary on the same historical event, Dongfangjuxiang
(Explosion in the East, 1998) was recognized by the 1999 Huabiao Awards. "Luohou jiuyao aida (Falling
behind will suffer failures)," as "China cannot stand up straight without the nuclear bomb," is a theme that
goes throughout the documentary. It pays special attention to decision-makers such as Mao Zedong and
Zhou Enlai as well as several important scientists.
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Explosion in the East: "If China did not produce the nuclear bomb and the hydrogen
bomb, and did not launch the satellite in the 1960s, then China could not achieve a
powerful international position now. These achievements reflect the capability of a nation,
and they are also symbols of the prosperity of a nation state."
Since 1989, China has successfully gone through a turbulent political transition
and managed to achieve high economic growth. In a study of the post-socialist culture
in China, Liu Kang argues that Chinese nationalism still provides an attractive and viable
option of resistance for post-revolutionary China.42 I agree with him that the
revolutionary legacy has played a crucial part in the post-socialist culture, especially
through Chinese nationalism, as shown in the films I discussed above. When nationalism
is appropriated as an effective ideological discourse to legitimate the CCP regime, it also
acts as a unifying force to conceal and distract the increasingly diverse social conflicts.
The polarization of class and the increased gap between the rich and the poor, as a
consequence of commercialization and globalization, have become the most severe social
conflicts in China since the 1990s. The number oflaid-off workers is increasing at an
alarming rate, as Chinese economic reform moves vigorously ahead. Most state-owned
factories have closed down; many workers and low-level managers have lost their jobs.
There is almost no encompassing welfare system or social security benefit for the laid-off
workers, and many of them are on the verge of starvation. These people grew up with the
socialist "iron rice bowl" and are not prepared for the psychological trauma associated
with being laid-off. Behind the glamorous commercial prosperity displayed in the cities,
42 Liu Kang, "Is There An Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization: The Debate about Modernity in China,"
in The Cultures ofGlobalization (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 164-190.
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there is a far more profound, disturbing, and yet invisible issue of division between
classes, and between the people and the government.
While the above-mentioned issues cannot be discussed publicly because of a
strict censorship, the reporting of several political conflicts between China and the U.S.
overwhelmed the mass media at the turn of the century. In May 1999, after the Belgrade
embassy bombing, many Chinese expressed their nationalist outrage, which resulted in a
violent nationalist protest against the u.s. Chinese across the globe poured into the
streets to protest. In April 200 1, an American surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter
collided over the South China Sea, and the Chinese pilot was killed, which further goads
the nationalist sentiment against the U.S. As William C. Kirby pointed out in his forward
for Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: "In China, as the Three People's Principles,
Marxism, Maoism, even Deng Xiaoping theory have come and gone, Chinese
nationalism remains the bedrock of any political legitimacy." 43 Extensive media
coverage ofthese two incidents, along with many others, successful distracts people's
uneasiness with many serious social problems by channeling their resentment to the West.
The cinematic representation of Chinese nationalism in "main melody" film
cannot be explained merely as a result of official ideology. It echoes the resurgence of the
nationalist sentiment in the era of globalization. As commercialism has become the most
powerful expression of the 1990s, more and more people feel unprecedented economic
pressure and cultural confusion, which has a lot to do with the advent of global capitalism
in China. Nationalism, at this historical conjuncture, becomes the most convenient
43 See Wei, c.x. George and Liu, Xiaoyuan, eds., Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and
Recent Cases (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 2.
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discourse for Chinese to express their uneasiness. The birth of Chinese nationalism was a
product of Westem imperialism and Japanese invasion. Its spontaneous reemergence in
the post-socialist China speaks to the contemporary global politics in which capitalism,
under a globalization disguise, reenters China to fulfill its unfinished imperialist project.
In this sense, the rising of nationalism in China and many third world countries bring
home vividly the often ignored historical lineage between colonialism, imperialism and
global capitalism.
In the historical development of Chinese nationalism, intellectuals have played an
important role. More importantly, in post-socialist China, nationalism also becomes a
discourse that the intellectual group can appropriate in order to regain the discursive
authority that they used to enjoy in the 1980s. It is in this sense that cooperation between
intellectuals and the Party on the cusp of forming. The cinematic representation of
nationalism in "main melody" films therefore carries a double mission. On the one hand,
it is an effective way to promote the Party's reform policy; on the other hand, it also
creates opportunities for many filmmakers to reclaim the intellectuals' discursive
authority in the post-socialist China.
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CHAPTER VII
ORIENTALISM, OCCIDENTALISM, AND CHINESE MASCULINITY IN CINEMA
Feminism was born as a social movement and a cultural-critical theory that is
concerned with women's oppression and the ways and means to empower woman. After
the hegemonic notion of "sisterhood" was challenged by women of color in the 70s,
feminism had to reexamine its essentialist theoretical ground, paying more attention to
differences among women. Consequently, since all men do not share equal masculine
rights and privileges either, men and masculinity became objects of study that had to face
questions of differences. Masculinity studies, despite controversy involving its
relationship to feminism, has grown into a vigorous field that analyzes the complexity of
social power aITangements since feminism's tum toward gender study.
A few works on Chinese masculinity have been appeared in the field of China
studies, including Masculinity Besieged?: Issues ofModernity and Male Subjectivity in
Chinese Literature ofthe Late Twentieth Century by Zhong Xueping, Theorising Chinese
Masculinity: Society and Gender in China by Kam Louie, and The Fragile Scholar:
Power and Masculinity in Chinese Culture by Song Geng. 1 In comparison to substantive
scholarship on Chinese women and femininity, studies on Chinese masculinity falls
behind in both China and the West, which cannot be simply explained in a chronological
sense. Why have studies on Chinese masculinity have been underplayed in the academic
1 Also see Cui Shuqin, Women through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century ofChinese Cinema
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003).
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field? The first part of this chapter attempts to trace one possible reason back to the
dominant legacy of Orientalism, which not only constructs a feminized image of China
but also feminizes China studies. The second part aims to contribute to the currently
inadequate studies on Chinese masculinity by examining its cinematic representation in
"main melody" films. Since there is no way to conduct exhaustive research on Chinese
masculinity, or more exactly, Chinese masculinities, even only limited in "main melody"
films, I shall focus on one predominant theme: cinematic representation of Chinese
masculinity in contrast to Western masculinity. Drawing from studies on masculinity or
the masculine body in Hollywood cinema as well as Hong Kong cinema, I attempt to
sketch a small part of the complicated gender discourse and its ideological significance in
contemporary China. As global capitalism further complicates gender discourse in
today's global cultural economy, I also attempt to reveal the interrelation between
discourse of masculinity and nationalism. Some comparative studies between Chinese
"main melody" films and Hollywood productions will be drawn upon to show how
discourses of masculinity, serving different political regimes nevertheless, are closely
related with discourses of nationalism.
Orientalism and Gender Discourse
Gender discourse of both men and women is always constructed socio-historically.
The relative stableness of a certain gender discourse in a given historical period and how
it undergoes transformation became the focus of many scholars. In socialist China, one
important gender discourse wasfuniijiefang or women's liberation, which called for
women's full-time participation in the labor force. As a sociopolitical campaign launched
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by the Communist party from the top down, women's liberation as well as its literary and
cinematic representation were not examined from a gendered perspective until the mid
1990s when feminism was systematically introduced into China, except for a few works
by Western scholars. Once the alleged natural order of male dominance is deconstructed,
efforts made by generations of Chinese women have been "emerging from the horizon of
history.,,2 From the May Fourth "new woman" to the defeminized "iron girl" in Maoist
China, to the white-collar office lady in today's transnational corporations, gender
performance and gender discourse in modem China have shown a richness that is no less
colorful than its Western counterparts.
Despite the fact that feminism provides literary critics a theoretical weapon to
question the patriarchal system and opens a new perspective to examine Chinese
literature and culture, Chinese women's literature, as Tani E. Barlow and other scholars
have pointed out, is just becoming another commodity on the global culture market. 3
This disturbing tendency indicates an always-already feminized China in the eyes of the
Westerners. In other words, the burgeoning studies on Chinese women's literature
inevitably serve the re-colonization of China to dominant Western discourses, including
feminism.
Corresponding to the commercialization of Chinese women's literature on the
global cultural market, a similar problematic phenomenon has occurred in the global
consumption of China cinema since the late 1980s. After his directorial debut Hong
2 "Emerging from the horizon of history" is a phrase I borrow from Dai Jinhua and Meng Yue's same titled
study on modem Chinese women writers. See Dai Jinhua and Meng Yue, Fuchu lishi dibiao (Zhengzhou:
Human renmin chubanshe, 1989).
3 Tani E. Barlow, Introduction in Gender Politics in Modern China, 1-13,9.
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gaoliang (Red Sorghum, 1987) received the Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film
Festival in 1988, Zhang Yimou has become an internationally acclaimed Chinese
filmmaker. His following production Judou (ludou, 1990) was nominated for Best
Foreign Language Film in the 1991 Oscar Awards. Dahong denglong gaogaogua (Raise
the Red Lantern, 1992) won Zhang a consecutive Oscar nomination. The international
popularity of Zhang's films, argues Sheldon Lu, "is the result of the filmmakers' efforts
to satisfy the tastes of the Western audience, and more damagingly, the result of their
willful surrender to the dominant discourse of First-World culture.,,4 Red Sorghum
exhibits a cinematic libidinal liberation, through which "my grandpa" frees "my
grandma" from the age-old repression represented by an old leper, the owner of a
sorghum-wine house. Judou tells of an incestuous affair between ludou and her nephew,
where both ludou's husband and lover are represented as symbolically castrated male
figures, "one sexually impotent, another socially impotent."s In Raise the Red Lantern, a
young woman becomes a concubine of a wealthy landlord during China's warlord era.
She joins the other three wives to fight for the old man's attention and secure power in
the house, and goes insane in the final scene. Lu Tonglin summarizes the main
characteristic of Zhang's films as "young women with numerous pseudo-traditional
Chinese rituals," which she labels as the Zhang Yimou mode1.6 A sexually impotent old
man, no matter ifit is the old leper, ludou's husband, or the wealthy landlord, is always
represented as feudalist old China that is characterized by sexual suppression.
4 Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, 2002, 128.
5 Cui Shuqin, 149.
6 Lu Tonglin. "The Zhang Yimou Model," Journal ofModern Literature in Chinese (1999): vo1.3, 1.
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Interestingly, none of them is the focus of the screen-sometimes they even do not
appear on the screen-which by no means is a coincidence. Instead, Chinese women,
beautiful victims of the repressive Chinese society, occupy the screen. As objects of the
Western gaze, the images of Chinese women also symbolize a feminized China in the
Western eyes.
As a matter of fact, after the Cultural Revolution, many writers used sexual
repression frequently as a way to express their political frustration, and the literary
representation of sexual liberation consequently became a way to challenge the Party
authority. For instance, an influential and arguable novel was Zhang Xianliang's Nanren
de yiban shi niiren (Half ofMan is Woman, 1985). It immediately became the object of
enormous controversy because of its description of sexual desire that was almost absent
in Mao's China. The novel tells the experiences of a political prisoner, Zhang Yonglin, in
the years ofthe Cultural Revolution. Two narrative lines go throughout the novel: one is
the hero's philosophical and political contemplation on China's fate and his own fate; the
other is his repressed sexual desire and his sexual relationship with Huang Xiangjiu, a
female prisoner. After an accidental peek at the naked body of Huang Xianjiu, who is
taking a bath in a lake surrounded with reeds, Zhang is astounded and runs away.
However, he soon falls into deep regret:
I felt the extreme vexation of having lost my chance. At the same time, I felt the
self-conceit of having successfully come through a severe trial-yet what exactly
that trial had been I could not say. What was the invisible demon barrier that had
held me back? What had kept me from plunging ahead? The same desire, mental
and physical, tormented us both. The same mark of suffering branded both our
bodies. Why couldn't we take a moment ofjoy in the midst ofhardship?7
7 Zhang Xianliang, HalfofMan is Woman, translated by Martha Avery (London: Viking, 1988),41.
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Here, sexual desire is legitimized by the author's accusation of the twisted and oppressed
humanity during the Cultural Revolution. The legitimatization of sexuality is a subversive
rewriting of socialist literature although the personal sexual desire is still subject to a
collective career: social reconstruction on the ruins ofthe Cultural Revolution. When
sexual desire is highlighted as the key to both personal and national recovery, the author
indicates that personal sexual liberation is the premise of social reconstruction. Wang
Anyi, one of the most important women writers in 1980s China, represents sexual desire
as a natural and universal affair between male and female free of political confinement.
In post-1989 China, among numerous novels and films devoted into representation of
sexuality, Jia Pinwan's novella Feidu (The Abandoned Capital, 1993) was the most
debatable one. The author uses an excessive erotic description of a post-socialist male
intellectual, especially his sexual relationship with several females, to express a male
intellectual's political frustration after the Tian' anmen Incident. In brief, discourses of
sexuality in post-Mao China have obvious political implications, including the three
Zhang Yimou films listed above. As a matter of fact, these three films are all adapted
from post-Mao avant-garde literature that aims to subvert socialist ideology by
constructing alternative narration of history in literature.8
However, when avant-garde literature is adapted into films, its political concern is
significantly weakened by Zhang's cinematic language that aims at creating a visual
8 In Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics: Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction,
Lu Tonglin argues that the common desire of post-Mao avant-garde literature is to subvert the Communist
ideology by means of misogynistic discourse, given the special function of women's emancipation in
socialist China. Considering the narration of history in the avant-garde literature that is directly against the
socialist ideology of class struggle, I cannot fully agree with her.
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spectacle that is "allegorical, spatial, seemingly ahistorical," as claimed by Sheldon Lu.9
Despite the fact that Zhang's films provide "alternative aesthetic conventions of
filmmaking and new ways of viewing to the domestic audience,,,Io when the visual
spectacle is exhibited in front of Western audiences, the political significance of sexuality
is immediately displaced into discourses of Orientalism in which the Orient is an
irrational, weak, feminized "Other" in contrast with the rational, strong, masculine West.
In other words, under the long lasting legacy of Orientalism, the Westerners often assume
an authoritative position to read the non-Western "Others" as feminized objects. The
Zhang Yimou model provides them a perfect cinematic representation of feminized
China. It is in this sense that the Zhang Yimou model has been condemned by many
critics as "self-Orientalism" and Zhang Yimou "part of the cultural and ideological
apparatuses of the discourse of Western postcolonialism in the 1990s.,,11
Regardless the vehement criticism, more filmmakers have followed the Zhang
Yimou model, and most of them have achieved considerable international success. The
international success of the Zhang Yimou model empowers the Orientalist representation
of the Asian people in Hollywood cinema that often subordinates Asian males and
fetishizes Asian females. I2 The appearance of more Asian faces in recent Hollywood
9 Sheldon Lu, 1997, 131.
10 Sheldon Lu, 1997, 132.
II Zhang Yiwu."Quanqiu xing houzhimin yujing zhong de Zhang Yimou (Zhang Yimou in the Global
Postcolonial Context)," Dangdai dianying (1993): vol. 3, 18-25.
12 For example, Paul Ng Chun-ming, "The Image of Overseas Chinese in American Cinema," in Kar Law,
ed., Overseas Chinese Figures in Cinema (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1992), 84. Also see Gina Marchetti,
Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993).
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productions does not fundamentally change this Orientalist legacy. For example, Jackie
Chan's success as a martial arts star in Hollywood is totally different from the masculine
roles he has played in Hong Kong. Appropriated by mainstream American stereotypes of
effeminate Asian males, he is now presented as a heroic and comical kung fu fighter
without any sexual appeal. His heroism lies "in his uncanny capacity to withstand pain
and his relentless tenacity in defeating his evil opponent."l3 A comparison between the
roles played by Jackie Chan and the James Bond character makes this point more visible.
No matter how the narrative goes, every Bond film ends up with a sexual romance
between the Caucasian Bond and different Bond girls, and this never happens to Jackie
Chan in Hollywood films.
In order to fill the lacuna of studies on Chinese masculinity, Kam Louie develops
a wen-wu paradigm of Chinese masculinity through literary studies, in which wen
represents literary attainment and wu martial virtue. Brave as it is, this theoretical
paradigm is also a risky one because the wen-wu scheme, as some critics argue, might
tum out to be a product of male fantasy: an enclosed world without women, where
literary cultivations and martial skills are the necessary foundation of Chinese males'
se1f-fashioning. 14 But at least Louie is right to point out that the affirmation of a Chinese
masculinity was a major concern in Chinese contacts with the West throughout the
twentieth century. In my point of view, the affirmation of a Chinese masculinity has been
a process of struggling and negotiating with discourses of Orientalism. For instance, two
13 Wai Kit Choi, "Post-Fordist Production and the Re-appropriation of Hong Kong Masculinity in
Hollywood" in Laikwan Pang and Day Wong eds., Masculinities and Hong Kong Cinema, 199-220.
14 See Yao Souchou's review in Australian Humanities Review (September 2002), 12-3.
236
phrases that were frequently used to describe the image of China in the eyes of the West
deserve special attention. One is the "sleeping lion" remarked by Napoleon, on seeing
China's potential; and the other is the "sick man ofEast Asia (Dongya bingfu)," insulting
a weakened China since the first Opium War. Both carry clear masculine connotations.
While the "sleeping lion" indicates that China may regain its lost glory, nothing could
better embody the masculinity crisis of Chinese under the Western invasion as in the
"sick man" phrase.
Mao's declaration of "the Chinese finally stand up" at the founding ceremony of
the PRC in 1949 can be considered as a direct answer to the "sick man" phrase. Gender
discourse was highly politicized in socialist China. Women's emancipation was carried
out under a larger nation building agenda and operated within the state discourse. "Funii
nengding banbiantian (women can shoulder halfpart of the sky)" became a professed
ideology of equality. Despite the fact that the word "mother" was frequently used as a
trope for both the Chinese country and the Communist Party, gender discourse in socialist
China was based on a de-feminization of women and their conformity with male
standards in terms of political consciousness, hard work ethic, and plain dressing. A
masculinized political culture predominated the socialist era, submerging alternative
gender performances of both men and women.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, with the rise of Chinese
economic and political power on the international stage, discourses of Chinese
masculinity have to be reconsidered in a global context, especially through their close
relationship with discourses of nationalism. In this regard, China's enthusiasm in all kind
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of international sports contests is the most telling example. The 1989 Tian'anmen
incident marked socialist China entering into a post-socialist era. This political transition
has brought changes in gender discourse at various levels, attracting great attention from
social critics and scholars. The socialist concept of sex equality has been re-examined
from a feminist perspective, and homosexuality is no longer a social taboo. By tracing
how the image of Confucius, the conscience and guardian of Chinese values, has been
resuscitated as entrepreneur in neo-Confucianism, Louie shows that the wen notion in
Chinese masculinity is undergoing changes in an economically driven social climate. The
wu component of masculinity is also changing, but Louie's examination of this change in
martial arts films does not speak directly to situations in post-socialist China. In the
following section, an examination of the cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity
in two "main melody" films will attempt to display how the process of globalization
complicates the construction of Chinese masculinity that is divergent from the wen-wu
paradigm.
Redemption and Sublimation of Chinese Masculinity
In her study on left-wing cinema, Laikwan Pang discusses the construction of
Chinese masculinity that penetrates the surface of the left-wing ideology and reveals a
collective subjectivity in its formation. As she notices, the overtly revolutionary films
were often heavily underpinned with libido, which defined both its ardor to the nation
and to the opposite sex, as represented by Sons and Daughters ofthe Storm and Dalu
(The Highway, 1934). The former constructs "a male composite figure of the filmmakers'
collective" and the latter successfully redirects libidinal desires to political
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participation. 15 She points out that sexuality is celebrated and glorified in this film only
under the condition of being a collective activity, which is significantly different from the
individualistic manhood prevalent in the American context. 16 A highly masculinized
version of nationalism thus was established in the 1930s, a time when China was facing
the imperialist invasion from Japan. Under the call for national salvation, romance
between the heroic poet and a rich widow in Sons and Daughters ofthe Storm was
criticized and the sacrifice made by the women in The Highway was highly praised.
The condemnation of romance and sexual desires was further developed in
socialist China. Many works of literature and art resorted to female images to legitimize
the Communist authority, and female images gradually became highly politicized codes,
or as Meng Vue argues, "to an extent, the heroine's unsexed image is an empty because
she is not a flesh-and-blood person but a political name.,,17 More often than not, from the
revolutionary girl in Red Women Detachment to the hard-worked woman peasant in Li
Shuangshuang (Li Shuangshuang, 1962), the women characters were constructed to serve
Party policy. 18 What dominated socialist China was still a patriarchal power represented
by stereotypical male party leaders. In this sense, the male subjectivity in Mao's China
was also an empty code in the symbolic power system because, like the flesh-and-blood
female, male image is ideologically constructed in the symbolic domain of power. In
15 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 92.
16 Laikwan Pang, 2002, 101.
17 Meng Vue, "Female Images and National Myth," in Gender Politics in Modern China (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1993), 118-36, 133.
18 Chris Berry, "Sexual Difference and the Viewing Subject in Li Shuangshuang and The In-Laws," in
Perspectives on Chinese Cinema, 2nd ed. (London: BFI Pub., 1991),38.
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other words, both femininity and masculinity are ideological discourses that sustain the
power operation.
"Main melody" films produced in the 1990s China, to a great extent, inherited
gender discourse from the socialist era, especially in terms of subordinating individual
sexual desire to a sacred nationalist course. However, it is wrong to argue that the
discursive construction of Chinese masculinity is identical with that of the socialist period.
A comparative examination between two films, a Hollywood blockbuster Pearl Harbor
(2001) and a Chinese "main melody" film Huanghe Juelian (Grief Over the Yellow
River, 1999), which share not only a narrative continuity but also an ideological
similarity, may shed light on the interaction of masculinity and nationalism, and reveal
how discourses of Orientalism and Occidentalism are employed to construct Chinese
masculinity in the era of globalization.
In Pearl Harbor (2001), the event of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is told
through the eyes of two childhood friends, Rafe and Danny, both who dream of flying
planes. After Rafe is selected for the British Royal Air Force and joins World War II in
Europe, Danny enlists with the u.s. Army Air Corps. When Rafe is shot down in an
attack and presumed dead, Danny comforts Rafe's girlfriend, Evelyn, a dedicated Navy
nurse. Gradually, they fall in love. However, Rafe turns up alive, and best friends become
rivals in love. After spending one and a half hours to set up the love triangle, intercut by
numerous vignettes involving political and military leaders in Washington and Tokyo, the
climax of this film comes with the Japanese attack, and the computer-generated effects of
bombardment bring the tragedy back to life with staggering power and intimacy. In the
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face of this unexpected and unprepared American defeat, Rafe and Danny immediately
team up and shoot down seven Japanese planes. A patriotic message is evidently
conveyed in this plot: individual grudges should yield to national interests. As a matter of
fact, the attack on Pearl Harbor was one of the most significant events in the history of
the U.S. that created the upswing of patriotism, love of the American flag, and the
popularity of the saying "United We Stand." In the film, when Danny and Rafe fight
hand in hand against the Japanese, the two young American pilots embody an overtly
glorification of American patriotism.
After a 40-minute visual spectacle of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the film
continues with a revenge attack on Japan, the so-called "Doolittle's Raid." Historically,
"Doolittle's Raid," the first air raid by the United States to strike back at the Japanese
home island of Honshu happened four months after the Pearl Harbor attack. Pearl
Harbor is not a historically accurate work. 19 By advancing the raid immediately after the
attack in the cinematic narration, American patriotism is endowed with heroic spirit. In
the film, both Rafe and Danny will join the raid. General Doolittle decides that as soon as
the bombing planes take off, the aircraft carrier will head straight back to Hawaii. One
pilot asks, "But with the carriers at home, where do we land?" General Doolittle answers,
"I have a phrase I want you to memorize, 'woshi yige meigou ren.' It means' I am an
American' in Chinese." The pilots are instructed to land in China and seek help from the
Chinese. After they finish the mission and land in north China, Danny dies in an
encounter with the Japanese patrols, and Rafe is rescued by the Chinese.
19 In comparison, two other films on the attack on Pearl Harbor, 30 Seconds over Tokyo (1944) and Tara!
Tara! Tara! (1970) are more faithful to history.
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I found this episode very amusing because the story of an American pilot's crash
landing in China during the war has been told in a Chinese "main melody" film, Huanghe
juelian (Grief over the Yellow River, 1997) two years earlier than Pearl Harbor. Grief
over the Yellow River features the Chinese people's heroic resistance ofthe Japanese
invasion during the same period. This film was directed by Feng Xiaoning, a filmmaker
who graduated from the Art Design Department of the Beijing Film Academy in 1982,
along with other internationally renowned Fifth Generation directors. He is the director
and scriptwriter of the "main melody" film Red River Valley (1996) that achieved
considerable success in the domestic market. 20 In Griefover the Yellow River, Feng
single-handedly takes the role of director, scriptwriter and photographer together. While
nationalism is clearly not an issue that preoccupies only the Chinese, why are both
Chinese and American filmmakers interested in screening American pilots? Does the role
of the pilots in both films embody the same ideological messages?
Griefover the Yellow River begins and ends with the American pilot Owen's trip
back to China in the 1990s. The film's main theme is a flashback of what happened
during the anti-Japanese War. In his flight to revisit China, Owen recalls his experience
in 1943:
Everyone has special times in his life; one of my greatest memories is a few short
days I've spent in China more than 50 years ago. I'll never forget the land raged
by the war, or the valiant Chinese people who face the challenges of their
incredibly hard lives with unwaving courage and spirit, the cave dwellings, the
ancient temples and the magnificent Yellow River.
20 Feng Xiaoning has worked for China's Children Film Studio as an art designer after the initial years of
graduation, where he made his film debut by Daqiceng Xiaoshi (The Disappeared Atmospheric Layer,
1989). Then he directed Zhanzheng Ziwuxian (The War Meridian, 1990). He has won many domestic and
international film awards.
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It is through Owen's recollection that the Chinese people's heroic resistance during the
anti-Japanese war is displayed on screen. One cannot help to ask why a "main melody"
film employs an American to validate the Chinese people's courage. Such a way of
narration, in my point of view, carries different ideological messages simultaneously.
First, by using an outsider to tell the history of China, the film aims to offer its audience a
"more objective" account of history that is not officially endorsed, which obviously
belongs to the polyphonic narrative of history discussed in Chapter 4. Secondly, when the
American pilot becomes the narrator, maintaining an authoritative voice in the film,
despite his regret for not fully understanding the Chinese soldiers, an Orientalist
perspective is thus established. In other words, it invites the Western audience to identify
with the narrator, and the cinematic narration subsequently. If we consider the fact that
Griefover the Yellow River was China's sole official entry into the Best Foreign Film
category of the 2000 Oscars, its Orientalist perspective is understandable. Trapped
between the international success of the Zhang Yimou model and the ideological
demands of "main melody" films, Griefover the Yellow River tries to strike a balance
between Orientalism and the Party ideology. Intentionally or not, the American pilot
becomes the only possible narrator in the film after all the Chinese characters, except a
little girl, die in the film.
Throughout the Orientalist perspective of narration, what deserves special
attention in Griefover the Yellow River is its representation of masculinity, both Chinese
and American. American masculinity in this film is represented by Owen's pilot identity
and a romance between Owen and a Chinese girl. The image of the combat pilot is a
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masculine ideal. The melding of man and machine, as argued by some critics, carries a
clear masculine and ultimately military connotation and has evolved over time from
depictions of individual knights to an emphasis, after 1933, on the pilot's national feeling
and his integration into a German community.21 Correspondingly, the brotherhood
between Danny and Rafe in Pearl Harbor is associated with their common passion for
the pilot career. The love triangle in Pearl Harbor also contributes to a cinematic
representation of both pilots' sexual masculine. But more importantly, their masculinity
is embodied by the melding with the combat plane, and the heroic deeds of defending the
American community as patriotic American pilots.
The same masculine pilots appear in Griefover the Yellow River, too. At the
beginning of the film, as Owen recalls, on an autumn day in 1943, two American pilots
fly to Japan to take pictures ofthe Japanese military facilities. On their way back to the
U.S. base, the other pilot Robert decides to bomb a Japanese warship because his brother
died in Pearl Harbor. In order to portray his masculine manner of behavior, the director
creates an excellent bombing scene with special effects. However, there is also an
implicit hint that Robert's death in this battle is partly due to his over-individualistic
decision, which can be understood as a Chinese critique ofthe American-styled
individualism.
After Owen manages to land in China and is rescued by a group of Communist-
led soldiers, he is soon attracted to a Chinese girl soldier named Angel. On their way to
the interior revolutionary base, they fall in love. The transnational love story between a
21 Stefanie Schueler-Springorum, "Flying and Killing: Military Masculinity in German Pilot Literature,
1914-1939," in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schiiler-Springorum eds., Home/Front: The Military, War
and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany (New York and Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2002), 109-23.
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Chinese girl and an American pilot is not an accidental plot. Although his plane crashed,
Owen's masculinity is manifested by his pursuit of Angel. Angel first appears in Owen's
eyes when he recovered from a coma, with her face dazzled by a bright backlight. This
typical "to-be-looked-at-ness" constructs her as the object of a Western man's gaze.
Angel was a medical student in Peking and has joined the army after the war broke out.
Because of her medical training and English speaking skills, she is assigned to
accompany Owen. "It seems the God has sent to me an angel. I couldn't believe I was
crossing the Great Wall of China, one of the greatest wonders of the world, which will
lead me to a fascinating land." His adventure in China is tuned with an exotic color.
The Owen character is not always cast in a positive light. Several debates between
Owen and his Chinese accompaniers are set up in the film to represent Owen as a naive
American with no knowledge of the Chinese war situation and Chinese values. On their
route to the interior base, Owen insists on taking the highway instead of the mountain
trail, which results in an encounter with the Japanese and the loss of one nameless soldier.
After Heizi, a male Chinese soldier and the leader of the detachment, decides to cross the
Yellow River from his hometown, the group is arrested by Angel's father, a local triad
leader who has business connections with some collaborators. When they are jailed by
Angel's father, Owen believes in the Geneva Agreement and wants to surrender to the
Japanese. Both Angel and Heizi disagree with him. As Angle says, "I would sacrifice my
life rather than losing the esteem of being a soldier." The debate ends in a fight between
Heizi and Owen. Owen's naivety of the Chinese situation, to some extent, undermines his
masculine power.
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In comparison with American masculinity characterized by military power and
the capability of love-pursuit, Chinese masculinity is displayed in a more complicated
way. Three Chinese male characters in this film have their respective masculine problems,
yet they all dedicate their life to the anti-Japanese war. First, Heizi, the leader of the
detachment is "a dark-faced fellow of few words, who looks unsatisfied with my
presence," as described by Owen. A competition between Owen and Heizi is set up
implicitly. In one scene, Angel is bathing in river; Owen peeks at her through bushes.
Heizi unhappily calls Owen back, which symbolizes that Angel is possessed by Chinese
men. However, Heizi cannot prevent the two from falling in love. The capture of a
Chinese girl from other Chinese men is nothing but a symbolic affirmation of the
Western masculinity. Later we are told that Heizi is a widower; both his wife and son
were killed by the Japanese three years ago. The fact that he has no son, only a daughter,
implies that his masculinity is in a default blank since only sons are considered the
"seeds" to pass on the family line. Meaningfully, Heizi's primary identity in the film is
neither husband nor father, but the leader of the detachment. A collective identity
replaces his masculine role in the family. In other words, his masculinity is backed up
with the anti-Japanese Eighth-route Army.
The second male character is Angel's father. With the plots unfolding, it turns out
that Heizi and Angel come from the same village, and they have had a clan feud for
generations. Angel's mother was killed in one fight, thus Angel's father is also a widower,
with two daughters. Like Heizi, his primary identity in the film is a local triad leader, and
his triad maintains a subtle business relationship with Chinese collaborators. At first,
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Angel's father jailed Heizi, Owen and Angel and wanted to turn Owen in to the Japanese.
But Angel threatens her father, saying that she would kill herselfifhe does so, and forces
him to release Owen. The same nationalist discourse-personal feud has to yield to
national interest- appears in this film, just like in Pearl Harbor, when Heizi
successfully persuades Angle's father to put aside the feud and resist the Japanese
invaders together.
The widower identity of both Heizi and Angel's father in this film symbolizes the
deprivation of their male subjectivity: the loss of wife indicates a suspension of their
masculine sexuality. Two quick flashbacks show the death of their respective wives, one
burned by atrocious Japanese soldiers, and another killed in a disordered clan fight. By
narrating their death in flashbacks full of violence, a "historically traumatized" male
subject, to borrow Silverman's term, is vividly constructed on screen. Regardless ofthe
traumatized male subjectivity, the cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity in
Griefover the Yellow River is different from that in the Zhang Yimou model. One
important ideological mission of this film is to construct Chinese masculinity against
American masculinity. Although an Orientalist narrative is employed to represent
Chinese in the war, it is in the mirror of American masculinity that a traumatized Chinese
masculinity regains its vigor. If not because of his fellow pilot Robert's individualist
venture to bomb the Japanese warship, they probably would have safely flown back to
the U.S. base and handed in the pictures they had taken. The cinematic representation of
Chinese masculinity is set directly against the imagined individualist-based American
masculinity. Angel's father could kill Heizi to avenge for his wife and his clan members.
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Heizi could choose not to cooperate with Angel's father because of the clan feud.
However, both do not seek the individualist approach for the sake of the nation. To help
Owen safely arrive at the interior with the important pictures, for Heizi and Angel's
father, is more important than their personal feud. In order to defeat the Japanese invasion,
they can sacrifice everything, including their life, not to mention personal feud.
Nationalism becomes a powerful ideological tool to unify Chinese in a collective spirit,
which can also be found in a conversation between Owen and Angel. When Owen asks
Angel to marry him and move to the U.S., Angel turns the proposal down since she has to
fight for the nation. One more disagreement takes place between the lovers. For Owen, to
be a soldier is to fulfill his duty. After a three-year service, he will leave the army and
build his own family. For Angel, there is no service length. As long as her nation is in
war, she will keep fighting for it. Although the presence of an American pilot who is
capable of wooing a Chinese girl makes the Chinese masculinity crisis more acute from
an international perspective, what has been embodied in their conversation is the conflict
between American individualism and Chinese collectivism/nationalism.
The most interesting male character in this film is a triad member named Sanpao,
who works for Angel's father. He was injured in a clan fight and lost his male potency.
Sanpao is the person who does business with the collaborators frequently and who
suggests to hand Owen over to the Japanese. In several plots, he is represented as a
stereotypical collaborator character that is ready to cooperate with the Japanese. He
enjoys singing folk love songs, but these songs only make him a more pathetic figure.
Angel's father even wants Angel to marry him. At the end of the film, Angel's father
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comes to the bank of the Yellow River, preparing boats for Owen. However, one of his
triad members has betrayed him to the Japanese. Refusing to surrender, he shoots down
two Japanese soldiers and dies on the bank of the river. Sanpao is with him, but he is too
scared to fight. The Japanese jail him in a small hut. Unknown what has happened on the
bank, Angel, Owen and Heizi are coming to the ferry. Surprisingly, the jailed Sanpao
manages to burn down the hut to warn Angel. When the Japanese bury Sanpao alive on
the bank, he sings his favorite folksong till the last minute.
The problematic Chinese masculinity is represented more strikingly in the Sanpao
character than the two widower characters. The masculine sexuality for the two widowers
is only suspended, while Sanpao's masculine sexuality is totally deprived. The three male
characters die on the bank of the Yellow River, as heroic as any revolutionary martyrs. If
we can argue that nationalism saves Heizi and Angel's father from dying in trivial clan
feud, Sanpao's death, in a more tragic way, represents how the anti-Japanese nationalist
spirit will eventually redeem an impotent man and elevate him to the position of national
hero. In other words, a masculine nationalist discourse is firmly constructed in the film
through a repeated theme: a sublime cause can redeem the wounded male subjectivity.
Sublime is a keyword to examine both aesthetics and politics in socialist China.
As Bang Wang points out, "If the grand narrative ofmodern Chinese history is a tragic
drama, the spectator has been induced to endow the dominant actor with sublime
qualities.',22 He traces how sublime or chonggao has been made to resonate with the
language ofMarxist historical materialism in the Chinese context, and how
22 Ban Wang, 1.
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sublimation-the converting of libidinal energies to serve culturally acceptable goals-
defines the psychic mechanism of Chinese revolutionary cinema. 23
China's transition from socialism to post-socialism does not mean that there are
no continuities between the two, and ideas about gender difference and sexuality are
often recruited to construct continuities in history. The notion of sublime, with a clear
masculine denotation, is one of the ideas that has successfully connects post-socialism
with socialism. As shown in Griefover the Yellow River, unified under the nationalist
discourse, the three male characters are represented as an undefeatable China. Although
their male identity may be problematic viewed from an individual perspective, masculine
characteristics emerge once they form a collective male group to fight for the nation. The
1990s was a decade where China had to face the continuous retreat of socialist system to
capitalist expansion. Therefore, it was necessary to construct an imagined cinematic
redemption of the castrated male subjectivity with the backup of nationalist discourses.
As China's still unfavorable status in the global competition was symbolized by the
wounded masculinity, Griefover the Yellow River promises a possible way to achieve a
sublimation that will be recognized by its Western counterparts. In the film, the
traumatized Chinese masculinity works more like a libido bridge to a sublimation of the
nationalist discourse.
Occidentalism and Chinese Masculinity
If we can agree with Zhong Xueping that Chinese male intellectuals, especially
writers and critics, constituted the most active force in China's response to the
23 Ban Wang, 13, and Chapter 4.
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Enlightenment-informed modes of modernity, then we can agree with her that male
desire for a strong and potent self in 1980s' China was part and parcel of Chinese cultural
nationalism since the male desire was legitimized by a larger project of modernization.24
In her examination on the subjectivity of modern and contemporary Chinese male
intellectuals, Zhong Xueping identifies the Chinese male gender anxiety over masculinity
as "a preoccupation with the lack of a male power position," which she calls a male
"marginality complex":
It is a male psyche predominantly manifested through Chinese (male)
intellectuals' preoccupation with the weakness of the country, the culture,and
Chinese men. In this sense, the complex is also a male desire, a desire to
overcome marginality and to search for (masculine) identity.25
This "marginality complex," as I understand, is more related with male
intellectuals' desire for both cultural and political authority when questions at the
economic level do not yet emerge yet. In other words, the "marginality complex" is
constructed as a motivation for male intellectuals to pursue power endlessly. For instance,
in Zhang Xianliang's HalfofMan is Woman, Zhang Yonglin' s lack of sexual potency is
added to his marginal identity as a political prisoner, and his political rehabilitation
follows his sexual liberation.
Zhong mentions that Chinese male intellectuals, in relation to their Western
counterparts, are obsessed with the notion of male weakness, too. Unfortunately, Zhong
focuses her study on Chinese intellectuals and their literary works and does not examine
the issue of masculinity in a cross-cultural perspective, especially in the prosperous field
24 Zhong Xueping, Masculinity Besieged?: Issues ofModernity & Male SubjectiVity in
Chinese Literature ofthe Late 20th Century (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2000), 14.
25 Zhong Xueping, 11,37.
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of mass media culture. What kind of changes has been taken place on discourse of
Chinese masculinity when China starts to set foot on the way of globalization?
When both the intellectual group and literature have been quickly marginalized in
1990's China, the most vivid cultural presentation of Chinese masculinity has appeared in
visual culture. A TV soap Beijing ren zai niuyue (Beijing Sojourners in New York) may
offer a good example to observe the new changes. This 21-episode TV soap was aired in
1993 and was extremely popular. The soap tells the adventure of a Chinese man in New
York, from a poor immigrant to a successful entrepreneur. Wang Qiming, the main
character, is a Beijing-born musician. During his first few years in New York, in addition
to economic pressures, he has to face many cultural shocks as well as an identity crisis.
His wife leaves him and marries an American factory owner, David McCarthy. An
important part of the story focuses on how Wang starts his own manufacturing business
and competes with David. It is interesting to see that the dramatized Sino-American
competition ends with David being defeated, because his Chinese wife reveals his
business secrets to Wang, her ex-husband?6 Lydia Liu reads this TV serial as "a logical
product of the transnational co-authorship of the ideology of business entrepreneurship
between the post-socialist official discourse of China and that of the mainstream
American media.,,27 What interests me in Beijing Sojourners is how "gender, class and
race all collapse into a single assertion oftroubled Chinese masculinity" in a
26 This TV drama is base on a same title novel written by an overseas Chinese writer. However, the
American businessman David is a TV creation that does not exist in the original novel.
27 Lydia H. Liu. "Beijing Sojourners in New York: Post-socialism and the Question ofIdeology in Global
Media Culture," Positions 7:3 (Winter 1999): 763-797, 790.
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transnational context.28 Wang's odyssey in American begins with the loss of his wife to
David. Then his economic success cures his wounded masculinity, as hinted by his
mistress. As Lydia Liu has noticed, although white women rarely make a significant
appearance in Beijing Sojourners, the closing scene of the final episode shows Wang
stopping his luxury car at a traffic light after he has gambled away his entire fortune,
sticking up his middle finger at a white women sitting in the next car. This time he has
secured a strong masculinity against the Westerns, both male and female, with his
symbolic power of engaging in global capitalism.
This crisis of male weakness, or masculine crisis, as shown in Beijing Sojourners,
has displayed more complicated characteristics when China is involved in the process of
globalization. Not only Confucius, as observed by Louie, became an entrepreneur, rather,
it is businessmen in general who started to dominate the Chinese screen. In other words,
economic power has become the most important element of Chinese masculinity.
Furthermore, the visual display of a growing Chinese entrepreneur class is always taken
place in a transnational background. One important strategy that has been employed to
reconstruct Chinese masculinity in a global era, to paraphrase Chen Xiaomei, is
Occidentalism. For Chen, the appropriation of Western discourse, such as feminism and
democracy, can actually have a politically and ideologically liberating effect on
contemporary Chinese culture. What I mean by the word Occidentalism, however, is
slightly different from Chen's definition-a counter-discourse used by the intellectuals in
post-Mao era to oppose the political regime- but much closer to her notion of "official
Occidentalism," that is, a dominant ideological practice that intentionally constructs the
28 Lydia H. Uu, 788
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Western "Other" as the inferior counterpart of the Chinese. In other words, the operation
of "Occidentalism" is merely a Chinese version of "Orientalism" in which the Western
"Other" is eroticized and feminized to legitimize China's growing economic power as
well as political influence in international affairs. Interestingly, both Orientalism and
Occidentalism play important role in representing either a feminized China or Chinese
masculinity in visual culture.
The success of Beijing Sojourners in China and many oversea Chinese
communities is not because it follows the tendency that Douglas Kellner has termed "a
fetishism of audience pleasure," but lies in its ability of creating this pleasure in "its use
ofcultural artifacts.,,29 In other terms, the audience pleasure does not exist independently
from or take precedence over mass cultural products; rather, it is constructed through the
practice of consuming. The reaffirmation of Chinese masculinity against American
masculinity, as in Griefover the Yellow River, has been employed as an effective cultural
artifact to identify the audiences with the new ideological transformation from socialism
to post-socialism when China has drifted into the global process.
After Beijing Sojourners, more and more Chinese mass media products show
great interests in portraying the transnational migration, and "the reassertion of Chinese
masculinity takes the form of transnational fantasy," which directly links to struggles in
the financial arena.30 In his study on a particular type of TV soap opera that describes
love affairs happened in today's China between male Chinese and female foreigners,
29 I agree with Lydia Liu that the valorization of audience pleasure is precisely what has rendered "critical"
analysis of cultural production one-sided, ifnot superfluous, in the first place. See Lydia H. Liu, note 7.
30 Sheldon Lu, 2001, 221.
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Sheldon H. Lu reveals how this type of TV soap opera becomes a way of imaging
Chinese national identity in the age of transnationalism and globalization. As he points
out, in the domestic and global arena of image production and consumption, there are
"two opposite yet complementary strategies in the politics of China's self-representation":
in the global cultural market Chinese artists offer localized narratives and images of
China by employing the strategy of self-exoticization and self-eroticization for the gaze
of the Western spectator; while in the domestic cultural market it is the foreign females
that has been eroticized, domesticated and tamed by Chinese males through a new
"transnational male imaginary" or "transnational libidinal economy.,,31
Compared with TV productions, films ofthe same transnational romance theme
such as Kuangwen eluosi (Kissing Russia, 1994), Dabianzi de youhou (The Bewitching
Braid, 1996) or Fenni de weixiao (On the Other Side of the Bridge, 2002) did not secure
good box office returns, partly due to the overall gloomy situation of the domestic film
market under the impact of Hollywood blockbusters, and partly due to the fact that most
Chinese filmmakers lack experience in producing attractive narrative strategies as in the
TV soap. Without government support, these transnational romances have no way to
compete with Hollywood blockbusters, especially in terms of market promotion.
When economic development has become the real "main melody" in China, have
"main melody" films adopted the same strategy to represent Chinese masculinity? As I
have discussed in previous chapters, one important them of the "main melody" film is the
revolutionary history and the CCP leadership. Chinese intellectuals also made
considerable efforts to regain their authority through cinematic representation. In general,
31 Sheldon Lu, 2001, 128-9.
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"main melody" films display a masculine character that is not economically determined.
It still portrays Chinese masculinity in political perspective, that is, a commitment for the
nation state. To some extend, this divergent representation of Chinese masculinity in
mass media reflects one of Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for post-socialist China: to grab
both material civilization and spiritual civilization with two hands. While the
development of spiritual civilization falls far behind economic development, it is the
"main melody" films that aim to shoulder this mission. Meanwhile, in order to achieve
ideological effects, the production of "main melody" films has to draw lessons from the
popular TV soaps. In this regard, Chongchu Yamasun (Charging out Amazon, 2002), a
"main melody" film that set the representation of Chinese masculinity in a transnational
background and narrated in Occidentalist discourses deserves special attention.
This film is based on a true story. In August 1999, two Chinese soldiers from the
Chinese Airborne Special Forces were selected to join the prestigious "International
School of Hunters" for a 87-day military training session held in the Amazon region, with
another 31 soldiers for four different countries. After his Chinese colleague was wounded,
Wang Yalin successfully completed the training, becoming one of the seven international
soldiers graduated from this school.32 The PLA-controlled August First film studio found
this story very attractive and decided to put it into film: sending two Chinese soldiers to a
foreign land and having them trained with other Western soldiers is a spectacle, not to
mention the exotic tropical Amazon region that will interest many audiences. The
32 An interview of Wang Valin "Tiyan shenglijixian (Experiencing the Physical Limit)" was published in
People's Daily, 27 August 2002, p.12.
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production of Charging out Amazon soon became a media focus, partly due to
propaganda works, partly due to its box office potential.
According to Ming Zhenjiang, the director of the August First studio, due to the
fact that Chinese film genre is very different from international categorization, China
should learn lessons from the international film genres such as thriller, action, romance
and gangster since they have accumulated rich experiences, therefore developing a
Chinese way for military filmmaking. 33 By producing Charging out Amazon, Ming
expected a reform on Chinese filmmaking in order to connect with the international
development. Meanwhile, he also emphasizes that the aim of this reform is to promote
the revolutionary heroism and patriotic spirit by representing the image of the
contemporary Chinese soldiers.34 Did Charging out Amazon fulfill these requirements?
Regardless of its narrative dysfunction, the representation of Chinese masculinity in this
film contributed greatly to the construction of the revolutionary heroism.
Our heroes in Charging out Amazon are renamed as Wang Hui and Hu Xiaolong.
A theme throughout this film is their performance in the international competition
represents the image of China. Masculinity is closely related with Nationalism. As a
school rule, all foreign students in this school should raise their national flags every
morning. If they fail the training, they should knock a fog bell and their national flags
will be lowered down. The film makes it clear that this is the first time that the Chinese
national flag is appearing in the Hunter School, indicating China's growing power in
33 Information comes from a group interview done by the Chinese Cinema Channel in September 2002.
<http://www.cctv.com/entertainment/newmoviel105 .html>
34 Ibid.
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international affairs. How to keep the red star flag flying high in the air becomes two
Chinese soldiers' primary concern.
In order to build a powerful image of Chinese masculinity, two narrative lines are
set up in this film. The first one is the competition between Chinese soldiers and their
Western classmates. The two Chinese soldiers stand among American and European
soldiers who are taller and stronger, creating a comedic effect, but it only makes their
final triumph more impressive. Hu even cannot find himself a size small uniform and
boots. What they have to face in the next two months is not only physical ordeals
reaching the human limit, but also contempt from some of their Western classmates. The
Italian flag becomes the first flag taken down when an Italian soldier cannot stand the
training. When the Italian soldier cries with his face in the folded national flag and is
carried away, a reverse shot shows Wang and Hu shaking hands together in the
foreground. "Do it for our country," they encourage each other. Out of focus is a red
Chinese national flag flying over their heads. This shot reminds me of Roland Barthes'
semiotic reading on the cover image of a black French soldier making a salute. He points
out that "French imperiality condemns the saluting Negro to be nothing more than an
instrumental signifier. ,,35 In our case here, both the two Chinese soldiers, with their hands
together, and the flying national flag in the background, are instrumental signifiers of
nationalism. This symbolic meaning is further enhanced by their presence on the foreign
land, among Western soldiers.
35 Stuart Hall ed., Representation: Cultural Representations and SignifYing Practices (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1997),45.
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Although the narrative in Charging out Amazon cannot compete with Hollywood
blockbusters such as Saving Private Ryan (200 I), the ideological messages that they are
trying to convey is almost identical. Saving Private Ryan opens and ends with shots of
the American star-spangled flag. The humanist mission of saving Ryan aims not only to
cover the brutality of the war but also encourage more Americans to identify with the
nation, to inspire more devotion in their lives for the nation. What is outstanding in
Charging out Amazon is a strong nationalist sentiment in front of the Westerners. When
instructor "crocodile" is reported that someone has stolen food from the kitchen at night,
he suspects Wang and Hu, "Deny your mistake is exactly you Chinese will do." This
sentence enrages Wang, "If you accuse Chinese a liar, then what I can do is to give up."
He intends to knock the bell and take down the Chinese flag. Hu gives Wang a slap and
reminds him, "Have you forgotten what we are going to prove by coming here?" They
decide to admit the stealing in order to carry out their mission: to have Chinese flag
flying in the school. Out of guilt, a Western soldier confesses that he is the person who
has stolen the corn cake.
One Chinese critic argues that the existence ofthe Western soldiers does not carry
out a practical narrative function throughout the whole training process.36 I would like to
say that the Westerners are intentionally set up as a mirror to construct both Chinese
masculinity and Chinese nationalism. During a training break, after the little man Hu
successful wrestles a strong American classmate in the mud, even the instructor shows
his high appreciation of Chinese Kung Fu. Later, when another Western soldier betrays
their boss in a torturing dry run, it is Hu that shows his Chinese Kung Fu again and beats
36 Yao Ruyong, "A Cultural malice aforethought," in Playwright (April 2003): 23-7.
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down the disguised instructor. This time, the tough instructor has to admit that Hu is "a
real soldier." Throughout the film, there is no real training competition between the two
Chinese soldiers and the rest of the Westerners, and the latter's existence simply works as
a background for a cinematic showing-off of the Chinese. To some extent, we can argue
that the dysfunction of the Westerners is a failure in narration due to the inexperience of
Chinese playwrights in dealing with such a new topic. Meanwhile, it is also possible to
argue that this self-conceited and self-consoled cinematic representation of Chinese
soldiers, in contrast with its Occidentalist representation ofthe Westerners, achieves an
imagined cinematic realization of Chinese masculinity, especially when we recall the
long humiliating history of China being the "sick man ofEast Asia." The confrontation
between Chinese and Westerners has been intentionally constructed as an
acknowledgment of the braveness of the Chinese. Wang and Hu's outstanding
performance in the school actually becomes an exhibition of the Chinese nationality on
the international military stage. The film also shows that Wang befriends an African
American soldier, Johnson, which reminds me of a political slogan that was promoted in
Mao's China: "Asia, Africa and Latin America are one family." When this Cold War
legacy is reflected in the film, African Americans become brothers of the Chinese.
This masculine imagination of a powerful China is further displayed by the
cinematic portray of a Western female character and her interactions with the Chinese
soldiers. Lieutenant Lena Ruth is a doctor working in the Hunter School, and she
expresses deep concerns to Wang when he is wounded in a test practice. She is the only
person who cheers for Hu when he defeats other soldiers who look down on him. When
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the instructor asks Lena: "You like Chinese soldiers or Chinese Kung Fu?" She answers:
"Both." Later, it turns out that Lena is the daughter of the school principle, General
Collin Ruth. In the second part of this film, when an international drug-smuggling group
kidnaps Lena to blackmail General Ruth, the Chinese hero Wang, overcoming his
acrophobia, single-handedly sneaks into the smugglers' base and kills them with a bomb.
A harsh ending notwithstanding, the point is still clear enough-it is the Chinese soldier
who saves the Western female from danger. Here again we see the oppositional
discursive politics between Orientalism and Occidentalism, with the same ideological
function. In Can subaltern Speak, Spivak has mentioned the importance of a white man
saving an Indian woman in the Sati practice, which shows the hegemonic position of the
Westerners to the Indians. This Orientalist cliche can be found in many Hollywood films.
For example, in Red Corner (1994), it is the American businessman who rescues the
Chinese female lawyer who is prosecuted by her fellow Chinese and the inhumanly
Communist environment. What we find in Charging out Amazon is a very meaningful
reversal-it is the Chinese man who saves the Western woman, and moreover, different
from Jackie Chan's Hollywood comedy, the Western female in Charging out Amazon is
almost ready to fall in love with Wang. After Wang has been awarded the honor medal
for best student, we see Lena sending him flowers and kissing his face. They stand
together like a couple, waving their hands to the people around them.
However, what hides behind the Occidentalism discourse in the film text is a
disturbing Self-Orientalism. As the director has explained, "in order to prevent this film
being too boring with a dominant training process, another supportive narrative on the
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feud between General Ruth and the drug-smuggling group has been added to cross-
develop the whole story.,,3? As a matter of fact, the double narrative structure comes
directly from a Hollywood production, G.l Jane (1997). Directed by Ridley Scott and
starring Demi Moore, G.l Jane tells the story of how Jordan O'Neil, a woman lieutenant,
is selected to join in the Navy commando force for three months of intensive military
training. No one expects her to succeed in this test case because of the standard 60%
dropout rate for men. The strong-willed O'Neil is determined to prove everyone wrong.
When training in the Mediterranean Sea is interrupted, the team joins a battle occurring at
the Libyan coast. O'Neil rescues their injured Master Chief from the vehement crossfire.
It is interesting to see that the two Chinese soldiers in Charging out Amazon actually
occupy Jane's position in G. l Jane -sexism is replaced by racism. One can argue that
the film scriptwriter of Charging out Amazon must have decided to copy G. 1. Jane
because his lack of creativity, but to have Chinese male soldiers to assume the female
position in its original also has something to tell about a deep-rooted influence of self-
Orientalism, as happened in both The Opium War and Griefover the Yellow River.
As a matter of fact, the interweaving of Occidentalism and Orientalism has
become a salient feature of "main melody" films. It reflects an uncertainty of China in the
reconfiguration of the world. On the one hand, it tries to get rid of the Orientalist
discourses such as "sick man of East Asia" to present a powerful China; on the other
hand, it always resorts to the West to affirm its powerfulness. In Charging out Amazon,
Lena's birthday is October 1st. At her birthday party, General Ruth congratulates Wang
and Hu because it is also the fifty anniversary of the PRC. He also prepares them a gift: a
37 See the director's interview on Jiejangjun ribao, 15 August 2001, p.6.
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satellite TV broadcasting news of the military celebration held in the Tian'anmen Square.
In a close-up shot, the film shows alignments of Chinese soldiers in the Square,
representing the inviolability of a strong China. One may argue that the insertion of the
Chinese military demonstration is a narcissist cinematic performance shared by
Hollywood films. At the end of Independence Day (1996), we see Americans cheering
for July Fourth as the Day of the Earth. However, a difference also emerges at this
moment. When Hollywood films are obsessed in fighting against all kinds of aliens to
save the Earth and human beings, the narcissist Chinese as represented in Charging out
Amazon and many other "main melody" films always resort to the acknowledgment of
the Westerners, which shows the uneven power relations between China and Western
countries. Gender politics become an effective instrument to cover this unevenness and
the Western female Ruth becomes a symbol to show the masculine attractiveness of the
Chinese.
Released on August 1st, 2002, the 75th anniversary of the founding of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA), Charging out Amazon was highly promoted by party
organs such as People's Daily and won the Golden Rooster and Huabiao Awards later.38
It also won the One Hundred Flower Award with the highest voting number from the
audiences. The success of this film, as some reviews have emphasized, lies in its impact
to the audience's patriotic passion, especially "the birth of self-esteem and glory that
38 The film aimed at being a Chinese blockbuster with a budget of 15 million yuan. According to the
screenplay, the whole story in Charging out Amazon should happen abroad, and besides the two Chinese
soldiers, all the rest characters are foreigners. However, its final released version is dubbed in Chinese. It
gives the audiences a hyper-feeling of watching a dubbed Hollywood blockbuster, although it is hard for
me to tell if this is the producer's original intention. The Chinese title of this film is identical with Chinese
translations of two Hollywood products: Flying Virus (2001) by Jeff Hare and 800 Leagues down the
Amazon (1993) by Luis Llosa. This film attended film weeks held in Australia and Pakistan in 2004.
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contemporary people are expecting for.,,39 Critics point out that the overt promotion of
the mainstream cultural discourse has put the hero into the back stage as pseudo-hero,
and the real hero in the front stage actually is the official ideology. This official ideology
has been clearly summarized in another review:
To be connected with the world and participated in the global competition is the
main theme of our era. Charging out Amazon has observantly caught this theme.
Through the screen story of how Chinese soldiers are growing up in fight with
soldiers across the world and become the winner, it proves that China is catching
up the pace when all countries in the world are taking the road of strengthening
their military force.,,4o
As a telling note to the military policy that has been carried out in China, this film
is also an ideological production and reproduction of the raised position of China in the
international stage, and the corresponding Chinese nationalism. Masculinity and
nationalism have been perceived by a number of critics as going hand in hand because
the latter was understood in terms of certain qualities such as assertiveness, power,
strength, aggressiveness, and fierceness, which were embodies in the heroic male body.41
The cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity in "main melody" films follows this
rule, especially in several films of the contemporary military themes such as Dandao
Wuhen (Traceless Bullet, 1994) and Chongtianfeibao (Flying Panther, 2000). Traceless
Bullet describes the growing up of a PLA soldier, and Flying Panther tells how two
generations of Chinese pilots carry out test flights for China's first battle plane. The
39 Tuo Lake. "Zhangsheng conghe erlai (Where Does the Applause Come from)?" Wenhui Baa, 9 August
2002, pA.
40 Yun Ding. "Xiezai guoqi shangde junwei (Military Power Written on the National Flag)," Guangming
Daily, 6 November 2002, pA.
41 Agnes S. M. Ku, "Masculinities in Self-Invention: Critics' Discourses on Kung Fu-Action Movies and
Comedies," in Masculinities and Hong Kong Cinema (Hong Kong & London: Hong Kong University Press
& Eurospan, 2005), 221-3.
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masculine-nationalist connection in "main melody" films has to be considered in a larger
socio-economic context in which China was asserting its newly acquired superpower
status.
The practice of masculinity discourses cannot exist independently; it is always
carried out with other discourses. In the Chinese context, two important discursive
practices are economic development and nationalism. Therefore, it is not a surprise to see
discourses of masculinity are closely related with these two discursive systems. In both
literary and cinematic representations, which side is assigned masculine characteristics
and which side will be the feminized role is never an innocent decision. It always has full
of implications of power. As Laikwan Pang critically points out, "Masculinity is a source
of power, and a site where power operates, so that is it also subjected to power. Therefore,
any simple political agenda that involves using one form of masculinity against another
simplifies their ultimate interconnectedness, which is manifested in different ways under
different social and cultural circumstances. ,,42 In contemporary China, it is either
businessmen or military figures instead of intellectuals that are assigned masculine
characteristics. These two ways of representations are not against but supplement to each
other, which reflects the changing social situation in China. Intellectuals, if not the whole
group but at least part of them, here I mean those involved in producing both the
transnational TV soaps and main melody films I have listed above, are active producers
of these new masculinity discourses. In the 1980s, Chinese male intellectuals' crisis of
masculinity was fully represented in literature. In the 1990s, it was popular TV soaps and
42 Laikwan Pang, Introduction in Masculinities and Hong Kong Cinema (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2005), 4.
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films featuring successful businessmen that represented their endangered social status
from an economic perspective. The "main melody" films of the 1990s tried to channel the
crisis into nationalism, which, to some extent, was successful. However, when an
economic versioned or a militarized Chinese masculinities is becoming increasingly
visible and popular in the Chinese screen, the masculinity of intellectuals remains in
threat or at least in question on the level of representation.
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CHAPTER VIII
ENCODING/DECODING:
"MAIN MELODY" FILMS AND THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE SPECTATOR
As a technological novelty, cinema has immediately become a true mass medium
because it quickly reached a large number of populations, especially the illiterate working
class. The presence of the spectator is an essential part in studying film medium as an
important branch of mass culture. Consider a group of people seated in a dark theater,
watching the moving images on the screen- why some are cheering while others are
feeling uneasy? Why do people have different views of the same film? What kind of
interaction takes place between individual spectators and the film text? How can the
messages conveyed by the film reinforce or change the spectators' worldviews? This
chapter will address the issue of the spectatorship, or to be more exact, the subjectivity of
the spectator in viewing Chinese "main melody" films.
Since the end of the Cold War, the CCP has encountered more difficulties in
carrying out its ideological operation, under extensive Western influences. As cultural
products of ideological reinforcement, all "main melody" films are labeled propaganda,
or even brainwash, by the Westerners. For people in China, after witnessing an
unprecedented socio-political transformation in the 1990s concerning both China and the
world, most of them have acquired a more critical awareness of the Party governance.
One interesting fact, however, is that many "main melody" films are still very popular
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among Chinese audiences, with considerable box office receipts. Some "main melody"
films were better received than many domestic productions, and a few even defeated
Hollywood blockbusters in the domestic market.! Does this mean Chinese audiences fully
identify with the ideological messages conveyed by the "main melody" films? If not,
what kinds of different interpretations do they have when watching these films? And how
could we evaluate these interpretations against the grain of the ideological operation?
Before attempting to disentangle these complicated issues regarding the
subjectivity of the Chinese audience in viewing "main melody" films, it is necessary to
review the theories on human subjectivity in general, and on the subjectivity of the film
spectator in particular. From structuralism to post-structuralism, from Marxism to
psychoanalysis, theories on human subjectivity have undergone sea changes over years,
which have directly influenced the study of film spectatorship. Among different
theoretical trends, the development of cultural studies since the 1960s has contributed
greatly to a comprehensive understanding of the spectatorship.
Subjectivity: From Passive Victims to Active Participants
V.I. Lenin proclaimed in 1922 that cinema was the most efficient medium for
propaganda. He remarked, "You will have to develop production on a wider basis and, in
particular, introduce wholesome films to the masses in the city and, to an even greater
extent, in the countryside.,,2 In his famous 1937 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin also predicted the potential ofthis new
1 For the box office list, see Dianying yishu (March 1999): 12.
2 From a conversation between Lenin and Lunacharsky in 1922, recalled by the latter in a letter to G. M.
Boltyansky. See Richard Taylor and Ian Christie, 1988,5.
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technology for the formulation of revolutionary demands. An assumption that Lenin and
Benjamin share with each other is that only when the film medium is under the control of
the revolutionary side can it be applied to revolutionary demands. However, a few film
studios have monopolized film industries in most Euro-American countries soon after the
birth of cinema, and Hollywood is the most telling example. Under such a situation,
could the film medium still play its revolutionary role?
According to Marx and Engels, the ruling class, on the basis of its control of the
means of material production, will also have control over the means of intellectual
production by representing its own interest as the common interest of all the members of
society, and these members will accept it through what Marx defines as "false
consciousness." So Marx argues:
If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as
the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. 3
Therefore, most Marxist followers, despite their theoretical divergences, do not
think that films produced under capitalism can offer any possibility for the masses to
actively engage in overthrowing the status quo. The subjectivity of the masses is greatly
de-emphasized, or even missing in Marxist critical perspectives. For example, in "The
Cultural Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," a well-known piece of the
Frankfurt School's critiques on mass culture, Adorno and Horkheimer claimed that the
basic characteristic of the cultural industry is standardization because it produces nothing
but uniform entertainment products. The application of new technologies creates in the
consumers an illusion of being enlightened, but actually it is just a "mass deception"
3 Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, The German Ideology (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970),64-65.
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because it works effectively by controlling the individual consciousness.4 According to
Adorno and Horkheimer, the ultimate goal ofthe cultural industry is to help the ruling
class defend social order. Adorno's essay "On Popular Music" further argues that the
standardized popular music only works as "social cement" to promote passive
consumption, turning consumers into passive victims. 5 In this sense, film industries in
the capitalist society, maybe the most powerful branch of the cultural industry, only
contribute to indoctrinate the ruling ideas into the masses' minds. The subjectivity of the
masses was totally denied.
Psychoanalysis, a theory built by Jacques Lacan, tries to explain the subjectivity
in a way that is totally different from the Marxist tradition. But both end with a denial of
subjectivity. According to Lacan, there are three stages in the formation of human
subjectivity-the imaginary phase in which the infant identifies itself as part of the
mother; the mirror phase in which the infant realizes itself as a separate being, and the
symbolic in which the infant seeks to step into the world of language, the world of the
Father. By describing the world oflanguage as an unbreakable symbolic order,
psychoanalysis shares the same negative view on human subjectivity with the Frankfurt
School. Christian Metz has taken Lacan's theory further and defines the role of cinema as
a way to temporarily fulfill the longing for the imaginary, the sense ofunity.6 As some
critics pointed out, the interaction of spectator and film text actually produces the viewer
4 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, "The Cultural Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," in
Dialectic ofEnlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94-136.
5 Theodor W. Adorno, "On Popular Music," in Essays on Music (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002),437-469.
6 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana Press,
1982).
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to be the subject in the process, so psychoanalytic film theory is concerned with
"establishing the complex, myriad mechanisms by which the relationship of spectator to
screen links the human psyche, particularly the unconscious, to the film text." 7 Either to
be an element of the symbolic world or to be exiled from this world, it seems that there is
a teleological end towards which all human subjects will walk despite their longing for
the unity.
In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Louis Althusser linked the
operation of ideology to the notion of the unconscious. He argued that ideology works
unconsciously as a system where we live, which speaks on behalf of us, and gives us the
illusion that we are in charge so that we could freely choose to believe the things we
believe. In his formulation, "all ideology has the function of 'constructing' concrete
individuals as subjects."s His notion of "interpellation" also leaves no room for the
subject to actively and critically engage in resisting the ideology produced by the
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), and the mass media occupy an important position
in the ISAs.
In the fields of linguistics and semiotics, there has been a general underestimation
of the role of the speaker/reader, too. For instance, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure focused on langue rather than parole, on formal systems rather than on
processes of use and production. In giving priority to the determining power ofthe
system, structuralism can be seen as fundamentally conservative.
7 E. Deidre Pribram, "Spectatorship and Subjectivity," in Miller, Toby and Robert Starn, eds., A
Companion to Film Theory (Malden & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 146-164, 149.
8 Louise Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 142-6, 162-77.
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The rediscovery of audience as a group was a significant point in the history of
mass communication theory during 1940s and 1950s. Unfortunately, the audiences were
mainly treated as market because, as McQuail argues, "it links sender and receivers in a
'calculative' rather than a normative or social relationship, as a cash transaction between
producer and consumer rather than a communication relationship.,,9 This rediscovery was
embodied in film producers' catering to the audience's taste, and also their cinematic
construction of taste. Audience studies then was focused on an uni-directional film
consumption rather than a two-way interpretation. In the interaction between film
industry, film text, and film audience, no emphasis has been put on film reception and the
actual use of film text by different groups of people.
For the first part of the twentieth century, structuralism dominated the field of
social science. The full denial of the agency of the masses, a weak point of the so-called
"Western Marxism" and the Althusserian "scientific Marxism," had aroused great
academic controversy. In 1960, structural linguist Roman lackobson proposed a model of
interpersonal verbal communication that moved beyond the basic Saussurian
transmission model of communication, highlighting the importance of the codes and
social contexts involved. According to lackobson, in order to make the addresser and the
addressee stay in communicate effectively, a code that is either fully, or at least partially
common to the addresser and addressee, is required for an effective operation of the
message.
Then what will happen if the addresser and the addressee do not share a fully
identified code system? Or only some of the addressees share with the addresser the same
9 Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, 4th edition (New York: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000), 226.
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code system and others do not? In the field of literary studies, as a response to the textual
emphasis ofNew Criticism, the reader-response theory argues that a literary text cannot
be a fulfilled text without considering its reception. Wolfgang Iser sees reading as a
dialectical process between the reader and text. For Hans-Robert Jauss, a reader's
aesthetic experience is always bound by time and historical determinants. In brief, the
reception process is not only determined by the information provided in the text, but also,
and sometimes more importantly, is related to the reader's specific social experience.
Therefore, the issue of subjectivity has been reconsidered with new theoretical
developments against structuralism. A simple passive subjectivity lost out to a
consideration of the possible intervention of the human agency in all kinds of social
activities. Theorists and critics have started to pay more attention to the formation of the
human subjectivity. Most of them agree that the human subjectivity is constructed by
multi-layered, and sometimes competing discourses. As Foucault has delineated,
discourses are systems of thoughts or knowledge that can form into certain ideologies
through repetitive practice such as discipline and punishment, or discourses on
heterosexuality. In other words, human subjectivity is nothing but a product of different
discursive practices that never complete but undergo continuous struggles and
negotiations. Although Foucault leaves the readers an impression of the omnipresent
power system that can engulf and integrate into itself all sorts of resistant activities, his
discursive theory is of great significance in terms of the interstices between different
ideological discourses.
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Among theories on human subjectivity, what I want to highlight is the re-
affirmation of the audience's subjectivity in the field of cultural studies since the 1960s,
especially in research done by Stuart Hall. As a major figure in the revival of the British
political left in the 1960s and 70s, Stuart Hall has argued that although the mass media do
tend to encode interpretations that serve the interests of the ruling class, they are also "a
field of ideological struggle" where the audiences, based on their concrete living social
experiences, can actively decode the ideological messages.
In his theoretical account of how messages are produced and disseminated in
"Encoding/Decoding," Hall inserted a semiotic paradigm into a social framework. 10 He
argues that the dominant ideology is typically inscribed as the "preferred reading" in a
media text, but that cannot be automatically adopted by receivers, as the Frankfurt School
and Althusser have insisted. On the contrary, the social situation of the receiver may lead
him/her to adopt different stances. According to Hall, there are three kinds of readings:
"dominant readings" are produced by those whose social situation favors the "preferred
reading;" "negotiated readings" are produced by those who can alter the "preferred
reading" by taking account of their own social position; and "oppositional readings" are
produced by those whose social position puts them into direct conflict with the "preferred
reading." Hall insists that the meaning of a text is located somewhere between the
producer and the reader. Even though the producer encodes the text in a particular way,
the receiver could negotiate the meaning of the text in a slightly different manner ifnot
all oppositional.
10 This essay was originally published in Stuart Hall, Encoding and Decoding in Television Discourse
(Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1973).
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Hall's model of encoding/decoding shares a common ground with Gramsci's
notion of"hegemony." According to Gramsic, a class is dominant in two ways, leading
and dominant. "Hegemony" refers to a situation in which the dominant class does not
rule a society by simply imposing its ruling ideas on the rest of society, but actively leads
it through continuous practice of moral and intellectual leadership. In other words, the
continuous practice of leadership means the operation of ideology is by no way seamless
and always-already dominative, thus it is highly possible that the subject can partly
achieve his/her subjectivity. In the formation of subjectivity, ideological interpellation is
accompanied by a consistent resistance of this very interpellation. Nothing can better
explain this than the rising of feminism and vehement criticism on the patriarchal society.
Viewed from a Chinese perspective, despite the fact that Chinese Marxism is
preoccupied with political struggles, the issue of subjectivity has remained central to a
few Marxist literary theorists. For example, Hu Feng's theory of a "subjective fighting
spirit" in realism linked the concept of social revolution with that of individual
consciousness.!! For Hu Feng, "the unity or combination of subjective spirit and
objective truth has produced a militant new literature, which we call realism.,,!2 Mao
launched a political assault on Hu's "bourgeois subjectivism," but Mao himself, as many
studies have point out, emphasizes the subjectivity of the masses in order to carry out the
revolutionary cause. To some extent, the Cultural Revolution was an extreme case of an
uncontrollable performance of mass subjectivity in a negative sense. In Mao's China, the
\I See Uu Kang, "Subjectivity, Marxism, and Cultural Theory in China", in Politics, Ideology, and Literary
Discourse in Modern China (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993),23-55,24.
12 Hu Feng, "Xianshi zhuyu zaijintian (Realism Today)," in Zai hunluan limian (Chongqing, 1943),9.
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people's collective subjectivity was used to undermine an individual subjectivity. In the
1980s, Li Zehou and many other intellectuals undertook the mission of reconstructing
subjectivity in Chinese culture, attempting to "distance cultural activity from political
reality by valorizing culture over and above other aspects of social life." 13 This
reconstruction in the cultural field, I would argue, is more a strategic way to secure a
room for the subjectivity of the intellectual group from the domain of the Party ideology.
Unfortunately, this effort ended with the traumatic 1989 incident in the Tian'anmen
Square.
Born as an attempt to undermine the dominance of the mass media in capitalist
society, Hall's model of "encoding/decoding" can be appropriated to a Chinese context,
examining the relationship between the subjectivity of Chinese audiences and the
ideological function of Chinese cinema at different historical periods. During the 1930s
and 1940s, the Japanese invasion led to a large-scale movement of "national salvation."
Hu Feng describes the genesis of artistic creation as "stemming from the struggle with the
real life of flesh and blood... in which the critics must grasp the social significance of the
object from its concrete, lively, and sensuous experience, and instill into this experience
the author's positive, affirmative, or negative viewpoint." This interaction between
subjectivity and the social conditions was not only embodied in works of realist literature,
but more vividly, in the left-wing film movement. Thanks to the subjective identification
between filmmakers and most audiences on issues of anti-feudalism and anti-
imperialism, left-wing films were enthusiastically received among the urbanites. In the
1950s and 1960s, the passion for socialist construction was effectively evoked in cinema.
13 Uu Kang, 1993,25.
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If we can argue that Mao partly succeeded in creating an ideological identification
between the masses and the Communist leadership to build a socialist society, then the
so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in post-1989 China has become a
problematic notion. One legacy of socialism is a full-denial of capitalism. Then how can
China practice capitalism while holding the flag of socialism? This ideological crisis
provides a rare interstice to view the ideological operation, especially when new
ideological messages are divergent from socialist legacy that the common people have
inherited. An "ideological jet lag," therefore, makes not only "negotiated reading" but
also "oppositional reading" in Hall's definition highly possible when Chinese audiences
watch "main melody" films.
Nostalgia for Socialism in Jiao Yulu
One of the first successful "main melody" films released after 1989 was Jiao Yulu
(1990), a biographical film based on areal life person. Jiao Yulu (1922 -1964) is a
Communist Party member. At the end of 1962, he was appointed the secretary of the
Party committee of Lankao County in the Henan Province where people were suffering
from waterlogged and alkalized soil. Jiao worked tirelessly to improve people's living
conditions; he died of liver cancer in 1964. After his story was propagandized by the
Xinhua Agency, the organ of the CCP, in 1966, Jiao became well known nationally as "a
good Party cadre." Part of the news report was included in high school textbooks for
years. According to this news report entitled "The Model of County Secretaries-Jiao
Yulu," Jiao brought with him The Selections ofMao Zedong to Lankao:
---------
277
He thinks, according to Chainnan Mao's instruction, in order to carry out all his
missions, one first of all must be familiar with the situation by investigation. 'No
investigation, no right to speak.' ...
He always feels that Comrade Mao Zedong's methods of going into the masses
and doing investigation are very important, so he decides to organize all the
cadres in the county to talk with the peasants, and solve difficulties with the
wisdom ofthe masses....
He says, when the masses are in big difficulties, CCP members should come to
them; when the masses need helps, they should take care of them and help them...
On his dying bed, he leaves his will: "I only have one request after my death.
Please send my body back to Lankao and bury me in the sand hill. I cannot
improve the sand condition, but I can see how you finish the task in future!,,14
The film Jiao Yulu tells the story of how Jiao devotes his life to people in the
Lankao County, much like what was told in the news report. It begins with the re-
location of Jiao's tomb in 1966, conducted in a local ritual. With black crows flying in
the sky, white mourning flags emerge from the horizon of the bared sand hill. Among the
wails and a heartbroken tune played by suona, a traditional Chinese musical instrument,
the only discernable voice is from an old man: "Come back, Secretary Jiao!" It shows
clearly that people are crying for a person who is already gone. Set in this mournful
atmosphere, the film recalls how Jiao worked in Lankao County until his death.
Jiao took up his position just after the three-year natural disaster (1959-1961). It is
understandable that this historical background is not clearly presented in the film since it
will damage the image of the CCP leadership. The situation in Lankao County, as
displayed in the film, was much worse than other parts of China because of its poor
natural conditions. The film shows that Jiao Yulu faces many problems-Party cadres are
eager to leave the destitute place, and common people are fleeing from famine. As the
new secretary of this county, Jiao has to fight against not only the natural disaster but also
14 This news report was written by Mu Qing, in collaboration with others, and published in People's Daily:
4 February 1966. Mu became the director of the Xinhua News Agency from 1982 to 1992.
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the dogmatist trend of other party cadres. In the film, Jiao visits an old sick woman,
saying, "I am your son. It is Chairman Mao who sends me to see you." Then he goes to
see an old herdsman, discussing ways to improve the alkalized soil. When many people
are starving, he risks his career to appropriate the administrative fund, buying and
distributing food to the starving people. His wife complains that he always thinks of
others first, never taking care of his own illness.
Jiao Yulu was in production before the Tian'anmen incident and released right
after it, winning all the important film awards in China. In addition to the government
Huabiao Awards, it was also the best picture winner of both the Golden Rooster and the
Hundred Flowers Awards. While the former is an award voted by film professionals, the
latter is decided by mass voting. The lead actor, Li Xuejian, won the best actor title of
both awards.
By concentrating on the love Jiao Yulu holds for his people and the love the
people have for him, the film successfully seizes the audiences' attention. Deeply moved
by the image of Jiao, a party cadre who wholeheartedly serves the people, many
audiences burst into tears while watching. Why is this film so popular and successful if it
is only a piece of propaganda? I would like to argue that one possible answer comes from
the common people's deep dissatisfaction with the status quo in 1990's China, especially
their great resentment towards corruption, which actually sparked the 1989 democratic
movement. The fact that so many cry for the death of Jiao doesn't mean that they
unconditionally identify with the "preferred reading" that has been encoded in the film
text, the positive image of the CCP member who serves the common people. Several
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biographical films based on deeds of good communist cadres were made in the 1990s.
For instance, Jiang Zhuying (1992) tells the story of a real life intellectual who devoted
his life to scientific research, and died in 1982. As a prominent optician who made great
contribution to China's scientific development, Jiang was admitted to Party membership
and received the title of "the national model" posthumously. Kong Fansen (1995) is
about another real life Party secretary who had worked in Tibet for many years and died
in a traffic accident in 1994. Neither was as successful as Jiao Yulu. One possible reason,
I will suggest, is because the party cadres in these films are not as symbolic as Jiao, "a
good party cadre" in Mao's socialist China when the issue of corruption was fully under
control. In an analysis on the social and cultural phenomena of "Mao Zedong Fever" at
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Dai Jinhua has pointed out that the
onset and peak of the fever "signifies an imaginary redemption and a nostalgic return to
the past.,,15 To some extent, Jiao Yulu can be regarded as a byproduct of the "Mao
Zedong Fever." The economic reforms after the Cultural Revolution led to a widespread
corruption in the 1980s. While the common people have no way to deal with the
corruption problem in reality, they resort to films such as Jiao Yulu to express strong
nostalgia for the socialist days and the "good Party cadre."
In the final shot of Jiao Yulu, the camera moves closer to Jiao who is coming
from the faraway horizon of the sand hill, then the background suddenly changes into a
green farm with modern agricultural machines, in which Jiao is coming closer again in
front of people holding red flags, and a voice-over singing "The CCP is our wholehearted
15 Dai Jinhua, "Redemption and Consumption: Depicting Culture in the 1990s," in Cinema and Desire:
Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work ofDai Jinhua (London & New York: Verso, 2002),
172-188,174.
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leader." The romanticized ending of this film contrasts sharply with the real social
situation, especially when Henan was still one of the poorest provinces in 1990s' China
where many peasants made a living by selling blood.
The social effect ofJiao Yulu can be seen in two aspects. As expected by the
Party, the film successfully channeled the resentment of the audience into nostalgia and
lament, especially through an overall mournful atmosphere that is constructed by several
heartbreaking crying scenes. Meanwhile, maybe unexpected to the Party, this film also
makes the audience feel more pain about the serious corruption problem they have to live
with in contemporary China. On the screen, audiences see the bright image of a model
party member that is already gone; out of the screen, news releases frequently expose
corrupt officials, most of them occupying high positions in the Party. It is easy to tell
which image is more applicable to people's real life. Thus it is easy to explain why some
audiences could keep a critical attitude to the official ideology when watching a "main
melody" film such as Jiao Yulu in tears. The contrast between the film text and the social
reality provides a chance for the audience to do a possible "negotiated reading" in which
the bright image of Jiao as represented in the film has been discounted by a not-so-bright
social reality.
Life and Death Decision: An Anti-corruption Triumph?
In 1994, as a pre-condition for China to join the WTO, Hollywood blockbusters
re-entered the Chinese film market. The co-existence of Hollywood blockbusters and
Chinese "main melody" films in the same sphere-the Chinese film market of the 1990s
has constructed a juxtaposition of two oppositional ideological systems. In terms of
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consumption, Hollywood films and Chinese "main melody" films have been viewed
differently, at least by most Chinese audiences, who identify the former as entertainment
and the latter propaganda. When the entertaining function of Hollywood films has been
taken for granted, the ideological messages encoded in the film text, working as an
invisible hand, will effectively indoctrinate the audiences. For example, Hollywood films
such as The Fugitive (1993) or Enemy ofthe State (1998) play more with the Chinese
audiences' imagination of American democracy and justice. In The Fugitive, the first
Hollywood blockbuster released in China in 1994, the wrongly convicted hero Dr.
Richard Kimble escapes from a prison bus and tries to find out who killed his wife. The
injustice that has been fallen on him will be exposed by his heroic individualism. In
Enemy ofthe State, when a successful labor lawyer Robert Clayton Dean finds himself on
the run from a corrupt NSA official and his men after receiving evidence to a politically
motivated murder, a game of cat and mouse begins. Dean turns to ex-NSA agent Brill for
help and protection. Working together, they find the exonerating information and release
it to the public. In numerous Hollywood productions like these two, although the hero is
framed by others, he or she can always find the way out and bring the criminal to justice.
In the Chinese context, however, Chinese audiences are often well aware that the
"main melody" film they are watching is a piece of propaganda, which means that its
ideological function has been exposed to some degree, if not fully. Therefore, they can
make a rather critical interpretation of the "preferred reading" that has been encoded in
the film text. In addition, a cinematic narration of the dark, corrupted force and its final
defeat by a brave protagonist with strong belief in notions such as democracy, freedom
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and equality is hardly seen in "main melody" films since the Party leadership cannot be
blasphemed. Individualist heroism is subject to collectivism. When the dark side is
defeated, it contributes to maintain the bright image of the Party leadership. Both the
reception context and the narrative feature decide that Chinese "main melody" films,
especially films involving contemporary political issues, will be read rather critically.
Shengsi Jueze (Life and Death Decision, 2000) was a film produced to promote
the CCP anti-corruption campaign. It is adapted from the novel Jueze (Decision, 1997).16
Based loosely on many identical events that happened in real life, which is far too
common in China, the novel paints an accurate picture of the rampant corruption in
China, namely, the "connection net." This novel won its author Zhang Ping the Fifth Mao
Dun Literature Award in 2001, the highest literature award in China. 17 In the novel, Li
Gaocheng is the mayor of the city of Haizhou. One day in early 1996, before the Chinese
New Year, workers ofa textile factory (where Li used to be chief) are in an uproar
because they have not received their salaries for months because the factory leaders have
stolen the money allocated to the factory in the name of reform. When the factory leaders
want to cover their dark secrets by declaring bankruptcy, workers begin to protest.
Initially, Li can't believe the team he selected is corrupt, but more and more evidence is
revealed, and the person who promoted Li to mayor turns out to be the senior backer of
this corrupt scheme. Furthermore, Li's beloved wife is involved in this conspiracy. What
16 This novel was first published in a literary journal Zhuomuniao (Woodpecker, 1997): vol. 2-4.
17 Zhang Pin is a writer from Xi'an. He is very good at portraying the anti-corruption struggle in
contemporary China. Before Decision, he has published Fahan Fenxi and Tianwang, both with
considerable success.
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will Li do? Will he risk his wife and boss to expose the truth behind the corrupt scandal?
Li is now facing a fatal decision...
"The appearance of Decision is not accidental. Last year when my colleagues and
me did interviews in several state-owned enterprises, it never happened to me that
workers were so enthusiastic about our interviewing.. .I always believe that literature
must actively exert its influence on the society and the people," said Zhang Ping, the
author of the novel. 18 Many writers like him have undertaken painstaking investigations
and managed to unearth corrupt details from local police, public prosecutors and judicial
officials. It was said that after Decision was published, Zhang received threatening letters
from enraged local officials, who believed he used them as models of the corrupt
characters in his work. But Zhang also got many encouraging letters for exactly the same
reason, attesting to how true-to-life the novel is. 19 In 1988, Decision was adapted into a
same-titled TV drama of 8 episodes and broadcasted by more than 100 TV stations.
The popularity ofDecision also attracted attention from people in the
Shanghai Film Group. In order to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the PRC, some in the
Group suggested adapting this novel into a film but others hesitated since they had never
dealt with such a political theme. Later, they received support from the Shanghai CCP
committee. As a matter of fact, the final approval of this film was also thanks to the
"connection net." After the Shanghai Film Studio finished a three-month postproduction
work, they realized that this film had little chance to pass the censorship board because
18 Zhang Pin, "Writing for the Common People Forever," in Decision (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe,
1997),254.
19 The TV series was directed by Chen Guoxing, the director of The Magnificent Birth.
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the cinematic representation of corruption was still too sensitive, so they managed to
hand it over to the Shanghai-rooted President Jiang Zemin. Since Jiang had stated many
times that anti-corruption was a big issue related to the life and death of the CCP, leaders
of the Shanghai Film Group decided to add "life-and-death" before "decision" in order to
highlight that anti-corruption was a party-approved issue.2° In order to support his
Shanghai fellows and show his determination of combating corruption, Jiang authorized
the film's national release. All members of the Political Bureau of the CCP watched this
film on August 8, 2000. Subsequently, CCP members at different local levels were
organized to watch this film.
The film opens with the worker protest in the textile factory, an event which is
hardly seen in any mass media reports in China despite the fact that it happens frequently
due to the high rate of unemployment in recent years and other social confrontations
between the people and the local government. The first climax in this film comes after Li
secretly visits a nightclub run by one of his brothers. It is U's wife who arranged Li's
brother this position through some factory leaders. Then Li interviews an old woman
worker in a privately owned textile factory, which is actually financed with funds and
equipment stolen from the state-owned enterprise. Not knowing of his identity, several
safeguards assault Li and pull him to the factory owners, most of who are cadres of the
state-owned enterprise. After regaining his consciousness from the coma, Li angrily
overturns their dinner table. Through a series of plots, Li is represented as a good Party
cadre who is innocent of his wife's involvement in corruption. However, this image is not
20 Ma Jianlong. "Shangying jituan dajueze (A Big Decision of the Shanghai Film Group)," Meiri xinbao: 22
August 2000, p.3.
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as persuasive as those party cadres who victimize the workers for their private economic
interests, especially when Li single-handedly fights with a group of corrupt cadres. As
expressed by one corrupt factory cadre, "if everyone is corrupted, then corruption does
matter anymore." The only cadre who does not join in the corrupt team is a young man.
But he has to collaborate with the team in order to protect himself. Later it turns out that
Li's promotion to mayor actually is a result of bribe by his men in the factory. A word
that is repeated in both the novel and the film is "collective corruption"-the connection
between factory leaders and some high-ranked Party officials, especially the vice
secretary of the province who has promoted Li.
Director Yu Benzheng admits that he has drawn inspiration from some real life
corruption cases to produce this film.2l Around the year of2000, many severe corruption
cases were disclosed to the public, partly because the Chinese media have begun to play
its role in supervising governmental officials, and partly because the CCP has to deal
with the rampant corruption. For example, many leading party officials, including the
former Vice-Minister of Public Security, were involved in the smuggling activities in
Zhanjian and Xiamen, especially in the well-known case of Lai Changxing. "We will
fight corruption unswervingly, unremittingly and without showing any tolerance or
mercy," President Jiang Zemin made the remarks in his interview with The New York
Times in 2001.22 According to the Xinhua Agency, China has begun to enhance its efforts
21 Yang Yang. "Dazao shengsijueze, fang daoyan Yu Benzhen (Directing Life and Death Decision: An
Interview ofYu Benzheng," Ha 'erbin ribao: 25 August 2000, p.6.
22 This interview was conducted on August 8 and published in People's Daily: 13 August 2001.
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to fight official corruption since 2000 and reported investigations of more than 134,000
cases and punishments given to 136,161 officials.23
Different from the novel, an interesting narrative in the film is the relationship
between Mayor Li and the Vice Party Secretary Yang Cheng. At the beginning of the
film, it seems that Li and Yang do not get along well since they are competing for the
same position of the Executive Party Secretary.24 A tension is built between Yang and Li
when Yang seems happy to see Li getting into trouble. Gradually they arrive at a
consensus that they have to work hand in hand to fight against the corrupt side. This
representation oftheir cooperation, to some extent, balances the cinematic narration
between the dark corrupt reality and a belief in the Party leadership, although it is hard to
tell if such cooperation would take place in real life. Another change is the revising of the
images of mayor Li' s wife and daughter. In the novel, Li' s wife is a corrupt party cadre.
Their daughter is a college student who spends most of her time in a far away university.
She is astounded to see that her parents are taking oppositional sides in the anti-
corruption campaign. In the film, however, Li has a mentally retarded daughter who
likes painting flowers. He does not know that the flowers sent to his house are very
precious and expensive. His wife takes care of the daughter, as well as her husband's sick
parents and poor brothers. She wants to save money for her daughter's future; therefore
she unintentionally gets her husband and herself into a dangerous situation. Just as Li
said, "I'm fighting against corruption outside, but the real corruption happens at my
home." Compared with the novel, the film offers a very sympathetic description ofLi's
23 Xinhua meiri dianxun (Xinhua Daily Telegraph): 17 June 2001, p.7.
24 In China, the mayor as an administrative leader is always below the party secretary.
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wife. After having realized that she has caused her husband much trouble, she asks for a
divorce and goes on to confess her crime. This changed image of Li' s wife offers a
special educational message for all party cadres' family members since one important
issue in the combat against corruption is to help the Party cadres better prevent their
spouses and children from being involved in corruption-related affairs. This is why in
some provinces not only the Party members but their families were required to watch this
film.
Like in all typical Hollywood narrations, the evil side will be executed at the end.
When the corrupt Vice Secretary wants to dismiss Li from his position, the provincial
boss comes back on time and announces: "No matter who has been involved in the
corruption case, and no matter what kind of difficulty we will encounter in dealing with
this case, we will arrest and sentence all those who deserve the legal punishment." Li
Zhun, an influential Chinese writer, and the vice president of the Association of Chinese
Writers, relates the success of Life and Death Decision to the literary debate of "singing
the praises and exposing the problems" that happened in the early 1980s. According to
him, as long as one grasps the essentials of his time, the spirit of the epoch, singing the
praises and exposing the problems actually do not conflict with each other. A
wholehearted praise of the real, good and beauty things is necessarily accompanied with a
vehement critique of the false, ugly and evil things, as well as a compelling exposure of
the corrupt things, and courage to face squarely the conflicts and confusions in the
reality?5 The paradoxical relation between "singing the praises" and "exposing the
25 Li Zhun. "Shengsijueze shi shidai de xuyao (Life and Death Decision is the need of time)," Huashang
bao (Chinese Business News): 5 September 2000.
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problems" constructs the dynamic of this film. If it comes only with "singing the praises,"
it cannot attract the audiences; if it only focuses on "exposing problems of corruption," it
has even a less chance to access the audience. In order to promote this film and help the
audience to watch it in the way ofthe "preferred reading," extensive propaganda work
was conducted nationwide through all kind of mass media. Among the numerous movie
reviews and related new reports, I found one entitled "Zhenhan, Guwu, Yihuo
(Astounded, Inspired and Confused)" echoes perfectly to Hall's theory of
encoding/decoding. It was published in Changjiang ribao (Yangzi River Daily), the party
organ in the Hubei province:
Anti-corruption is the primary concern of the common people. On August 18,100
citizens were organized to watch Life and Death Decision. They had very strong
feedback. According to the Film Company (in the Hubei Province) that organized
this activity, these 100 citizens' feedback on the significance of this film can be
generalized into three aspects: astounded, inspired and confused.
First of all, this film reflects the problem of reform in the state-run enterprise with
a very realistic, persuasive description of the reason of corruption and its social
damage, as well as the two sides of the struggle. It is very striking... ,Those
serious social problems have never been represented in film, so the audiences are
deeply astounded by the great courage of the film crew.
Secondly, the brave exposure and the reasonable examination of the corruption
can inspire many people. The concern from President Jiang after the film's release
is another inspiration. It symbols that the Party's big decision in carrying out the
anti-corruption campaign to serve the people.
The third is confusions besides the good reviews. Question one: Do we have a
good mayor in our real life as mayor Li in the film? Question two: If we could
have such a good mayor, will there be a good provincial party secretary who will
fight against the corruption, too? Will it be too coincidental? Question three: At
the end of the film, the provincial party secretary solves the serious corruption
issue with a few sentences, which gives the audiences an impression that China is
still in the phase of "Renzhi (a few people's governance)" rather than "Fazhi (a
legal system)"....26
26 Zhai Xiaolin. "Zhenhan, guwu, yihuo, guangzhong kan shengsi jueze (Astounded, Inspired and Confused,
Audiences Watching Life and Death Decision)," Changjiang ribao (Yangzi River Daily): 24 August 2000.
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This report displays vividly how the audience can read the film differently from the
"preferred reading." Only part of the "astounded" can be categorized as the "preferred
reading" since their astounding is not only comes from the courage of the film crew in
exposing the issue of corruption, but also the first cinematic representation of this very
issue. Maybe some audiences feel "inspired" by the highest party leader's decision of
combating corruption, but how to carry out the campaign is not promising for most
audiences, shown clearly in their confusion. From astounded to inspired and confused,
although these three different reactions have been refined rhetorically in order to fit the
propaganda tone, one still can sense that rather than accepting the "preferred reading" as
expected by the Party organ, audiences can still actively question the credibility of the
"preferred reading" according to their real social experience, especially when "collective
corruption" has become an omnipresent social phenomenon in China.
Another movie review published in Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing Youth News), a
Youth League owned newspaper where Party control is not as strict as those provincial
Party organs, brings the confusion to a more suspicious level:
What is corruption? How much do the common people know about it? What they
see is the shut down of their beloved factories and their fate of being laid-off. Life
becomes worse and worse. What is the reason for this poor situation? It is related
with the overall economic situation. However, what is fearful is not the natural
disasters but those committed by man! Look at those fat rats. They are frequent to
the luxurious places by group. What they are drinking is people's blood, what
they are eating is people's flesh. The poor workers have no way to sue them since
they have built an intimate connection net. It is just like a moth seeking its own
doom. Haven't you see even the mayor is beat so terribly in the film when he is
mistaken as a common people? In order to break the connection net, mayor Li
combats his intimate fellows, his boss and his wife. What kind of courage and
self-sacrifice spirit does he have? Could he do this in reality? Those who have
promoted him can dismiss him very easily. Without power, he can punish nobody.
The only one that will be punished is himself. Film is an art of idealism. But Life
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and Death Decision can aroused great echoes among the people, which speaks to
the fact that people hate the corruption so much... They are expecting. Hopefully
when they walk out of the dark cinema, a bright blue sky is waiting for them.,,27
If a publicly published movie review can be as critical as this one, then what is the
general response from the audiences that cannot appear in any newspapers and TV news
programs? One won't be too surprised to find that many said, "I finally know how
corrupt they are!" Compared with the end in which justice has long arms, what attracts
the audiences the most is the detailed, sometimes dramatic description of the corrupt
Party cadres, which speaks to the fact that audiences can have their own choice to decide
which message they will accept and which they will refuse within a given text. An
interesting episode about this film is, in order to warn potential investors or merchants of
the corrupt tactics practiced by Chinese officials, Life and Death Decision was aired in
Taiwan and Hong Kong, the top two major investors in China.
Since Deng Xiaoping launched China's economic reform in the late 1970s, the
Chinese economy has been growing at an exceedingly high rate, and corruption crimes
have become more and more widespread. The average social wealth loss in each
corruption case has become more and more substantial. Although the Party has put more
energy in solving this issue such as raising the salaries of the civil servants to prevent
corruption, the overall situation has deteriorated day by day. Worker protests and local
conflicts cannot be reported in Chinese media. For example, one of the official
documents issued by the Central Department ofPropaganda clearly states that all news
media cannot report the suicides of laid-off workers, especially women workers. Instead,
27 Ding Xin. "Huashuo shengsi jueze: laobaixing de hushing (On Life and Death Decision: Call from the
Common People)", Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing Youth News): 1 September 2000.
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what have appeared in media coverage are stories of how laid-off women workers
become "female bosses." Many books that portrayed the dark insidious side of corruption
were published, and banned immediately. Being circulated in the underground book
market, these books further intensify the common people's voyeurism.
The Party censorship on TV production, compared with that on filmmaking, is
less strict. In the 1990s, several TV drama series featuring the issue of corruption have
been well received, yet more in the thriller genre. Beside the abovementioned Decisions,
based on the corruption case that occurred at Beijing Capital Steel Company, a "main
melody" TV series Hongse kangnaixin (The Red Carnation, 2001) was broadcast with
great popularity. As the genre soon proved to be profitable in the market, and more and
more writers tackled the theme and joined in the production of TV series, debates began.
Critics worried that some works could arouse uncomfortable feelings because writers
always adopted a naturalistic way to describe corruption. Also under the theme of
"fighting corruption," some writers focused more on specific political tricks and
administrative schemes. This trend attracted attention from the Central Department of
Propaganda. As a result, a ban was extended to all TV dramas focusing on corruption
issues. Under such circumstances, thanks to the special authorization from President
Jiang, Life and Death Decision collected the biggest box office revenue in 2000.
However, no film featuring the theme of corruption has been produced after Lift and
Death Decision despite big box office potential, which reveals the Party's uneasiness
with the audience's possible "negotiated readings" and "oppositional readings." In the
field of TV production, instead of the anti-corruption theme, TV series ofrevolutionary
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history have gradually adopted the thriller genre, especially in some anti-spy series such
as Hongse zhuijiling (Red Wanted Order, 2002) and Ruci duojiao (So Splendid, 2004),
both featuring the anti-spy struggle between the CCP and the KMT in the beginning years
ofthe PRe.
Intervening the Encoding Process
The theoretical turn from an irresistible ideological interpellation towards an
emphasis on spectatorship or readership marks a significant step in studying the issue of
subjectivity. The spectator is no longer framed in passive subjectivity. Rather, he/she can
offer active readings of the ideological messages offered by the text. This is exactly what
has happened in Jiao Yulu, Life and Death Decision and many other Chinese "main
melody" films with successful market performance. An absolutely passive spectatorship
could not explain the popularity of these Chinese "main melody" films.
What is very valuable about Hall's "encoding/decoding" model can be observed
through comparisons with his coevals and followers. Traditional Marxist theorists tend to
emphasize the role of mass media in the reproduction of the status quo, in contrast to
liberal pluralists who emphasize the role of the media in promoting diversified speeches.
Richard Dyer's essay Entertainment and Utopia (1977) put the issue of subjectivity on
the agenda of cultural studies through his research on the Hollywood musical and the
entertainment industry as a whole. He argues that Hollywood musicals can express the
audience's real needs for a utopian society, and the unusual characteristics of the
entertainment industry lie in that the subordinate groups could play important roles in the
development and definition of entertainment. Dyer's recuperation of entertainment has
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helped pave the way for cultural populism. Later, John Fiske launches a postmodernist
celebration of an unlimited subjectivity, in which audiences are seen as capable of
appropriating the media in an infinite variety of ways according to their prior needs and
dispositions. As he argues:
How actual audience groups actively use television as part oftheir own cultures-
that is, use it to make meanings that are useful to them in making sense of their
own social experiences and therefore ofthemselves.2s
This utopian notion of resistance goes beyond the parameters of dominant
ideology, which leads him to conclude that "exploring the strategies by which
subordinate subcultures make their own meaning in resistance to the dominant is
currently one of the most productive strands of cultural studies.,,29 What has been
underestimated in his argument is that the encoding process, to a great extent, limits
possible ways of decoding.
In comparison, what insightful of Hall's "encoding/decoding" model is that he
rejects both traditional Marxist and liberal pluralists by standing between the
base/superstructure formulation and the subjectivity of the receiver. As a neo-Marxist,
Hall sees the media as part of an ideological arena where various class ideas are fighting.
At the same time, he does not ignore the various ways in which audiences use mass
media although these ways are still confined by the overall ideological structure. In other
words, the subjectivity is always one that cannot totally break away from the ideological
net. How to maintain a position for political intervention is a main concern in cultural
studies, in consonant with its Marxist origin. Hall seeks to avoid the totalizing over-
28 John Fiske, 1992, 300.
29 John Fiske, 1992, 304.
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determinism of psychoanalytic theory and Althusserian-based concepts of ideology in
which the subject is interpellated by the ideologies that constitute that person. Then, what
kind of radical politics could be offered by Hall's "encoding/decoding" model? In my
point of view, if the filmmaker can make the best use of the discrepancy between the
encoding system and the decoding ends, it will make both "negotiated readings" and
"oppositional readings" highly possible. However, it requires filmmakers to be not only
good at using the cinematic language but also familiar with the common people's social
experiences.
As I have mentioned earlier, in order to compete with Hollywood, the CCP
government has begun to co-operate with some Fifth and Sixth generation filmmakers in
producing more successful "main melody" films, both politically and commercially. For
many filmmakers, to get financial support from the government is also important, which
lays the ground for collaboration. Li Shaohong, an important female director from the
Fifth Generation, is one of those who began to work with official approva1.30 However,
this by no way leads to a full identification between filmmakers and the government. For
instance, the cinematic representation of nationalist discourse, as I discussed in Chapter 5,
serves the Party and the intellectual group differently. Li Shaohong's "main melody" film
Xingfu dajie (Happy Street, 1997) further shows how the director can suggest possible
"oppositional readings" through certain narrative strategies.
30 As one of the growing numbers offemale directors in China, Li Shaohong has produced not only a few
successful films but also many popular TV dramas. Her early works include Yinshe mousha'an (Silver
Snake Case, 1988), Xuese qingchen (Bloody Morning, 1990), Sishi buhuo (Family Portrait, 1992), and
Hongfen (Blush, 1994). Li has received praise from audiences and critics alike meriting her China's best
female director.
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Happy Street tells a story of a laid-off worker in Beijing. The term "laid-off' in
China is commonly known as "xiagang" or lost one's job. In news media, this disastrous
event has been represented as an opportunity to venture into individual business success,
and those who fail are labeled as lazy people who cannot adjust to the new environment.
In the field of literature, the so-called "realism returning on horseback" shares the same
opinion through a theme of "sharing hardships with the nation," as termed by Dai
Jinhua.31 When the laid-off female workers finally become visible, they are represented
as bearers of all misfortunes that could happen to them, and being laid-off is just one
episode. This kind of melodramatic representation greatly distracts the reader's attention
away from the serious social problem.
Happy Street to some extent obeys this convention, but it is also slightly different
from those realistic novels. In Happy Street, a worker has been laid off and he cannot
face telling his wife that he has lost his job. He pretends to go to work everyday.
Elements of social criticism are overwhelmed by a sentimentalist description of the poor
couple. However, the laid-off husband seems not to be the protagonist of the film,
especially when his wife steps in as the narrator. It is a story of a laid-off husband, but it
is narrated by his wife. This strategy is of great significance especially when the voice of
the laid-off women workers is hardly heard in the mass media during the mid 1990s. By
narrating a laid-off man's experience through the eyes of his wife, the voice of laid-off
women workers emerges on the screen in disguise.
31 Dai Jinhua, "Invisible Writings" in Cinema and Desire: Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the
Work ofDai Jinhua (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 213-234.
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As the story goes, the wife, who works in a meatpacking factory, offends the
factory leader. The director gives many clues that she will likely be laid-off soon.
However, she is rewarded 200 yuan instead because she has bravely defended the
factory's interest in the black market. The unexpected reward won't prevent the audience
from thinking in another way: what if she is laid-offtoo, after her husband? The film
ends with a confession from the wife: "This is my story. The director lets me to tell the
story in this way. I have more to say, but the director said this is enough." This ending
voice can be read as an ironic confession of the director herself under the censorship of
the government: "this is the story told as required by the government, although I have
more to say, but the government obviously won't allow it." It leaves the audience to
imagine what else the director wants to tell. Actually the title of this film is ironic, too.
There is nothing happy about this poor couple throughout the film although they live on
Happy Street. The notion of "happiness" is directly related to the legitimacy of the CCP,
since one promise of the Party is to make people live happily. Happy Street was censored
for a long time before its final release on July 1998 under a new title, Hong xifu (Red
Suit). The red suit in the film is bought by the wife as a birthday gift for her husband.
Western suit in China is generally a dress code for successful businessmen. However, as
we can see, the husband has no chance to make big money. The husband has no chance to
wear the suit, especially when he finally finds job as a bike repairman on the street.
Before he decides to take this job, he has been working in a hotel as a restroom waiter.
When a rich customer asks him to tie his pants, the husband angrily quits the job.
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Therefore, the red suit becomes ironic too, symbolizing a dream of the ordinary people
that can never be actualized.
In the process of encoding, as we can see, the director makes efforts to undermine
the "preferred reading." Despite the long censorship it has undergone, as a film that
expresses social concerns on the laid-off workers, this film was still awarded a
governmental Huabiao award. Although its box office performance was not good, at least
it shows the possibility that filmmakers can actively intervene in the encoding process to
offer the audience possibilities to read "main melody" films critically.
The efforts in constructing a national identity, both for its citizen and its culture,
informs a continue struggle of the Chinese nation-state in the international order that is
established by the dominant Western powers. The Chinese film industry was a product of
semi-colonial modernity, and a persistent resistance to the very semi-colonial situation
accompanied its development. Socialist cinema has played an important role in the CCP's
pursuit of socialist modernity that is de-linked from the capitalist world. The advent of
globalization only intensifies the process since both the ideological and psychological
demand for maintaining a stable national identity becomes more urgent than before.
Film productions in 1990s' China can be divided into three categories:
government-sponsored "main melody" films, private-invested entertainment films, and
art cinema. As propaganda has remained a major mission ofthe film industry, dramatic
changes have happened to what was categorized as propaganda. In her study titled
"Media, Market, and Democracy in China," Zhao Yuezhi suggests a new broadened
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concept of ideology with a critical examination of the intertwining ofParty control and
market forces in the Chinese news media. According to her, ideology in contemporary
China is "an active practice operation on the level ofcommon sense and everyday
consciousness and discourses, rather than as merely an explicit and static set of
doctrines.,,32 Besides "main melody" films, TV drama, stage drama, literature, and even
revolutionary song are all influential ideological state apparatus of the Party hegemony.
Sometimes they have interactive relations with the "main melody" film productions. In
terms of film production, while there was a clear boundary between "main melody" films
and entertainment films during the 1980s, more and more "semi-main melody" films
have been produced since 2000, aiming at both commercial and ideological
achievements. Both "main melody" films and "semi-main melody" films are productions
in China's pursuit of a global modernity
The most important characteristic of the film medium is its ability to combine
entertainment with education and propaganda, and this characteristic becomes more
salient in the global era, as embodied vividly by Chinese "main melody" films. Different
ideological messages in "main melody" film do not simply complement each other. More
often than not, they are contradictory and logically inconsistent. While The Great
Decisive War focuses on Party leaders, Days without Lei Feng goes in the opposite
direction by creating the image of the ordinary person. In My 1919, the staging of an
individual at a major historical event hints a bankruptcy of socialist collectivism; while
the cinematic representation of Chinese masculinity in Griefover the Yellow River
32 Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 5.
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reclaims the collective subjectivity vis-a.-vis American individualism. The mechanism of
ideology in "main melody" film is characterized by these conflictions, which is exactly
how ideology works. These conflictions, on the other hand, also create interstices to
observe the operation of ideology, therefore makes ideological criticism a meaningful
intellectual challenge.
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APPENDIX
THE CHll'JESE CINEMA HUABIAO AWARDS
(r:p III E~Jr~~*~)
The Huabiao Awards is based on the Excellent Film Awards by the Ministry of
Culture ()(1t-tflHj[;*~Jt~). It began in 1957. After 22 years intermission, it was
resumed since 1979, as an annual award. In 1985, the Film Bureau of the Ministry of
Culture was reorganized into the Ministry of Broadcasting, Film, and Television (MBFT),
and this award was renamed as the Excellent Film Awards of the MBFT. It has been
renamed as the Huabiao Awards (Palace Columns Awards, ~*~) since 1994. From
1994, the Chinese government awards 10 feature films along with other categories
produced in the previous year.
Films mentioned in this dissertation are marked by * with English title.
1989-1990
Best Feature Films:
Kaiguo dadian (The Founding Ceremony) *00*.*
Jiao yulu (Jiao Yulu) ~:nH**
Baise qiyi S ~Jt9x
Longnian Jingguan :ftiF~'§
Laodian ;;tm
Tequ dagongmei t~[R1TIMc
Jianu zhenqing 11~t~J{I~~
Dachengshi 1990 *~rn 1990
Lianshou jingtan ~~t¥~:J*
Zhongguo bawanghua r:p 00 IA I1-t:
Douji 4x%
Duminghan ~-6P¥JZ.
Beijing nizao ~~J?-, 1{J\1f!.
Huanghe yao ~}pJ~
Nihao taipingyang '(f]\~T' ::t3fr:¥:
Baiqiu'en: yige yingxiong de chengzhang S :1<J~,: -1-~1liEnp)(;*
Best Documentaries:
Zhou enlai (Zhou Enlai) )WJ J~,* *
Leifeng shishui? (Who is Lei Feng?) m~fi!:il? *
1991
Best Feature Films:
Dajuezhan (The Great Decisive War) :A~~*
Zhou enlai (Zhou Enlai)mJJ~,* *
Kaitian pidi (The Birth ofa New Age) 3f~,8¥±-fu*
Mao zedong he tade erzi (Mao Zedong and His Son) :B¥l:*~01tBEt''1)L-=f*
Guonian :ctif
Juezhan zhihou~~JGZ)§
Liehuo jingang ~!~*~~U
Qingsa pujiang t~~¥mrr
shijie wuji de taiyang t!tJf.~1fEt''1*~B
Gaopeng manzuo f.§jM1~~
Xinxiang 1L.,j:
1992
Best Feature Films:
Jiang zhuying (Jiang Zhuying) ~if[~*
Queli renjia 1Wi] lIL1\.*
Liu shaoqi de sishisi tian xJjj>~ Et''1 [9+ [g~
Zhanzhile bie paxia MHT, jJrJ W~r
Zhongguo ren 9:J ~A
1993
Best Feature Films:
Fenghuang qin p&.m~
Chongqing tanpan :l:JJ(i3t~~IJ
Donggui yingxiongzhuan *Y3~ME1t
Diyi youhuo ~-i*~
Paobing shaoxiao ~§~j>t51
1994
Best Feature Films:
Beigao shanggangye *Bl15 WfI :fJ-
Dandao wuhen (Traceless Bullet) 5~i!!3Gm *
Bum huihuang ~A%*~~
Liucun chakan OOf1~~
Yijia liangzhi (Two Systems in One Family) -*~ftU*
Tianwang~ Iij
Juejing fengsheng ~tg:lj:ii1:
Jinghun i?~
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Best Foreign Film:
The Fugitive t:$::R¥JI*
1995
Best Feature Films:
Kong fansen (Kong fansen) fL~~*
YingjiaA*
Qiqi shibian -t-t$~
Shibing de rongyu ±~8<J5R1t
Xingfangban zhuren 1j§ ijj1}±1f
Jiuxiang tLw
Hong yingtao (Red Cherries) U~tJE*
Best Documentary:
Jiaoliang (Bout) ~;. - -m~ll¥)MJG%~~*
1996
Best Feature Films:
Dazhuanzhe (The Great Turning Point) *~1JT*
Hoilghe gu (Red River Valley) ~I¥PJ1§-*
Xilian %Jl
Fuchang qihe xPI§~;fIJ
Likai Lei feng de rizi (Days without Lei Feng)~3fiIH~8<J B-1-*
Nanhun nujia ~ ~'ti--jxfJ*.
Yihanjiemeng ~~~!Mi
Junsao ~P!l
Qingnian Uu bocheng 1f~)(IHBjf(
Yi keshu -;f;W:~
1997
Best Feature Films:
Yapian zhanzheng (The Opium War) Jf~Jt~%*
Dajinjun (The Great Military Advance)**,*: }g~*1ffim*
Anju ~Ji5
Yidai tianjiao Chengji sihan -1~::R:mp)tEJi!j,¥f
Reshi shengfei ~$1:~~
Hei yanjing (The Colors of Blind) ~§lUw*
Changzheng (Long March) *:fiE*
Hong xifu (Red Suite, aka Happy Street) ~I1ffiE~*
Dengta shijia n*tf:I:*
Feichang aiqing ~~1t~'tff
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Best Documentary:
Zhou enlai waijiao fengyun (Legend of Zhou Enlai) JWJ J~,*jrrjt}x\'-E*
1998
Best Feature Films:
Chuntian de kuangxiang (Rhapsody ofSpring);g:~(jI,Jll~l!*
Nan funu zhuren ~ ~(=r:3z:3::11
Shiji zhimeng tt!:~cz.J#
Kuaile laojia '~*~*
Yige dou buneng shao -1-t~/G~~d>
Guyuan qiuse ~lmtk'@,
Bujian busan /G~/G~
Longfei fengwu :ft~P&.~
Liangxin ~ IG\
Shanghai jishi J:~~c:jJ
Best Foreign Film:
Save the Private Ryan t?R*!x:=*~IifflJ~l*
1999
Best Feature Films:
Hengkong chushi (The Magnificent Birth) f~~ ill tt!:*
Dajinjun II (The Great Military Advance II) =*Jit~: =*~?¥?#L*
Guoge (National Anthem)OOgJ.x*
Jinji pojiang (Crash Landing) ~;§i§.~*
Wode 1919 (My 1919) ft(jI,J 1919*
Huanghe juelian (Grief over the Yellow River) .¥PJ~1g~*
Wode fuqin muqin ftB<]X:~-BJ:~
Nushuai nanbing :3z:yrjJ~~
Chongtian feibao (Flying Leopard) {lf~~$~ *
Sai10ng duojin .:ft~fm
Best Animation:
Baoliandeng (The Magic Lotus Lantern) ~~n*
Best Documentary:
Dongfangjuxiang (Explosion in the East)*1J§U[Qj*
2000
Best Feature Films:
Shengsijueze (Life and death Decision) 1:.JE:r.::R:1¥*
Xiangban rongyuan if§{*"7jdZli
Zhenxin J{.IG\
Yueyuanjinxiao J3 [Q1]~1!f
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Yingxiong Zheng chenggong ~1l11J~~px:r;i]
Mao zedong yu sinuo ::§~:f:*~1JT1!
Cailian dangkongwu ~~ff 3:S::~
Zhan tianyou (Zhan Tianyou) 1ix1t!*
Zuochu xiaoyan de nushen :IE te 1i~~~ EJ<J :9:f$
Zuoguo yandong :lEiiF4:-
2001
Best Feature Films:
Mao zedong zai 1925 ::§~*:ff 1925
Chongchu yamaxun (Charging out Amazon) J1P te]E~~*
Beishui yizhan 1t7.K-M
Shengzhen changkong JE_*:S::
Tianshang caoyuan XL1jr1*
Faguan mama yt;;B'~JJ;~JJ;
Lizhi hongle ~tttt7
Miandui shengming OOX11:iP
Gaoyuan rumeng ~JJR~P~
Geda meilin p-i:itfilJr#
Best Foreign Film:
Pearl Harbor ~~m*
2002
Best Feature Films:
Jintao hailang'Ojt~~~y~
Deng xiaopin x~/J'f
Meili de dajiao ~BB l¥J*W;~
Shouxi zhixingguan l¥rfft fA1r B'
Shijie shang zuiteng wode nageren na qule tttJl1- L~W,fJtEJ<Jjj~1- A~~* 7
Ku'erban dashu shang beijing Wj]\**mzL~~*
Zhou enlai wanlong zhixing Ji!fJ }~BR7J~iZ 1r
He ni zai yiqi %pf{J\:ff-JE9
Nuanchun a-i~
Special Award:
Yingxiong (Hero) ~llt*
2003
Best Feature Films:
Taiwan wangshi r5'¥>~tt¥
Tiandi yingxiong x±m~llt
Jingxin dongpo 'OjtIL.\Z9JI3l
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Canlan de jijie 1t1J1~En*11
Sanshiba du --=.+)\.fj[
Yi'an zhonghun *jt~~~~
Xintiao motuo i~\~E~Jm
NuanSj
Nuoma de shiqisui it;E~En+--t~
Mao zedong qu anyuan ·:€d~*"**¥Jj
2004
Best Feature Films:
Yilun mingyue -~~jj
Ren changxia 11:*~
Wode falanxi suiyue fltEn¥!~Iffi~ jj
Deng xiaoping 1928 5<~/J\f 1928
Zheng peimin J$:t-g:~
Huayao xinniang 1tJJltJT~f{
Fengqi yunyong )XUE9-z?¥ffl
Keke xiIi -PY-iJJIffiII
Chenmo de yuanshan mJJEn:®ill
Zhang side *}i!!,q~
2007
Best Feature Films:
Taihang shan shang *1]- ill J:
Dongjing shenpan *J?-:'Efi!#IJ
Wode changzheng fit En*1iE
Yunshui shao -z?7](ii
Qianli zou danqi T llJE1f!.~
Xiaoxiang zongli /J\~ ,tl,J][
Biena ziji budang ganbu j]IJ:$: § B/F -ili-=f$
Shangxiang shuji ill J; 4518
Shengsi tuofu 1-:JEfE11
Xiangbala xinshi ~ E.:til1*1t
Best Co-production:
Baohulu de mimi (The Secret of the Magic Gourd) ~itl'lpEn~M* *
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